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Abstract 
Recent research in science indicates that we are living in a fine-tuned universe. Only a very small 
parameter space of universal fundamental constants in Physics is congenial for the existence of life. 
Moreover, recent studies in Biological evolution also reveal that fine-tuning did exist in the evolution. It 
seems that we are so lucky to exist as all universal fundamental constants and life-permitting factors 
really fall into such a very small life-allowing region. This problem is known as the fine-tuning problem. 
Does this phenomenon need an explanation? Can the fine-tuning problem point to the existence of God? 
Modern Science invokes the idea of multiverse to address the fine-tuning problem. Some scientists 
suggest that each universe in a set of infinitely many universes contains a typical set of fundamental 
constants. We should not be surprised why our universe is fine-tuned because we would not exist if the 
constants are not the life-allowed values. Some suggest that the existence of God can explain this fine-
tuning problem. The naturalistic multiverse theory and the existence of God are the two most robust 
proposals to address the fine-tuning problem. Moreover, some argue that the fine-tuning problem is not 
real because we are just subject to observational selection effect. In this thesis, I will provide a 
comprehensive discussion on the fine-tuning phenomena in our universe. In particular, I will use the 
confirmation principle and the inference to the best explanation simultaneously to evaluate different 
hypotheses in a more systematic way and give some of the new and updated scientific and philosophical 
arguments to respond to the recent criticisms of the fine-tuning arguments. I conclude that the theistic 
hypothesis is the best among all to address the fine-tuning problem. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
Many centuries ago, people believed that our natural world is designed by a designer. For example, the 
Stoic school founded by Zeno around 300 BCE suggested that the universe exhibits a great deal of order, 
which must be the result of intelligent agency.1 This is one of the most primitive forms of the “Design 
Argument” or “Teleological Argument”. Although there were some other contributions from Augustine 
and Boethius in a few centuries later, the Stoic school basically dominates the major idea of the Design 
Argument.2  
Until the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas offered five arguments for the existence of God, which is known 
as the “Five Ways”. The famous Fifth Way suggests that “we see that things which lack knowledge, such 
as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the 
same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that they achieve their end not by chance, but 
by design.”3 It is a posteriori in that it appeals to experience in order to establish that inanimate things act 
towards a goal.4  
Later, in 1716, A Dutch mathematician called Bernard Nieuwentyt published a book on natural theology, 
which further improves the Design Argument.5 Nieuwentyt suggests that only intelligent agency can 
produce systems of parts interacting strictly by mechanical means and having all of the following 
properties: 1. The interacting parts together accomplish a useful function; 2. The function is repeatedly or 
continuously produced by this arrangement of parts; 3. Altering any one part destroys the ability of the 
system to serve the useful function. Since the above properties can be found in many parts of our natural 
world, there exists a designer.6 The argument from Nieuwentyt basically follows the major ideas from 
Stoic school. Nevertheless, Nieuwentyt identifies some similarity between the natural world and a watch, 
and he focuses more on the term “function”.  
                                                          
1 Benjamin Jantzen, An Introduction to Design Arguments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.38. 
2 Ibid, p.51. 
3 Thomas Aquinas, “The Classical Cosmological Argument”, The Philosophy of Religion Reader, ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), p.195. 
4 Benjamin Jantzen, An Introduction to Design Arguments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.57. 
5 Bernard Nieuwentyt, The Religious Philosopher; or, the Right Use of Contemplating the Works of the Creator, 
trans. John Chamberlayne (London: J. Senex and W. Taylor, 1721). 
6 Benjamin Jantzen, An Introduction to Design Arguments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp.69-
71. 
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In 1802, a theologian William Paley published his work on natural theology, which suggests that our 
complex natural world and life reveal a designer.7 He thought that it is hard to think that there exists a 
complex watch without any watchmaker. By the same analogy, it is also hard to think that the complex 
features of our natural world and biological organisms are not designed by a designer.8 His argument can 
be viewed as the argument from analogy:9 
Organisms are like watches with respect to properties P1, P2, P3,…, Pn. 
Watches have designers. 
__________________________________________________________ 
Organisms have designers. 
 
On the other hand, Paley’s argument can also be viewed as follow: The surprising properties found in a 
living thing can be explained by design and chance. Under the hypothesis of design, the properties of the 
living thing are much more probable than under the hypothesis of chance.10  
 
Generally speaking, from Stoic school to Paley’s argument, the major idea of the Design Argument is 
based on the existence of natural order and certain complex mechanisms in living things. I regard all the 
above mentioned design arguments versions of the “Classical Design Argument”. However, the Classical 
Design Argument was strongly criticized by many philosophers and scientists such as Hume and Darwin 
in the 18th and 19th centuries. For examples, Hume denies that the existence of a designer could be derived 
from the existence of natural order. He says “that order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes is 
not, of itself, any proof of design, but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that 
principle. For aught we can know a priori, matter may contain the source or spring of order originally, 
within itself, as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements, 
from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that their 
ideas, in the great, universal mind, from a like internal, unknown cause, fall into that arrangement.” 11 
This counterargument is further supported by the discovery of biological evolution. Charles Darwin 
proposes an alternative mechanism for generating the “natural order” that appears in organisms. Through 
                                                          
7 William Paley, “The Classical Design Argument”, The Philosophy of Religion Reader, ed. (New York: Routledge, 
2008), pp.251-255. 
8 William Paley, “The Classical Design Argument”, The Philosophy of Religion Reader, ed. (New York: Routledge, 
2008), pp.251-252. 
9 Benjamin Jantzen, An Introduction to Design Arguments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.125. 
10 Ibid, p.129. 
11 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and Other Writings, ed. Dorothy Coleman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.22-23 
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competitions among organisms and natural selection, some complex adaptations and behavior could be 
generated. After a long period of time, a certain complex properties in organisms would be formed.  In 
other words, complex feature does not entail the requirement of design.  
As a result, many modern philosophers and scientists deny this Classical Design Argument based on the 
counterarguments from Hume and Darwin. Nevertheless, some interesting discoveries in modern science 
give rise to a modern form of design argument.  For example, recent research in science indicates that we 
are living in a fine-tuned universe. Only a very small parameter space of universal fundamental constants 
in physics is congenial for the existence of life.12 Moreover, recent studies in biological evolution also 
reveal that fine-tuning did exist in the evolution.13 It seems that we are so lucky to exist as all universal 
fundamental constants and life-permitting factors really fall into such a very small life-allowing region. 
These phenomena are known as the fine-tuning phenomena. Basically, the definition of fine-tuning can be 
formulated as follow (by Saward).14 
Definition of fine-tuning: A universe Φ is fine-tuned for life if there is some constant σ in a physical law 
of Φ, such that 
1. The range of values of σ compatible with the existence of life (life-permitting range) is much 
smaller than the range of possible values of σ; 
2. σ is within the life-permitting range; 
3. Φ is life-permitting. 
Traditionally, the fine-tuning phenomena mainly focus on the fundamental constants and life-permitting 
range. However, the effects of the fundamental constants also depend on the initial conditions (see 
chapter 4). Therefore it is also very important to consider the fine-tuned conditions for life. Besides, if we 
further focus on the “intelligence-permitting range”, some more fine-tuned parameters and conditions 
have to be considered. Therefore, we can enlarge the fine-tuning phenomena by including the evolution of 
intelligence, especially the evolution of human beings. Based on the above reasons, the new definition of 
fine-tuning can be stated as follow. 
New definition of fine-tuning: A universe Φ is fine-tuned for intelligent life if there is some constant σ or 
condition η in a physical law of Φ, such that 
                                                          
12 See Alister McGrath, A Fine-Tuned Universe (Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009). 
13 See Michael Denton, Nature’s Destiny (New York: The Free Press, 1998). 
14 Mark Saward, “Fine-tuning as Evidence for a Multiverse: Why White is Wrong,” International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 73 (2013):243-253. 
4 
 
1’.   The range of values of σ or the condition η compatible with the existence of intelligent life 
(intelligent-life-permitting range) is much smaller than the range of possible values of σ or η; 
2’.   σ or η is within the intelligent-life-permitting range; 
3’.   Φ is intelligent-life-permitting. 
For the statement 1’, the range of σ or the condition η for intelligent life being smaller than the possible 
values of σ or η means that the probability of getting the intelligent-life permitting σ or η is very small. 
Therefore, the statement 1’ can be re-stated as “the probability of getting the intelligent-life permitting 
range σ or η is very low”. If a certain condition is highly specific (i.e. many strict and specific 
requirements are needed), the probability of getting this condition by chance would be very low, and I 
regard this condition as a fine-tuned condition.   
The fine-tuning phenomena can be addressed by two worldviews: theistic worldview and naturalistic 
worldview. In the theistic worldview, God designs and creates the universe in order to allow life to be 
evolved on Earth. Therefore, the existence of God explains why our universe is fine-tuned. This modern 
form of design argument does not build on analogy, but on certain analytical and philosophical 
arguments. For example, Richard Swinburne uses confirmation principle (see chapter 2) to show that the 
fine-tuning phenomena can be best explained by a theistic worldview (see chapter 6).15 In the naturalistic 
worldview, all the evolving processes are natural and governed by natural laws. In particular, all the fine-
tuned values in our universe can be generated through natural mechanisms. For example, Stephen 
Hawking suggests that the fine-tuning phenomena can be explained by the multiverse theory.16 
In fact, most scientists believe that all physical events can be explained solely, and exclusively, in terms 
of other physical events. This way of thinking is usually known as “Scientific Naturalism”.17 
Nevertheless, this Scientific Naturalism is just methodological naturalism. Since it is logically possible 
that God can create and intervene our universe through physical events, a scientist can also be a theist. In 
other words, Scientific Naturalism is not necessarily atheistic. The meaning of naturalism is usually 
founded on a commitment, voiced initially by W. V. O. Quine, to let the sciences be our guide in 
epistemology and metaphysics.18 A more precise definition of naturalism can be stated as follow: “a 
                                                          
15 See Richard Swinburne, “Argument from the Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” Modern Cosmology and Philosophy, 
ed. John Leslie (NY: Prometheus Books, 1998) 
16 Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design (NY: Bantam Books, 2010), p.118. 
17 Rodney Holder, God, the Multiverse, and Everything: Modern Cosmology and the Argument from Design (VT: 
Ashgate, 2004), p.2. 
18 Alexander Rosenberg, Darwinism in Philosophy, Social Science and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), p.1. 
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metaphysics that holds that whatever exists in any sense, is susceptible, both in fact and in right, to forms 
of inquiry oriented toward prediction and control.”19 Therefore, a metaphysical naturalism has to be 
considered as atheistic. Therefore, in a naturalistic worldview, no supernatural beings should be 
postulated.  
Many religious beliefs have the concept of God or gods. God can be regarded as a supernatural being who 
can intervene in the nature. The discussion in this thesis does not point to any specific God. We will just 
discuss the probability of God’s existence but not discuss which religious beliefs are better than the 
others. The existence of God is a controversial issue in religion, philosophy and science. Nevertheless, it 
is commonly believed that God is omnipotent, omniscience and perfectly good. These three properties are 
the simplest and most basic for God. According to the definition from Swinburne, the meaning of 
omnipotence is that God can do anything that is logically possible.20 The meaning of omniscience is that 
God knows at any time all that is logically possible to know at that time.21 God is perfectly good means 
that He will always do what is overall the best, and never do what is overall bad.22 We will discuss the 
existence of God based on these properties in the following chapters.  
In this thesis, I will give a comprehensive study on the arguments of fine-tuning and the modern form of 
design argument. I call this modern form argument the “anthropic design argument”. We will first review 
all the scientific findings about the fine-tuning phenomena. Then we will examine both the theistic and 
naturalistic worldviews by considering the fine-tuning evidence and ascertain a best explanation of the 
fine-tuning phenomena. Many new arguments and findings will be described and discussed throughout 
the thesis. The thesis is divided into several parts. First, in chapter 2, I will describe and review the 
methodology used in this thesis. Then in chapters 3 and 4, I will discuss and review the fine-tuning 
phenomena in the nature, including the fine-tuning of fundamental constants and conditions. In these 
chapters, I will provide some new arguments to defend the existence of fine-tuning. In chapter 5, I will 
review some specific fine-tuned conditions in the evolution of intelligent human beings. In particular, I 
will provide some new evidence of fine-tuning based on latest discoveries. In chapter 6, I will discuss and 
evaluate some major hypotheses that are able to solve the fine-tuning problem. In fact, most of the 
discussion in the recent literatures concerning about different hypotheses are fragmented and simplified. 
Here, I will formulate a comprehensive analysis on the most popular hypotheses and give new arguments 
to assess the best explanation of the fine-tuning phenomena among the hypotheses. In fact, many previous 
                                                          
19 Philip Devine, “What is Naturalism”, Philosophia Christi 8 (2006):125-139. 
20 Richard Swinburne, Is There a God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.8-9. 
21 Ibid, p.9. 
22 Ibid, pp.13-14. 
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discussions mainly use the confirmation principle to evaluate the available hypotheses. For example, 
Swinburne uses the confirmation principle to show that the fine-tuning phenomena support the existence 
of God more than the multiverse hypothesis.23 Besides, Robin Collins uses a similar method – “the 
likelihood principle” – to reach the same conclusion.24 In this thesis, in addition to the confirmation 
principle, I will try another approach – the inference to the best explanation – to evaluate different 
hypotheses. In chapter 7, I will discuss the compatibility of the major hypotheses and reply to some major 
criticisms about the modern form of design argument. Here, I will give some new discussions on the 
relation between the existence of God and the multiverse hypothesis. Also, I will show that the 
disconfirmation of multiverse hypothesis can indirectly support the God hypothesis.   
Generally speaking, the old discussions of the fine-tuning argument are fragmented. Most of the articles 
mainly focus on the comparison between the multiverse and the God hypotheses or the criticisms of 
different hypotheses. Furthermore, most of the discussions are narrow in perspective. The arguments are 
either based on science or philosophy. In this thesis, I try to give a comprehensive and thorough 
discussion on this topic. The anthropic design argument will be evaluated from both scientific and 
philosophical perspectives integrated in a single theoretical framework. My unique contributions for this 
topic are as follow:  
1. I will use the confirmation principle and the inference to the best explanation simultaneously to 
evaluate different hypotheses in a more systematic way (in Chapter 6).  
2. I will discuss the compatibility of the God hypothesis and the multiverse hypothesis and show 
that the incompatibility of the two hypotheses can give an indirect support of the anthropic design 
argument (in Chapter 7).  
3. I will discuss some of the new and updated scientific and philosophical arguments (Chapter 3-5) 
and respond to recent criticisms of the fine-tuning arguments (Chapter 7).  
Therefore, in this thesis, we can have a broader view and a more complete understanding of this 
interdisciplinary topic.  
 
 
                                                          
23 See Richard Swinburne, “Argument from the Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” Modern Cosmology and Philosophy, 
ed. J. Leslie (New York: Prometheus Books, 1998). 
24 See Robin Collins, “The Teleological Argument.” In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, eds. C. 
Meister and P. Copan (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
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Chapter 2  The confirmation theory and the inference to the best explanation 
When a hypothesis is going to explain the fine-tuning phenomena, how can we assess that hypothesis? In 
this thesis, I will use the confirmation theory developed by Swinburne and the inference to the best 
explanation to evaluate all the hypotheses. 
 
2.1 Confirmation theory 
2.1.1 Formalism 
Confirmation theory seeks to state the rules for assessing how different evidence conferring probability on 
different hypotheses.25 It is based on a theorem called Bayes theorem in the theory of probability, which is 
given by 
   𝑃(𝐴|𝐵)𝑃(𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)𝑃(𝐴),                                                        (2.1) 
where A and B are two independent events. Therefore, if we substitute A and B by theory T and evidence 
E respectively, we get 
𝑃(𝑇|𝐸) =
𝑃(𝐸|𝑇)𝑃(𝑇)
𝑃(𝐸)
,                                                               (2.2) 
Here, P(T|E) means the probability of the theory being true given that the evidence E exists, P(E|T) means 
the probability of the evidence given that the theory is true, P(T) is the prior probability of the theory and 
P(E) is the prior probability of the evidence. In this context, confirmation theory states that the evidence E 
confirms theory T if and only if P(T|E) > P(T). This confirmation theory is a key philosophical foundation 
in determining whether a theory should be accepted in science. For example, the discovery of light 
bending in the 20th century during the solar eclipse matches the prediction made by General Relativity. 
Therefore, this is an evidence that support or confirm General Relativity. 
Besides, the confirmation theory also enables us to evaluate which theory is the better theory. Suppose 
there are two competing theories, T1 and T2. Given that all other things being equal, we should choose T1 
rather than T2 if the evidence E supports T1 more than T2, which means P(T1|E) > P(T2|E). This is a very 
important criterion in evaluating different theories. I will use this criterion to compare different 
hypotheses in explaining the fine-tuning phenomena. 
                                                          
25 Richard Swinburne, An Introduction to Confirmation Theory (London: Methuen, 1973), p.1. 
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According to the Bayes’ theorem, P(T1|E) > P(T2|E) if and only if 
𝑃(𝐸|𝑇1)𝑃(𝑇1) > 𝑃(𝐸|𝑇2)𝑃(𝑇2).                                                    (2.3) 
The above inequality would be satisfied if we have both P(E|T1) > P(E|T2) and P(T1) > P(T2). If a theory 
T1 renders E more probable than T2 does, then we have P(E|T1) > P(E|T2). Generally speaking, a good 
explanation of evidence E by theory T should satisfy the following three conditions:26 
1. Causation condition: T can cause E. 
2. Inference condition: E can be inferred from T, to a high degree. 
3. Plausibility condition: T is relatively likely to be true, compared to competing theories, given our 
background knowledge. 
Since the best theory should have the largest value of P(E|T)P(T), we define the strength of a theory T by: 
                                                                    𝑆(𝑇, 𝐸) = 𝑃(𝐸|𝑇)𝑃(𝑇).                                                       (2.4) 
In other words, the greatest strength of a theory is the best theory. Suppose there are N theories 
(𝑇1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇𝑁) that can explain an evidence E. We can write 
                                   𝑃(𝑇1|𝐸) =
𝑃(𝐸|𝑇1)𝑃(𝑇1)
𝑃(𝐸|𝑇1)𝑃(𝑇1)+𝑃(𝐸|𝑇2)𝑃(𝑇2)+⋯+𝑃(𝐸|𝑇𝑁)𝑃(𝑇𝑁)
=
𝑆(𝑇1,𝐸)
∑ 𝑆(𝑇𝑖|𝐸)𝑁𝑖=1
                 (2.5) 
If the value of 𝑆(𝑇1, 𝐸) is much greater than ∑ 𝑆(𝑇𝑖|𝐸)
𝑁
𝑖=2 , 𝑃(𝑇1|𝐸) would be very large even though the 
actual value of 𝑆(𝑇1, 𝐸) is small. Therefore, to show a theory T1 is the best theory, we just need to show 
𝑆(𝑇1, 𝐸) > ∑ 𝑆(𝑇𝑖, 𝐸)
𝑁
𝑖=2 . 
 
2.1.2 Simplicity of a theory 
Given that the prior probabilities of theories T1 and T2 are equal and both theories can cause E, then we 
may just compare P(E|T1) and P(E|T2), which is known as the likelihood argument. This can be easily 
done by deductive arguments. What if P(E|T1) is comparable to P(E|T2)? In general, we can easily design 
two theories such that they have nearly the same explanatory powers (P(E|T1) = P(E|T2)).  If this happens, 
we have to compare the prior probabilities of theories T1 and T2. However, what criteria determine the 
prior probability of a theory? Swinburne suggests that the simplicity of a theory can determine the prior 
                                                          
26 Richard Johns, “Inference to the Best Explanation”, http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/rjohns/ibe.pdf. 
9 
 
probability.27 Historically, there are many different proposals to define the meaning of a simple theory. 
For example, Popper suggests that the epistemological questions which arise in connection with the 
concept of simplicity can all be answered if we equate this concept with degree of falsifiability. In 
general, a simpler theory should be more falsifiable.28 Later, Sober suggests that the simplest theory is the 
most informative theory in the sense of the one with respect to which you need to obtain less additional 
information in order to be able to answer the questions.29 Based on the previous works from Popper and 
Sober, Swinburne further elaborates that the simplest theory should have the simplest formulation. He 
thinks that there are six criteria to assess what is the simplest theory:30 
1. A simpler theory should have a fewer number of things postulated (Ockham’s razor). 
2. A simpler theory should have a fewer number of kinds of things (number of kinds of entities or 
properties of entities). 
3. A formulation of a theory which contains a term referring to an entity or descriptive of a property 
which can only be grasped by someone who grasps some other term will be less simple than an 
otherwise equally simple formulation of a theory which contains the latter term instead. 
4. A formulation of theory consisting of a few separate laws is simpler than the one consisting of 
many laws. 
5. A formulation of a theory is simpler in which individual laws relate few variables rather than 
many. 
6. A mathematically simpler formulation is simpler. 
How do we know that we should choose a simple theory rather than a complicated theory? In view of the 
criteria above, a theory is simple if it is based on a few assumptions, a few kinds of entities and a few 
properties of entities. Therefore, theory T1 is simpler than T2 if the assumptions needed in T2 is more than 
that in T1 or the theory T1 involves less entities or properties of entities than that of T2.  Keeping other 
factors constant, a simpler theory means a higher prior probability of the theory because each assumption 
in the theory would reduce the probability. For example, a theory T has N independent assumptions A1, 
A2, …, AN. Then prior probability that the theory T is true is P(T|A1, A2, … , AN), which is  
𝑃(𝑇|𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑁) = 𝑃(𝑇) × ∏ 𝑃(𝐴𝑖)𝑖                                              (2.6) 
                                                          
27 Richard Swinburne, Is there a God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.24. 
28 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959), p.140. 
29 Elliot Sober, Simplicity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). 
30 Richard Swinburne, Simplicity as Evidence of Truth (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1997), pp.24-26. 
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where P(Ai) is the probability that the ith assumption is true. A multiplication of these probabilities further 
decreases the prior probability P(T). Therefore, fewer assumptions make a theory more probable.31  
Besides, Bentham states that “that which is used to prove everything else… cannot itself be proved.”32 
This means that there must be a fundamental principle which cannot be proved. It cannot be justified or 
proven by mathematics or logic. For example, the axioms in Euclidean geometry are the fundamental 
principles. These principles can generate many different theorems by deduction. Here, we may regard the 
“principle of simplicity” to be the fundamental principle for our assessment. Although this principle 
cannot be proved to be true, it is widely-held by scientists, and science history tells us that a simpler 
theory usually gives a better prediction. In view of this, Swinburne says “the fact that in general simpler 
theories have worked well in the past which justifies us in assuming that they will work well in the 
future.”33 In fact, if we do not assume this principle of simplicity, scientists might encounter many 
problems in scientific investigation. For example, scientists usually use a straight line to represent the 
relation between the elastic force of a spring 𝐹 and the length of compression 𝑒. This is known as the 
Hooke’s law (𝐹 = 𝑘𝑒). However, there are infinitely many ways to link up the data points about the 
elastic force and the length of compression (such as a higher order polynomial function) because the 
actual number of data points in an experiment must be finite. There must be some space between the data 
points and we can always choose another curve other than straight line to fit the data points. Therefore, 
based on the principle of simplicity, we choose the simplest way, a straight line (the fewest degrees of 
freedom and the simplest formulation), to fit the data points. If we do not use this principle, the 
justification of most of the scientific laws would break down. 
 
2.1.3 Other knowledge 
Besides considering the simplicity of a theory, the prior probability can also be assessed by our 
background knowledge about the theory. If we have other data or evidence (e.g. E1, E2, …) besides the 
evidence E, we can assess the value of P(T) by these other data or evidence (i.e. P(T|E1,E2,…)). For 
example, the theory of General Relativity (theory T) can explain the precession of the perihelion of 
Mercury (evidence E). In other words, the value of P(E|T) is high. Moreover, some other experiments 
                                                          
31 Richard Swinburne, “Argument from the Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” Modern Cosmology and Philosophy, ed. J. 
Leslie (NY: Prometheus Books, 1998), p.177. 
32 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (NY: Doubleday, 1961), p.19. 
33 Richard Swinburne, Simplicity as Evidence of Truth (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1997), p.45. 
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such as data from Gravitational Redshift support General Relativity. This increases the value of P(T) and 
gives a high value of P(T|E). 
 
2.1.4 Objection to the confirmation theory 
However, although the confirmation theory is based on some solid mathematical theorems, there are some 
objections to this theory. One of the most important criticisms is called the “old evidence problem”.  
The old evidence problem states that if an evidence is already known, the probability of getting the 
evidence P(E) should be 1. If P(E) = 1, according to the Bayes theorem, and since P(E|T) ≤ 1, we get 
P(T|E) ≤ P(T). That means for all theories that can account for or explain the old evidence would be 
disconfirmed. However, whether a theory is confirmed or not should not be based on whether the 
evidence is old or new. Therefore, the confirmation theory may have some intrinsic problem. One of the 
most famous examples to illustrate this problem is the precession of the perihelion of Mercury. Well 
before the publication of General Relativity, scientists had already known that the precession of the 
perihelion of Mercury cannot be fully addressed by Newton’s laws. Nevertheless, after Einstein published 
his theory of General Relativity, the discrepancy between the theory and observation is reconciled. 
Although the precession problem of Mercury is old evidence at that time, most scientists regard that piece 
of evidence confirms the General Relativity.34 How can we reconcile the problem of old evidence and the 
confirmation theory? The answer is that P(E) is not 1 in the old evidence’s case. The evidence is old or 
new depends solely on the time of the discovery. One can treat all the old evidence as the predicted 
evidence. This means that P(E) is not 1, but may be a small value. This is valid because there is no logical 
difference between a theory T predicting an observation O or an observation O generating a theory T. The 
only difference is that T appears earlier than O in the former case while T appears later than O in the latter 
case. However, the logical connection between T and O should not be affected by the chronological order. 
Swinburne says that35  
“I cannot see that it matters as regards the support given by observations to the theory whether, say, 100 
observations are made first and the theory then constructed to explain them, or whether the theory is 
constructed on the basis of fifty observations and it successfully predicts another fifty. The support given 
                                                          
34 Bradley Monton, “God, Fine-tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence,” British Journal of Philosophy of Science 57 
(2006): 405-424. 
35 Richard Swinburne, Is There a God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.30. 
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by observations to a theory concerns a logical relation between observations and the theory, and is 
independent of when the observations are made.” 
In general, it is always possible for us to divide the evidence into two categories: new evidence e (not yet 
observed evidence) and background evidence k (already observed evidence). Swinburne suggests that 
they are the same thing. The division between e and k can be made where you like. As stated in the 
previous example, you can assume we don’t know the precession of the perihelion of Mercury (assign k 
as e) and assess the General Relativity by using the confirmation principle. Similarly, Dawes suggests that 
a theory can be corroborated if it is able to predict some fact that cannot be explained by, or that 
apparently falsifies, its predecessor. Whether the fact is known or unknown is irrelevant.36 From this point 
of view, we could always treat the known evidence as a “prediction” if that evidence cannot be explained 
by existing theories. This kind of understanding is following the so-called Hempel’s covering-law models 
of scientific explanation (the deductive-nomological (DN) model and the inductive-statistical (IS) 
model).37 These models suggest a symmetry exists between explanation and prediction (explanation-
prediction symmetry) because they have the same logical structure (it conforms to the covering-law 
model).38 However, Miller thinks that the above arguments “suppose that the test of an explanatory 
hypothesis must have the form of a prediction deduced from general laws and independent statements of 
antecedents which are part of the hypothesis itself”.39 In other words, he thinks that we can always tailor-
make a theory to explain the data. Nevertheless, it is more difficult for us to formulate a theory such that 
the prediction matches the data in future observations. Therefore, there has been an interesting debate for 
the past few decades, on whether successful prediction provides more epistemic warrant to a theory than 
accommodation (explanation). For example, Scheffler critiques the idea of a strict logical parallel 
between the explanation and prediction. He says that explanations are required to be true if they were to 
be acceptable explanations. While for predictions, we could produce successful predictions without 
adequate explanations. 40 Although the nature of prediction and explanation might be a bit different, many 
philosophical studies inclined to support the explanation-prediction symmetry due to the logical 
                                                          
36 Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.121. 
37 C. G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: The Free 
Press, 1965), p.337. 
38 See C. G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: The 
Free Press, 1965), p.368. In particular, the explanation-prediction symmetry thesis can be divided into two sub-
theses, namely that “every adequate explanation is a potential prediction” and “every adequate prediction is a 
potential explanation”. 
39 Richard Miller, Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation and Reality in the Natural and the Social Sciences 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), p.49. 
40 Israel Scheffler, “Explanation, Prediction, and Abstraction”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 
7(1957):293-309. 
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symmetry. 41 In the DN-model, predictions were just explanations given at a different epistemic-temporal 
location. In other words, explanations were merely late predictions (some call it retrodiction or 
postdiction).42 Practically, the function and value of explanation and prediction are not totally 
independent. Douglas thinks that the relationship between explanation and prediction is a tight, functional 
one. Explanations provide the cognitive path to predictions, which then serve to test and refine the 
explanations.43 As mentioned above, the precession problem of Mercury can be a piece of evidence to 
confirm General Relativity, though the discovery of the precession problem was many years earlier than 
the formulation of General Relativity. Here, the evidence is merely a late prediction (retrodiction).   
Since the confirmation theory is related to the logical structure of an explanation (time independent), the 
symmetry of explanation and prediction still applies to a certain extent. However, as stated above, it 
seems that prediction is not totally the same as retrodiction.44 My standpoint is that we need not 
completely resolve the issue here. The above debate does not affect my claim in this thesis. In applying 
the confirmation principle, we can simply assume that explanation share some similarity with “late 
prediction”, but they are not identical. Therefore, we assume that we did not know the evidence E to be 
true so that P(E) is not 1, but a certain small value that is less than 1. Then, we can assess a theory 
whether it can be confirmed by the evidence by comparing P(T|E) and P(T).  
 
2.2 Inference to the best explanation 
Although the confirmation principle can help us to assess which theory is a better explanation, sometimes 
it is not easy for us to compare the values of 𝑆(𝑇, 𝐸). For example, if both the likelihoods and the prior 
probabilities of all available theories are small, the variation of 𝑆(𝑇, 𝐸) for different theories would be too 
small to compare.  Therefore, we have to invoke another useful principle to judge the best theory. 
 
 
                                                          
41 See Paul Dietl, “Paresis and the Alleged Asymmetry between Explanation and Prediction”, The British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science 17 (1967):313-318; Robert Lee, “A Critical Analysis of the Thesis of the Symmetry 
between Explanation and Prediction: Including a Case Study of Evolutionary Theory”, PhD thesis, The University of 
British Columbia, 1979. 
42 Heather Douglas, “Reintroducing Prediction to Explanation”, Philosophy of Science 76(2009):444-463. 
43 Ibid. 
44 See the discussion about this “asymmetry problem” from Kent Staley, An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp.207-208. 
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2.2.1 Formalism 
In science, we usually have several models or theories that can explain certain observational data. The 
meaning of explanation can be defined as follow:45 
Definition: An explanation is a story about what caused an object to exist, or an event to occur. 
If there are more than one theories that can provide explanation, what criteria should we use to determine 
which theory is the right one to explain those observations? Most scientists and philosophers invoke 
“inference to the best explanation” to choose the best theory. This principle states that we should choose a 
theory that displays, to a greater degree than any competitor, certain explanatory virtues.46  
Definition: The method “inference to the best explanation” tells you which theory T to infer from the 
available evidence E. It says you should infer the theory T that best explains E.47 The structure of the 
argument can be formulated as follow:48 
P1: The surprising fact, E, is observed. 
P2: A hypothesis H would be a satisfactory explanation of E. 
P3: No available competing hypothesis would explain E as well as H does. 
C: Therefore, H is true. 
The above version is a strong version of the “inference to the best explanation”. A weaker version can be 
obtained by replacing the conclusion by “Therefore it is reasonable to accept H”. If a theory can display 
certain explanatory virtues, that theory could be regarded as a satisfactory explanation (i.e. satisfy P2). 
What are the explanatory virtues? Kuhn suggests that a good scientific theory should have five 
characteristics. They are accuracy, consistency, simplicity, fruitfulness, and broad scope.49 Later, Dawes 
summarizes several explanatory virtues commonly used by scientists and philosophers. They are 
explanatory power, degree of testability, simplicity, consistency from background knowledge, 
informativeness, and fecundity.50 The meanings of explanatory power and simplicity have been discussed 
                                                          
45 Richard Johns, “Inference to the Best Explanation”, http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/rjohns/ibe.pdf. 
46 Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.112. 
47 Richard Johns, “Inference to the Best Explanation”, http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/rjohns/ibe.pdf. 
48 Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.111. 
49 Thomas Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1977), pp.321-322. 
50 Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.112. 
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in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, respectively. In the following, we briefly discuss the importance of the remaining 
explanatory virtues suggested by Dawes. 
 
2.2.2 Degree of testability 
Testability is usually regarded as a necessary condition of at least a scientific explanation. A better theory 
should have a high degree of testability. In general, a hypothesis is independently testable if we can use it 
to make predictions (lead us to expect) about facts other than those it purports to explain.51 Therefore, a 
testable hypothesis should have some chance that the prediction it makes will turn out to be false. This 
means that a hypothesis must contain some degree of empirical content. In other words, the greater the 
degree of empirical content, the higher the degree of testability. As mentioned above, predictions can also 
include retrodiction of the known evidence. 
 
2.2.3 Consistency with background knowledge 
Background knowledge includes known successful theories and our basic experience and knowledge. The 
proposed theory should be consistent with our best existing theories.52 Furthermore, the suggested theory 
should be comprehensible by our background knowledge. Dawes suggests that “for other things being 
equal, the explanations afforded by a theory are better explanations if the theory is familiar, that is, 
introduces mechanisms, entities, or concepts that are used in established explanations. The use of 
familiar models is not essential to explanation, but it helps”.53 Therefore, a theory which is more 
consistent with our best existing theories and comprehensible by our background knowledge would be a 
better theory. 
How about the past explanatory success? From a Bayesian point of view, the past explanatory success of 
a theory might increase its prior probability. However, strictly speaking, it does not apply to the 
assessment of worldviews. It is because we do not have the track records of the theistic worldview and 
naturalistic worldview. In particular, the past failure of explanation from a theistic worldview does not 
preclude future success. Therefore, the past failure of explanation from a certain worldview would not be 
assessed in the following discussion. 
                                                          
51 Ibid, p.117. 
52 Ibid, p.126. 
53 Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.127. 
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2.2.4 Informativeness 
An informative theory is close to what Peter Lipton describes as the loveliness of a proposed 
explanation.54 A lovely explanation is one that specifies some articulated casual mechanism whose 
description allows us to deduce the precise details of the effect.55 Lipton argues that we should prefer the 
loveliest explanation to the likeliest explanation. It is because while “likeliness speaks the truth”, 
“loveliness speaks of potential understanding”.56 Therefore, an informative theory should intrinsically 
possess some detailed mechanisms, and we should have ability to deduce the subsequent effect of that 
theory.  
 
2.2.5 Fecundity 
Dawes suggests that a good theory should possess fecundity – able to suggest new lines of research.57 In 
general, a true theory would show its effects in many aspects. For example, the theory of General 
Relativity does not only explain the motion of Mercury, but also the light path. Therefore, General 
Relativity suggests a new line of research on Gravitational redshift and Gravitational lensing effect. In 
other words, a large fecundity of a theory would raise its prior probability. 
 
2.3 Criticisms of the inference to the best explanation 
The major criticism of the inference to the best explanation is its alleged subjectivity. In particular, we 
may have biases and prejudices in assessing the prior probability of a theory. Choosing the simplest 
theory according to the above criteria might be objective. However, the assessment of a theory based on 
the explanatory virtues may be affected by our prior knowledge or subjective experience. For example, a 
God-believer may believe that the existence of God is consistent with our background knowledge while 
an atheist might disagree with that. This is because the subjective experience of a God-believer would 
contribute to the assessment.  
Although it is widely accepted that the inference to the best explanation involves a certain degree of 
subjectivity, it does not mean that this principle should be denied in assessing different theories. In 
                                                          
54 Ibid, p.138. 
55 Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (London: Routledge, 1991), p.118. 
56 Ibid, p.59. 
57 Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.116. 
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science, scientists still use this principle to determine the best theory to explain observations. There may 
be some different subjective assessments of the prior probability of a theory at the very beginning. 
Nevertheless, when the observational data become plentiful and accurate, the initial biases would 
eventually converge on the same opinion. Those prejudices can be overwhelmed by the empirical 
evidence. This defense of scientific rationality is often called “the washing out of the priors”.58  
Besides the problem of subjectivity, some criticisms suggest that it is possible to have a theory which is 
the best theory among all the competitors but a very bad theory (P(T|E) is very low, but it is the largest 
value among all available theories). In general, a theory would be justified if P(T|E) > 0.5 and there exists 
no competing hypothesis whose probability is higher. However, in many cases, it is difficult for us to get 
such a high posterior probability. In fact, there are many instances of people accepting scientific theories 
even though their posterior probability has not yet been shown to be greater than 0.5.59 Therefore, it is still 
reasonable for us to choose the best theory if it displays an overall greater degree of explanatory virtues 
than any competitor, though the value of P(T|E) might not be greater than 0.5.  
What if there is only one possible explanation for a certain evidence? Would the theory win by default 
based on the inference to the best explanation? Sober thinks that no conclusion can be drawn if there is no 
comparison, even P(T|E) is high. 60  However, Musgrave suggests that we can always think of a theory as 
being tested against a competitor, even if that theory is empty or tautologous. 61 This is similar to the 
usage of “null hypothesis” in statistics. In statistics, we usually compare a statistical result with a result 
from “null hypothesis” – a hypothesis that assumes all results are randomly generated. Therefore, we can 
always compare a theory with a “null theory”, which suggests every phenomenon is due to random 
events. Based on the above discussions, most of the suggested conceptual problem for the inference to the 
best explanation can be solved. 
 
2.4 Residual confirmation 
Consider some hypotheses that can explain an observation. In general, some of the hypotheses are not 
mutually exclusive. Therefore, some hypotheses can co-exist together and contribute to an explanation of 
the observation. For example, the origin of life can be explained by God’s creation or theory of chemical 
                                                          
58 Richard Johns, “Inference to the Best Explanation”, http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/rjohns/ibe.pdf. 
59 Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.111. 
60 Elliot Sober, “Testability”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (1999):47-76. 
61 Alan Musgrave, Essays on Realism and Rationality, Studies in the Philosophy of Karl R. Popper and Critical 
Rationalism 12 (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1999), p.246. 
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evolution. In general, both theories are not mutually exclusive. If this happens, it can be shown that the 
degree of confirmation would be affected if both theories can co-exist.  This effect can be measured by 
“Residual confirmation (RC)”. 
Before defining RC, let’s define a concept called “marginally independent”. A and B are said to be 
marginally independent if P(A|B) = P(A).62 That means the existence of B would not affect the probability 
of A. Otherwise, A and B are not independent.  
Suppose there are two theories T1 and T2 which can explain an evidence E. If we now confirm T2 is true, 
the confirmation of T2 would probably explain away the evidence for T1 by a certain extent. In other 
words, the degree of confirmation of T1 would be very small if T2 can almost explain away the evidence E 
for T1. This effect can be measured by the degree of residual confirmation, which is defined by63 
                                                                  𝑅𝐶 = log [
𝑃(𝑇1|𝐸, 𝑇2)
𝑃(𝑇1)
].                                                           (2.7) 
According to the confirmation principle, the theory T1 can still be confirmed if RC is positive. If T1 and 
T2 are marginally independent, it can be shown that 
                                              𝑅𝐶 = log [𝑃(𝑇1) +
𝑃(𝐸|~𝑇1, 𝑇2)
𝑃(𝐸|𝑇1, 𝑇2)
𝑃(~𝑇1)]
−1
.                                             (2.8) 
In this case, RC would be positive if 𝑃(𝐸|𝑇1, 𝑇2) > 𝑃(𝐸|~𝑇1, 𝑇2) . If we have 𝑃(𝐸|𝑇1, 𝑇2) ≤
𝑃(𝐸|~𝑇1, 𝑇2), T1 can be regarded as completely explained away by T2. If T1 and T2 are not independent, 
we have 
                                        𝑅𝐶 = log [𝑃(𝑇1) +
𝑃(𝐸|~𝑇1, 𝑇2)
𝑃(𝐸|𝑇1, 𝑇2)
𝑃(𝑇2|~𝑇1)
𝑃(𝑇2|𝑇1)
𝑃(~𝑇1)]
−1
.                                  (2.9) 
In this case, RC would be positive if 𝑃(𝐸|𝑇1, 𝑇2) > 𝑃(𝐸|~𝑇1, 𝑇2) and 𝑃(𝑇2|𝑇1) > 𝑃(𝑇2|~𝑇1). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
62 David Glass, “Can Evidence for Design be Explained Away?” Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, eds. Jake 
Chandler and Victoria Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.79-102. 
63 Ibid. 
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2.5 The effect of other negative evidence 
Suppose there is an evidence E1 that confirms a theory T while there is another evidence E2 which 
disconfirms T. How would the degree of confirmation be affected? The posterior probability of T given 
that E1 and E2 are true is given by64 
                                         𝑃(𝑇|𝐸1, 𝐸2) =
𝑃(𝐸1, 𝐸2|𝑇)𝑃(𝑇)
𝑃(𝐸1, 𝐸2|𝑇)𝑃(𝑇)+𝑃(𝐸1, 𝐸2|~𝑇)𝑃(~𝑇)
.                                       (2.10) 
The RC can be written as 
                                    𝑅𝐶 = log [
𝑃(𝑇|𝐸1, 𝐸2)
𝑃(𝑇)
] = log [𝑃(𝑇) +
𝑃(𝐸1, 𝐸2|~𝑇)
𝑃(𝐸1, 𝐸2|𝑇)
𝑃(~𝑇)]
−1
.                       (2.11) 
Therefore, RC would be positive if 𝑃(𝐸1, 𝐸2|~𝑇) < 𝑃(𝐸1, 𝐸2|𝑇). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64 Richard Swinburne, “Bayes, God, and the Multiverse”, Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, eds. Jake 
Chandler and Victoria Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.102-123. 
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Chapter 3   Fine-tuning of the Physical constants 
Life is composed by many different kinds of elements. For example, the fundamental biological system - 
cell - contains many elements such as carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, sulfur and phosphorous. In 
some essential metabolic mechanisms for life, we also need some metal elements such as sodium, 
magnesium, potassium, calcium, manganese, iron, nickel, copper and zinc. Most of these metals 
contribute to the reduction and oxidation transformations that are critical to all life.65 Basically, out of 92 
naturally occurring elements, 25 are presently considered essential for life.66 In the following, I call all 
these crucial elements for life “the anthropic elements”. In fact, these elements form various compounds 
and serve for different functions in life. I call these crucial molecules for life “the anthropic molecules”. 
Among all the above mentioned elements, carbon is the most important for life evolution. Therefore, life 
is “carbon-based”.  In general, it is possible to have non-carbon-based life, for example, silicon-based life, 
which is suspected to be an alternative possible form.  It is because silicon shares similar chemical 
properties with carbon. However, some studies indicate that silicon-silicon bond is weaker than carbon-
carbon bond so that their biotic potential in oxygen-rich environments is severely reduced. Also, silicon 
cannot form double or triple bonds, or any biologically significant form of delocalized bond that are 
found in carbon compounds. Furthermore, silicon dioxide is insoluble solid which is difficult to generate 
silicon cycle in the environment.67 Even if it is possible for silicon to form some basic building blocks, 
there is no evidence for the higher organization of the hypothetical silicon life forms, including possible 
analogs cell membranes, enzymes, coding systems, etc.68 Based on the above arguments, though we 
cannot hundred percent rule out the possibility, silicon-based life is not likely to exist. The reason why we 
focus on carbon is that in the mid-twentieth century, scientists discovered that the production of carbon in 
the nature looks like a fine-tuned process. Later on, various studies indicate that the production of many 
anthropic elements and molecules are dependent on the values of some fundamental constants in physics. 
In order to make life possible, many values have to be fine-tuned – only a very narrow range of the value 
is friendly for life. Our nature seems to be biocentric.   
In this chapter, I will discuss the production of the anthropic elements and how these anthropic elements 
depend on the fundamental constants. I call this the primary fine-tuning. In addition, many physical and 
chemical properties of the anthropic molecules are very crucial to life. I will also discuss how these 
                                                          
65 Alister McGrath, A Fine-Tuned Universe (Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), p.156. 
66 Michael Denton, Nature’s Destiny (New York: The Free Press, 1998), p.74. 
67 Alister McGrath, A Fine-Tuned Universe (Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), p.139. 
68 Michael Denton, “The Place of Life and Man in Nature: Defending the Anthropocentric Thesis,” Bio-complexity 
2013 (2013): pp.1-15.  
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properties are fine-tuned in nature. I call this the secondary fine-tuning. Lastly, I will review some 
arguments against the idea of fine-tuning. 
 
3.1 How elements were produced? 
It is commonly believed that our present universe originated from the Big Bang. The temperature of the 
universe is decreasing when the universe is expanding. In the period called Big Bang Nucleosynthesis, 
hydrogen, helium and a tiny amount of lithium were formed in the first three minutes since Big Bang. 69 
All elements heavier than lithium (atomic number larger than 3) would not be formed because beryllium 
(atomic number = 4) is highly unstable. All beryllium formed will decay into lithium quickly. But why do 
we have carbon, oxygen, etc. in the universe now? The answer is that all heavier elements were produced 
by nuclear fusion in stars and a nucleosynthetic process in supernovae.  
Stars generate energy by nuclear fusion. A large amount of hydrogen and helium formed during Big Bang 
Nucleosynthesis would form stars. When the density and central temperature is high enough,  4 hydrogen 
atoms would form 1 helium atom by some physical processes and a large amount of energy is released. 
When most of the hydrogen is consumed, the core of the star starts to contract, and the temperature would 
be increased. When the temperature reaches 120 million Kelvin, helium starts to form carbon and oxygen 
through some physical processes called triple alpha process.70 For some heavier stars (mass greater than 4 
solar mass), carbon will be ignited to form neon, magnesium and sodium. For a star which has mass 
greater than 20 solar mass, nuclear fusion can generate iron as product. As far as we know, iron is the 
most stable element (largest binding energy per nucleon). No heavier elements will be generated through 
nuclear fusion in stars. When the nuclear fusion ends, the core of the star will contract and generate a 
severe explosion called supernova. Due to the high energy release, all elements heavier than iron could be 
generated. During supernova, most of the materials in the star, including hydrogen, helium, and products 
of nuclear fusion will be ejected to other regions. These ejected materials can later form another star or 
planets. Generally speaking, all the elements found in Earth were produced by stars from the previous 
generations. In other words, we are made from stars!  
 
                                                          
69 Bradley Carroll and Dale Ostlie, An Introduction to Modern Astrophysics (San Francisco: Pearson, 2007), pp.1177-
1179. 
70 Ibid, p.312. 
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3.2 Fine-tuning of the fundamental constants 
All these element-generating processes have been known for several decades. However, astrophysicists 
Fred Hoyle and William Fowler discovered in 1957 that the synthesis of carbon in stars is a fine-tuned 
process.71 In the triple alpha process mentioned above, the production of oxygen and carbon requires three 
important processes:72 
𝐻𝑒 + 𝐻𝑒 → 𝐵𝑒                                                                      (3.1) 
𝐵𝑒 + 𝐻𝑒 → 𝐶                                                                        (3.2) 
𝐶 + 𝐻𝑒 → 𝑂                                                                        (3.3) 
It is not quite probable for 3 helium nuclei (He) to form a carbon atom (C) by collisions. It would be 
possible only if an energy level 7.65 MeV exists in carbon so that beryllium (Be) can be formed to react 
with one more helium (the second process). Later, Hoyle found that there really exists an energy level 
7.65 MeV in carbon. This excited energy level (resonant level) has to be fine-tuned to exactly this value 
in order for carbon-based life to exist. On the other hand, since the carbon produced in the second process 
will probably be consumed to form oxygen in the third process (2.3), carbon may be just an intermediate 
product but not the final product. If so, no carbon will be produced in star and no carbon-based life is 
allowed. Fortunately, a significant amount of carbon is retained because oxygen has an energy level at 
7.12 MeV, which is just below the combined energies of carbon and helium at 7.19 MeV. As a result, the 
existence of these two energy levels (7.65 MeV in carbon and 7.12 MeV in oxygen) produces a 
significant amount of both carbon and oxygen.  Later, Hoyle gave a remarkable reflection on this result: 73 
“From 1953 onward, Willy Fowler and I have always been intrigued by the remarkable relation of the 
7.65 MeV energy level in the nucleus of carbon to the 7.12 MeV level in oxygen. If you wanted to produce 
carbon and oxygen in roughly equal quantities by stellar nucleosynthesis, there are two levels you would 
have to fix, and your fixing would have to be just where these levels are actually found to be.” 
Therefore, the energy levels in carbon and oxygen seem to be fine-tuned so that carbon can be produced 
and life can exist. These values are mainly controlled by the electromagnetic force and quite sensitive to 
the strong force in nature. This means that the fundamental constants for electromagnetic force and strong 
                                                          
71 Margaret Burbidge et al., “Synthesis of the Elements in Stars,” Review of Modern Physics 29 (1957): pp.547-650. 
72 Bradley Carroll and Dale Ostlie, An Introduction to Modern Astrophysics (San Francisco: Pearson, 2007), pp.312-
313. 
73 Fred Hoyle, “The Universe: Past and Present Reflections,” Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics 20 
(1982): pp.1-35 (at p.16). 
23 
 
force are needed to be fine-tuned. Calculations show that even a four percent shift of strong force would 
severely deplete the amount of carbon made.74  
In fact, the fine-tuning phenomenon does not only occur in triple-alpha process. Scientists discover that 
our universe is fine-tuned in many ways for life. As mentioned above, the formation of stars is crucial for 
life (no stars, no life). Recent studies reveal that the gravitational constant needs to be fine-tuned in order 
to form stars. Calculations by Brandon Carter show that if gravity had been stronger or weaker by one 
part in 1040, then life-sustaining stars like the sun could not exist.75 On the other hand, the fundamental 
constant for weak force is also fine-tuned. If this number is somewhat greater, some heavier elements that 
are crucial for life would not be produced by supernovae. No hydrogen would be formed if this number is 
somewhat smaller than the actual values.76 Moreover, if the strong force were to have been as little as 2 
percent stronger relative to the other forces, all hydrogen would have been converted into helium. If it 
were 5 percent weaker, no helium at all would have formed and there would be nothing but hydrogen.77 
Therefore, all forces in the nature – electromagnetic force, gravitational force, strong force and weak 
force – and the corresponding fundamental constants are fine-tuned for life. The relative strengths for 
gravitational force, nuclear strong force, electromagnetic force and weak force are 5.9 × 10−39, 15, 
3.05 × 10−12 and 7.03 × 10−3 respectively.78 In addition to the forces in nature, the formation of stars 
also depends on the matter content and the initial state of the universe. These properties can be 
characterized by some other physical constants. 
Martin Rees summarized all the fine-tuning phenomena and suggested that six important numbers are 
fine-tuned for life. They are the strength of the electric forces that hold atoms together divided by the 
force of gravity between them (N = 1036), a number which defines how firmly atomic nuclei bind together 
and how all the atoms were made (ε = 0.007), the number which defines how much material in our 
universe (Ω), the cosmological constant (λ), the primordial or initial quantum fluctuation (Q = 10-5) and 
number of the spatial dimension (D = 3).79 The numbers N and ε represent the fundamental forces in 
nature. The numbers Ω and λ represent the amount of matter and energy that exist in our universe. The 
number Q represents the initial condition of our universe. The number D represents the actual dimensions 
which have not been contracted. A slight change in any of these numbers would make the necessary 
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anthropic elements disappear (primary fine-tuning). We have already discussed the fine-tuning of N and 
ε. Moreover, some express another fine-tuning evidence by stating that the masses of proton and neutron 
are fine-tuned for life (or the ratio of proton mass to neutron mass).80 Actually, this is just another 
expression by combining N and ε. 
In the following sections, we will have a brief discussion on the fine-tuning of energy and matter content 
and the initial conditions of our universe. Since the contraction of dimensions requires some uncertainties 
and technical details in string theory, we will not discuss the fine-tuning of D in this thesis.  
 
3.3 Fine-tuning of the state of the Universe 
Cosmological studies reveal that the formation of galaxies and stars depends sensitively on the matter 
content of the universe. The constant Ω that characterizes the matter content needs to have the right value 
in order to permit life. The required precision is astonishing: at one second after the Big Bang, Ω cannot 
have differed from unity by more than 0.000000000000001.81 That means one second after the Big Bang, 
0.999999999999999 ≤ Ω ≤ 1.000000000000001, where this number in general can be any values. 
This fine-tuning problem is previously known as the “flatness problem”. It is commonly believed that this 
problem can be solved by the existence of an inflation field at the very beginning of the Big Bang. This is 
known as the inflation theory. This theory suggests that an unknown scalar field (energy) exists at the 
very beginning of our universe. This field makes our universe expand suddenly by a huge amount so that 
the matter density becomes much smaller due to a huge increase in volume. As a result, the matter content 
Ω becomes very small and equal to the value that we measured.  However, the inflation should start and 
end at a right time and the amount of inflation field should be greater than some value.82 Therefore, the 
flatness problem is just displaced by another problem with some other fine-tuned values. A famous 
scientist Steinhardt says that “In a typical inflationary model, the value must be near 10-15—that is, zero to 
15 decimal places. A less fine-tuned choice, such as zero to only 12 or 10 or eight decimal places, would 
produce bad inflation: the same degree of accelerated expansion (or more) but with a large temperature 
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variation that is inconsistent with observations”.83 In other words, the fine-tuning problem of matter 
content still exists and cannot be addressed by the inflation model alone.  
Another intriguing parameter called the cosmological constant λ, re-entered the cosmological model in 
1998 because of the observation of acceleration in universe expansion. It measures the content of dark 
energy that exists in the universe. Although we do not know what it is and why it exists, we can measure 
its value by observing the cosmic microwave background radiation. If this number is too large, all matter 
in the universe will not form structures. If this number is too small, the gravity will be strong enough to 
pull everything together after a rather short time, which means that there is not enough time for life to 
evolve.84  
Besides physical laws, all subsequent motion of particles also depends on initial conditions. For example, 
you need to tell me the position and the initial velocity of a particle in order to predict its position and 
velocity after some time interval. Same as the expansion of the universe, a constant called primordial or 
initial quantum fluctuation Q characterizes the amplitude of initial irregularities when the Big Bang starts. 
The current measured value is about Q = 10-5.85 Calculations show that the star formation would be slow 
and inefficient if Q is smaller than 10-5. If it were smaller than 10-6, gas would never condense into 
structures at all. If it were substantially larger than 10-5, regions far bigger than galaxies would condense 
early in its history, and they wouldn’t fragment into stars.86 
To conclude, the existence of stars and anthropic elements are highly dependent on the 5 fine-tuned 
values N, ε, Ω, λ and Q (and also the dimension D). If one of the parameters change slightly, says, 10 
times larger, no life would exist. 
 
3.4 Secondary fine-tuning 
The existence of some anthropic elements is very sensitive to the fundamental constants.  In fact, many 
compounds formed from these elements are crucial to life. Recent studies reveal that the properties of 
these compounds are also fine-tuned for life (secondary fine-tuning). These properties depend on complex 
interactions among gravitational force, electromagnetic force and strong force. This suggests that the 
feasible parameter space for life would be further narrowed. In this section, I will outline several major 
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physical and chemical properties of some important compounds or structures such as water, carbon 
dioxide, oxygen, proteins and DNA.   
 
3.4.1 Fine-tuning of water 
The most important compound for life is water. Water molecules have several important fine-tuned 
properties that are crucial for life.  
By vital coincidence, the temperature range in which water is a fluid (0-100℃) overlaps with the 
temperature range in which chemical bonds can be readily manipulated by biochemical system. 87 
Moreover, because the properties of expansion and contraction of liquid water and ice are unique, water 
would not be frozen easily on Earth. The high latent heat of vapourization and specific heat capacity helps 
to stabilize our climate in order to make life possible.88 Besides, its high dielectric constant is responsible 
for its ability to dissolve virtually all charged molecules so that the distribution of chemical species is 
possible.89 Furthermore, the viscosity of water is nearly the minimum known for any fluid. This makes the 
movement of fish possible, and the development of higher organisms depends critically on the ability of 
cells to move and crawl around during embryogenesis.90 The viscosity of ice also lies within an 
appropriate range for life. If the viscosity of ice is too large, water will be immobilized at the poles and 
high mountains which change our climate severely. If the viscosity of ice is too small, the glacial activity 
would be much less effective in grinding down the mountains and releasing vital minerals into the 
hydrosphere.91  
The above properties are independent of each other and are adapted to serve cooperatively the same 
biological end. In summary, the unique properties of water serve to stabilize the weather,  preserve the 
liquid water in Earth and help temperature regulation. Life would not be possible to evolve if any of these 
properties change significantly. For example, life is possible only in a very narrow temperature interval, 
just 1-2% between 0 K to surface temperature of Earth. Moreover, the most suitable temperature range for 
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organic chemistry is about −20℃ − 120℃.92 Therefore, it is very important to stabilize the climate and 
regulate the temperature change in organisms.  
 
3.4.2 Fine-tuning of carbon dioxide 
Henderson points out that carbon dioxide is an innocuous gas soluble in water, and present therefore 
wherever there is water throughout the biosphere.93 Carbon dioxide dissolves in water and will be 
converted to bicarbonate. This chemical has excellent buffering capacities to maintain the acid-base 
balance in the body and in the hydrosphere.94  The acidity of blood is mainly controlled by the acid 
dissociation constant (pKa). The pKa of carbonic acid is close to 6.1 in blood. Surprisingly, the buffer 
function of bicarbonate is optimum at pKa = 6.1.95 Also, this dissolving property makes the oxidative 
metabolism in organisms and carbon cycle in Earth possible, which are crucial mechanisms in generating 
energy and sustain life on Earth respectively.96    
 
3.4.3 Fine-tuning of oxygen 
Oxygen is essential for life to generate energy. Most oxygen must be first dissolved in water in order to 
undergo metabolisms. Therefore, the solubility of oxygen is an essential property for life. Scientific 
studies indicate that the solubility of oxygen is fine-tuned. Organisms would not be able to extract oxygen 
from an aqueous solution for metabolic needs and circulatory or respiratory system would be suppressed 
if the solubility of oxygen is too low. On the other hand, oxygen would interact with water to produce 
radicals which is harmful to life if the solubility of oxygen is too high.97  Interestingly, the best solubility 
of oxygen should be at temperature range 0 − 50℃, which coincides with many best working ranges of 
other essential chemicals for life.98 
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3.4.4 Fine-tuning of protein 
Protein is one of the crucial building blocks of life. Its molecule is complex and formed from bonding 
different amino acid molecules together. To carry out biological functions, protein molecules must 
necessarily associate intimately with other molecules in cell, termed “ligands”.99 These associations are 
formed by the weak chemical bonds. Recent studies indicate that the strength of this weak bond is fine-
tuned. If the bond is weaker, no protein would bind specifically to any molecule in cell. If the bond is 
stronger, protein and ligand would be bound so strong never be separated. This would decrease the 
mobility of protein.  As a result, the proteins and all constituents of the cell would be frozen into rigid 
immobile structures and would be incompatible with cellular existence.100   This weak bond strength is 
approximately 1/20 of the strong bond strength. It would be problematic if the strength is 1/2 or 1/200 of 
the strong bond strength.101  
 
3.4.5 Fine-tuning of DNA 
One of the most important discoveries in Life Science is the discovery of DNA. DNA has a double helical 
structure to store genetic information for life. It is a polymer made up of four subunits called nucleotides. 
Each nucleotide consists of a phosphate, a ribose sugar, and one of four bases: guanine (G), cytosine (C), 
thymine (T), or adenine (A). The DNA is composed of two strands,  and the strands are twisted around 
one another to form the double helical structure.   
There exist some fine-tuned properties of DNA that make life possible. First of all, it is relatively stable in 
a solution, even at room temperature for months. As a result, the DNA cannot be broken down easily by 
chemicals.102 Although the two strands bind strongly, their affinity is not so great. This makes 
dissociation of the two strands possible during replication. The binding force strength between two 
strands is fine-tuned for biological function. Stronger or weaker of the force would make both strands 
immobile or fall apart respectively.103 No biological functions would be effective if either case happened.  
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3.5 Combination of primary and secondary fine-tuning 
Generally speaking, all the above examples of secondary fine-tuning require fine-tuned fundamental 
constants of electromagnetic force and strong force. All these properties are totally independent of the 
requirement of the existence of elements. Therefore, the fine-tuned ranges of fundamental constants for 
existence of anthropic elements coincide with the fine-tuned ranges of fundamental constants for the 
essential properties for life of anthropic molecules. In fact, the values of the fundamental constants in the 
primary fine-tuning would probably restrict the scope of the secondary fine-tuning, which make the 
secondary fine-tuning less likely. If the probabilities of getting the primary and secondary fine-tuned 
values are 𝑃(𝑝) and 𝑃(𝑠) respectively, the conditional probability 𝑃(𝑠|𝑝) would be less than 𝑃(𝑠). 
Therefore, the total probability of getting both primary and secondary fine-tuned values is  
𝑃(𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝) = 𝑃(𝑠|𝑝) × 𝑃(𝑝) ≤ 𝑃(𝑠) × 𝑃(𝑝),                                             (3.4) 
Since P(s) and P(p) are very small, P(s and p) is an extremely small value. As a result, the secondary fine-
tuning further narrows down the life-allowing parameter space. It is highly improbable for life to exist if 
these values were chosen randomly. In other words, it seems that we are so lucky to be living in this 
universe.  
 
3.6 Arguments against the existence of fine-tuning 
All the above information indicates that fine-tuning of some physical constants is required for life. The 
life-allowing parameter space that includes N, ε, Ω, λ, Q and D is extremely small. In this section, I will 
briefly describe some arguments against the fine-tuning thesis.  
 
3.6.1 Zooming argument 
The parameter space is not absolute, but depends on the scales of the axes. For example, the life-allowing 
region shown in Figure 1 depends on the scale you choose. You can make it look big by deftly choosing 
the limits of the plot. You could also distort parameter space using logarithmic axes or any other arbitrary 
axes.104 Therefore, argument becomes: 
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P1: The parameter space depends on the scale of the axes. 
P2: The probability of getting the life-allowing region depends on the area of the parameter space. 
P3: The axes are arbitrary. 
C1: The probability of getting the life-allowing region is indeterminate. 
C2: Fine-tuning argument is a fallacy. 
In other words, this argument indicates that you can always zoom-in to the figure and get a larger 
probability. The life-allowing region will be much larger if you zoom-in on its neighbourhood.  
 
Figure 1. The parameter space for electron mass to proton mass ratio and electromagnetic coupling 
constant. The life-allowed region is the small black rectangle.105 
In fact, the premises P1 and P3 are correct. However, the premise P2 is not correct. When you zoom into 
the parameter space, the life-allowing region will also be enlarged. The probability is area of the life-
allowing region A divided by the whole possible parameter space Aw. Making Aw larger will 
simultaneously make A larger to the same extent. Therefore, the ratio A/Aw would not change if you 
choose any other arbitrary axes.  
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3.6.2 Coarse-tuning objection 
Some may argue that the total parameter space Aw should be infinitely large as there is no limitation on 
the values of the physical constants. Therefore, no matter how large the A is, the probability of getting the 
life-allowing region must be close to 0. For example, we know that 0.006 ≤ ε ≤ 0.008 for life-permitting 
universe. Since the total parameter space Aw is infinitely large, the probability of getting this range of ε is 
zero. Even if the life-permitting universe needs 0.006 ≤ ε ≤ 6000, the probability of getting this range is 
also zero because the total parameter space Aw is infinitely large. Therefore, no matter it is fine-tuning or 
coarse-tuning, the probability is the same – zero. Should we still care about the fine-tuning problem? 
The above argument is based on the logical interpretation of probability and the Principle of Indifference - 
treating all equal intervals for all parameters as equally probable. T. McGrew, L. McGrew and Vestrup 
state that since the possible sets of values for the fundamental constants are unbounded, it is non-
normalizable. The probabilities make sense only if the sum of the logically possible disjoint alternatives 
adds up to one.106 Therefore, either each possibility will be assigned probability zero, in which case the 
total will be zero, or each possibility will be assigned some fixed positive probability, in which case the 
total will be infinite.107 Since the definition of the fine-tuning probability is not clear, the fine-tuning 
argument is not well-defined. 
To address this problem, Koperski suggests that the probability of getting the fine-tuned values can still 
be defined by considering the ratio of life-permitting region A to the total parameter space Aw: 
𝑃 =
𝐴
𝐴𝑤
 ,                                                                               (3.5) 
if the numerator does not diverge.108 However, it is possible that Aw is not an actual infinity. In the 
Hilbert’s Hotel paradox, even though the hotel has no vacancies, a large number of guests can be 
accommodated by having everyone move up a fixed number of rooms. Any countable number of guests 
could just as easily be fit into this “full” hotel.109 However, it is a contradiction that a “full hotel” can still 
be occupied by many more guests. Craig thinks that the Hilbert’s Hotel paradox proves that actual 
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infinities do not exist.110 The view is that infinity (∞) is merely a mathematical device but not physically 
real in nature. If actual infinities do not exist, then the probability defined in Equation (3.5) can be 
possible because the probability is normalizable.  
Although the actual infinities do not exist in our real nature, the coarse-tuning problem still exists if the 
area Aw is extremely large. This is because we do not have a clear boundary to constrain how small of the 
life-permitting region is said to be fine-tuned. In the following, I suggest a useful way so that the coarse-
tuning objection can be addressed. Suppose we can really define the probability of getting the fine-tuned 
values. Is fine-tuning a problem if we get P = 0.1 only? What if we get P = 0.01, do we need to explain it? 
According to the definition of fine-tuning in chapter 1, the phenomenon can be regarded as a fine-tuning 
problem when P is small. How small should it be? From the above example, if the life-permitting 
universe needs 0.006 ≤ ε ≤ 6000, the probability of getting this range is also very small, probably smaller 
than 0.00001, because the actual parameter space is very large. However, we know that the fine-tuning 
problem is more serious if the range of ε is much smaller. Therefore, it is not very useful in defining the 
problem by using the probability defined in equation (3.5). In other words, the actual value of P is not 
important. The most important is how to assess whether fine-tuning problem is serious or not (the degree 
of seriousness). Therefore, Holder suggests that the probability should be regarded as quantifying the 
rational degree of belief rather than proportions in an ensemble.111 Suppose a value S is defined to 
measure the “seriousness of the fine-tuning problem” (S is large means that the fine-tuning problem is 
very serious).  It is obvious to note that S is large when A is small and vice versa. Let’s suggest an 
intuitive relation 
𝑆 ∝
1
𝐴
 .                                                                         (3.6) 
This relation depends on A, but not Aw. The proportionality constant can be any arbitrary number as the 
value S is arbitrary. If the life-permitting range is small, then we have small A and large S. Therefore, it is 
possible for us to distinguish the coarse-tuning and fine-tuning by comparing their respective values of S.  
Moreover, one can define a ratio R, which is defined as the ratio of possible variance Δ𝜀 (the variation of 
the life-permitting range) to the mean measured value ε0: 
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𝑅 =
Δ𝜀
𝜀0
 .                                                                            (3.7) 
For example, for our universe, Δ𝜀 = 0.001 and 𝜀0 = 0.007 for life-permitting. Therefore, the ratio is R = 
0.142. We know that S would be large if R is small. We can now relate the probability of getting the fine-
tuned value by using R such that  𝑃 ∝ 𝑅. Although we do not have the actual value of P, we can 
qualitatively describe the fine-tuning problem by using the value of R. Therefore, when we say that the 
probability (rational degree of belief) of getting the life-permitting range is small, that means the variable 
range is small, and thus the ratio R is small too.  In general, we can have the following relation: 
𝑃 ∝ 𝑅 ∝
1
𝑆
∝ 𝐴 .                                                                    (3.8) 
From the above relation, it is not necessary for us to consider the Aw and the actual value of P. More 
importantly, instead, we should consider how small the variance of the anthropic value is. In other words, 
we should be surprised when we notice that the change in the ratio of the gravitational force to the 
electromagnetic force by as little as 1 part in 1040 would have dramatic consequences for the types of star 
which occur, but not asking how large is the parameter space.112 Also, we can arbitrarily define the fine-
tuning phenomenon as serious if the corresponding R is smaller than a certain value, says, 10. By using 
this criterion, one can determine a constant is fine-tuned or coarse-tuned. Regarding all the fine-tuned 
fundamental constants discussed in the above sections, all R values are smaller than 10. Certainly one can 
arbitrarily define the fine-tuning problem as serious when R is smaller than 10-1000. However, it can only 
be justified subjectively by our experience and knowledge. In fact, most scientists and philosophers have 
already claimed that the current fine-tuning problem is serious for many fundamental constants. A 
consensus has already been reached by considering a reasonable value for R. Although R is a better 
indicator for the fine-tuning problem, we will still say that a constant or condition is fine-tuned because 
the probability P of getting such constant or condition is small.  
 
3.6.3 Objection to Principle of Indifference 
As mentioned above, the discussion in the section 3.6.2 is based on the Principle of Indifference. Is this 
principle right at all? Monton thinks that we need not rely on the Principle of Indifference.113 It is open for 
us to assign zero probability to some possible values of constant and non-zero probability to other 
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possible values. This suggestion is trying to solve the non-normalization problem in probability. 
However, what is the criteria for choosing some regions and discard some other regions? Some argue that 
there may be a probabilistic density distribution function f that characterizes the probability such that it is 
finite for infinite large parameter space: 
∫ …
∞
0 ∫ 𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛)
∞
0
𝑑𝑥1𝑑𝑥2 … 𝑑𝑥𝑛 = finite ,                                       (3.9) 
where x1, x2,…,xn are the possible fundamental constants in the parameter space. For example, Jaynes 
suggests the probabilistic distribution function can be obtained by using the “Principle of Maximum 
Entropy”.114 This principle can be applied in cosmology to determine some relations between different 
fundamental constants. These relations indicate that the probabilities of getting these fundamental 
constants are dependent on each other. Therefore, if it is true, the Principle of Indifference may not be a 
good approximation to the problem. However, we still do not have enough knowledge to determine the 
exact probabilistic density distribution f and many of the derived distributions are highly model-
dependent.115 Holder states that the measures derived from Jaynes’s principle are not unique. There is an 
inherent ambiguity.116 
Therefore, the Principle of Indifference is the most intuitive and basic one that is based on our prior 
knowledge. For example, we often assign a uniform probability for a die that looks perfectly normal (even 
if it is loaded).117 Similarly, it is always possible that the “cosmological dice” may be loaded. However, 
according to our general beliefs that our universe is isotropic and homogeneous, it is reasonable for us to 
assume that the Principle of Indifference applies.  
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3.6.4 Arguments from Stenger 
Particle physicist V. J. Stenger wrote a book “The fallacy of fine-tuning” to present his arguments against 
the fine-tuning thesis.118 In the following I will briefly describe some of his important arguments on fine-
tuning and respond to them. 
In his book, he says “They make fine-tuning claims based on the parameters of our universe and our form 
of like, ignoring the possibility of other life-forms”. This statement is not true. We can predict by science 
that in which conditions life would exist. For example, if some physical constants are changed such that 
hydrogen atoms cannot be formed. In our understanding, if water and hydrocarbon molecules cannot be 
formed, this also makes life impossible. As mentioned above, silicon-based life may be possible to exist. 
However, this possibility also depends on the fine-tuning of physical constants such as N, ε, etc.  It is 
always logically possible that there exists some unknown atomic formation mechanisms in the nature. But 
we cannot falsify the fine-tuning argument by pointing to some unknown mechanisms. Based on our 
current knowledge, there is no other anthropic elements’ formation mechanism other than that we have 
discussed above. 
Second, he says that the strength of the electromagnetic force and gravitational force cannot be 
universally defined. They all depend on some more fundamental constants such as strong coupling 
constant, mass of proton and electron. All these values can be derived from well-established physics. 
Therefore, no fine-tuning is required for these forces. These statements are partly correct. You can always 
write the strength of these forces in terms of other constants such as proton mass and force coupling 
constants. However, these constants have to be fine-tuned too if you transform in this way. Stenger 
mentions that the Higgs’ mechanism and gauge theory can naturally get all the masses of particles and 
force coupling constants respectively. This is not correct!  It may be true that Higgs’ mechanism can 
generate the masses of particles, but this mechanism requires the unification of weak and strong forces, 
which is not clearly known nowadays. It is still very far from predicting these masses from physical laws 
alone. Actually, Stenger agrees that “Theories in which the electroweak and strong forces are unified are 
called the grand unified theories (GUTs), but none of these are established empirically”.119 In fact, what 
he wants to argue is that “… for my purposes I do not need to know that theory. I just have to show that 
we have a plausible explanation for the force strengths, and the burden is on the theist to show why these 
are necessarily fine-tuned”.120 Therefore, he argues against the fine-tuning thesis by raising some 
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unknown mechanisms. However, the burden of proof should be on Stenger’s side because he needs to 
provide the details of these unknown mechanisms. Otherwise, everything can be doubted in this way 
because there is always some unknown possible explanation. Besides, the calculations of proton and 
neutron mass require the mass of quarks. Recent studies indicate that the quark mass is also fine-tuned.121 
This means that the fine-tuning of proton and neutron mass is just displaced by other fine-tuned constants. 
Stenger states that “All the claims of the fine-tuning of the forces of nature have referred to the values of 
the force strengths in our current universe. They are assumed to be constants, but, according to 
established theory (even without supersymmetry), they vary with energy”.122 It is true that the constants 
are related to energy.  However, the constants at high energy levels are irrelevant to the fine-tuning 
problem as fusion in stars etc. are at low energy regime.123 Besides, the relation between the constants and 
energy involves some other numbers which would be needed to fine-tune.124 Again, the fine-tuning 
problem is just displaced by another problem. 
Stenger also makes a general argument against the fine-tuning problem by stating that “The examples of 
fine-tuning given in the theist literature … vary one parameter while holding all the rest constant. This is 
both dubious and scientifically shoddy. As we shall see in several specific cases, changing one or more 
other parameters can often compensate for the one that is changed”.125 This statement means that when 
we say the allowing range of ε is 0.006-0.008, we need to consider the other constants unchanged. He 
gives an example that the variation of the strong coupling constant should also be involved in considering 
the life-allowing region. See Figure 2, the life-allowing parameter space seems to be larger when we 
include one more parameter α (the strong coupling constant).126 Therefore, a wider range of the fine-tuned 
constant is obtained if another constant is also allowed to vary. This is a delusion. The fact is that if you 
involve more parameters, on the contrary, the probability of the life-allowing region would be smaller. 
The probability calculated by varying only one parameter is actually an overestimation of the probability 
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calculated using more parameters. 127 Barnes illustrates this by assuming the full life-permitting criterion 
that defines the area is 
1 − 𝑒 ≤
𝜀
𝜀0
≤ 1 + 𝑒                                                                (3.10) 
where e is a small number quantifying the allowed deviation from the value of ε in our universe with N 
fixed and ε0 is the number that we have actually measured.128 Then the probability of a life-permitting 
universe is 2e if we only consider ε. If we calculate the probability by involving one more parameter N, 
the probability of getting the life-permitting region (the triangular area) for N ≤ N0 and ε ≤ ε0(1+e) 
becomes (see Figure 2) 
𝑃 =
1
2
𝑁0𝜀0[(1+𝑒)−(1−𝑒)]
𝑁0𝜀0(1+𝑒)
≈ 𝑒 ,                                                         (3.11) 
which is smaller than just considering one parameter. This probability would be much smaller if we 
consider all possible N and ε (we haven’t considered N > N0 and ε > ε0(1+e)). The reason is that when we 
open up more parameter space in which life can form, but simultaneously also open much more parameter 
space in which life cannot form. 129 In fact, Rees and Tegmark have already considered multiple 
parameters in his argument of fine-tuning problem instead of varying only one parameter.130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The allowed parameter space for two parameters N and ε. 
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Stenger also comments on the traditional fine-tuning resonant energy level of carbon atom in nuclear 
fusion. He suggests that the resonant energy level is not fine-tuned at 7.65 MeV by quoting a research 
result from Livio et al. which showed that the energy level can be increased by as much as 0.277 MeV to 
7.933 MeV.131 Also, an excited state anywhere from this energy down to near the minimum energy would 
produce adequate carbon for life.132 Therefore, the possible range of the resonant energy level should be 
about 7.4 MeV-7.9 MeV. For the other resonant energy level of oxygen at 7.12 MeV, he just quotes an 
argument from physicist Craig Hogan which states that this resonant energy level is a natural result of a 
symmetry rather than a tuning.133 Therefore, four helium atoms are tightly bound because of its symmetry 
in quantum mechanics, which does not produce similar resonant states. No fine-tuning is required to 
produce sufficient carbon for life.134 For the first argument, the problem of fine-tuning may be alleviated 
to some extent due to a larger possible range obtained. However, this is just a few percent variations, 
which is still quite narrow range. For the second argument, it is just a rough idea suggested by Stenger. 
Oberhymmer et al. have performed rigorous calculations based on this theory and suggested that fine-
tuning is required:135 
“Even with a change of 0.4% in the strength of force, carbon-based life appears to be impossible, since 
all the stars then would produce either almost solely carbon or oxygen, but could not produce both 
elements.” 
Therefore, the arguments suggested cannot solve the fine-tuning problem. 
All the above arguments made by Stenger concern mainly the constants N and ε. Stenger continues his 
arguments and claims that the matter content Ω, initial quantum fluctuations Q and cosmological constant 
λ need not to be fine-tuned.   
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For matter content Ω, he invokes the inflation model to address the fine-tuning of Ω.136 As mentioned 
above, this is just displaced by another fine-tuned value in the inflation model. Therefore, this argument is 
not valid.  
For the initial quantum fluctuations Q, Stenger states that “heroic attempts by the best minds in cosmology 
have not yet succeeded in calculating the magnitude of Q, inflation theory successfully predicted the 
angular correlation across the sky that has been observed.”137This is wrong. A given inflationary model 
will predict Q, and it will only predict a life-permitting value for Q if the parameters of the inflation 
potential are suitably fine-tuned.138 Further to this argument, Stenger suggests that a Cold Big Bang model 
can avoid the fine-tuning of Q. The Cold Big Bang model suggests that our universe starts at zero 
temperature and all particles are in thermal equilibrium. If our universe is expanding according to the 
Cold Big Bang model, then life is still possible when the initial quantum fluctuation is less than 10-7.139 
Therefore, a wider range of Q is obtained and fine-tuning is not required. It is commonly believed that the 
expansion of our universe is according to Hot Big Bang scenario but not the Cold Big Bang. The Hot Big 
Bang suggests that our universe starts with high temperature after the inflation. This model is strongly 
supported by observational data such as the cosmic microwave background radiation and the observed 
ratio of helium to hydrogen in the universe. Stenger actually agrees with that by stating “This is now 
widely accepted as the standard cosmological model because of its good agreement with observational 
data. That does not mean that all alternatives have been ruled out of consideration”.140 This is true only if 
the alternatives have been supported by some strong evidence. A proposition with no evidence should be 
ruled out when compared with another highly supported scenario. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to 
support the Cold Big Bang model although it is logically possible. Since Stenger knows that the Cold Big 
Bang model cannot explain the isotropic cosmic microwave background radiation, he therefore suggests 
the existence of Population III objects in the early universe. These objects can help to thermalize the 
background and yield the required observations.141 Scientists believe that Population III stars (first 
generation star) might exist in the early time, but this is not enough to show that the cosmic microwave 
background radiation detected can be matched with this scenario. Besides, this suggestion cannot explain 
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the relative abundance of hydrogen and helium in the universe. Suggestions of such unverified models 
(Cold Big Bang model and Population III objects) should not be treated as arguments to falsify the fine-
tuning problem. 
For the cosmological constant λ, Stenger shows by calculations that current quantum theories cannot 
obtain this value.142 In quantum physics, vacuum is not really vacuum but full of creation and annihilation 
of virtual particles. Quantum mechanics show that the ground state energy is not zero for vacuum. This is 
known as the vacuum energy. However, the calculated λ by using this vacuum energy is much larger than 
the observed one.143 Then, Stenger claims that “the standard calculation of this parameter is grossly 
wrong and should be ignored. Viable possibilities exist for explaining its value, and until these are all 
ruled out, no fine-tuning can be claimed”.144 Barnes replies this by stating that a calculation is wrong does 
not show that the cosmological constant is not fine-tuned.145 The calculation being much larger than the 
measured value may be due to some cancelations by virtual bosons and fermions which we didn’t take 
into account. 146 This is already known by most particle physicists. Stenger argues that the cosmological 
constant should be zero by suggesting the existence of a “ghost particle” conjectured by Sakharov.147 
However, this suggestion has not been confirmed by any experiments and observations. If the 
cosmological constant is zero, then we need an explanation for the accelerating universe. Stenger suggests 
using the theory of quintessence, which is another form of energy with negative pressure. There exists a 
parameter w to distinguish the cosmological constant (w = -1) and the quintessence (-1 < w < 0).  
Although this theory has not been ruled out yet, recent studies from observation indicate that w = -0. 99 ± 
0.06, which strongly favours the model of cosmological constant but not quintessence.148 Even if the 
theory of quintessence is true, quintessence models must be also fine-tuned in exactly the same way as the 
cosmological constant.149 Therefore, the fine-tuning problem for λ still exists. 
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In a chapter of his book, he writes down some important constraints for life and allows four free 
parameters (the coupling constant for electromagnetic force α, the strong coupling constant αs, the mass of 
electron and proton) to vary. By using simulations, he discovers that a considerable amount of life-
permitting universe is generated. The variation of parameters can be as large as ten times or two orders of 
magnitude.150 Therefore, he claims that fine-tuning is not necessary for life. In fact, he does not include all 
the constraints. He includes 14 constraints in his calculations, but not the constraints of molecular 
stability, proton stability, pair creation of electrons, bound state of diproton, stability of deuteron, stability 
of carbon production, etc.151 Many more constraints should be included in the calculations. The life-
allowing parameter space would be much larger even if you just omit one constraint. Some careful studies 
about these four parameters have been carried by Tegmark, which indicate that only an extremely tiny 
parameter space is allowed for life.152 Some more arguments such as using Bayesian method to disprove 
the fine-tuning problem have been suggested by Stenger. I will discuss these arguments in later chapters. 
To conclude, none of the suggested arguments from Stenger seem reasonable to address the fine-tuning 
problem. In fact, the existence of fine-tuning is widely accepted in the scientific community.  Barnes 
quotes many famous scientists that support the idea of a fine-tuned universe for life.153 Even if we accept 
all the arguments from Stenger that the existence of stars and anthropic elements need not be fine-tuned, 
he still needs to explain the secondary fine-tuning in the nature, such as the thermal properties of water 
and carbon dioxide. All these constraints would limit these physical constants to a narrow region.  In the 
later chapters, I will continue to discuss some more constraints on the initial conditions and fundamental 
constants, especially in our environment and biological evolution. That will make the fine-tuning problem 
even more seriously. 
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Chapter 4   Fine-tuning of the initial conditions and life formation 
In the previous chapter, I have reviewed the facts about some important fine-tuned constants in nature. 
Some of the constants such as N, ε and masses of elementary particles are related to physical laws. 
Strictly speaking, all primary and secondary fine-tuning are based on four fine-tuned fundamental 
constants of forces (electromagnetic, gravitational, weak and strong forces). Nevertheless, these constants 
are not the only way to govern the consequences. All subsequent motions of particles are governed by two 
things: physical laws and initial conditions.  Basically, given some required initial conditions, physical 
laws can tell you all the subsequent motions. For example, in Newtonian mechanics, the motions are 
mainly governed by Newton’s second law, which is a second order differential equation: 
𝐹 = 𝑚
𝑑2𝑥
𝑑2𝑡
                                                                          (4.1) 
where F, m, x, t are the force on the particle, mass of the particle, displacement function (position) and 
time respectively. Mathematical theorem states that at least two initial conditions should be given to a 
second order differential equation so that a subsequent motion can be well-defined. Usually, given the 
initial position and velocity of a particle, the future trajectory of the particle can be derived. Therefore, 
initial conditions are very important in knowing the particle behaviors. In the evolution of our universe, 
the primordial fluctuation Q, matter content Ω and the cosmological constant λ can be regarded as the 
initial conditions.  
Life is highly dependent on the environmental changes. Our Earth is not habitable if there are too much 
cosmic rays attacking life or the surface temperature of the Earth is a few Celsius degrees higher.  All the 
environment changes are governed by physical laws and initial conditions. A slight change in the initial 
conditions and physical laws may give rise to a drastic change in the environment, in which life cannot 
live anymore. For example, Venus is a similar planet to Earth, in many physical compositions. Its 
temperature is about 400℃ due to severe greenhouse effect. Obviously, no life known can be living in 
such environment. In addition, evolution of life also sensitively depends on the environmental changes. 
For example, mammals become a dominant force in nature because the fall of dinosaurs due to drastic 
change in environment. The evolution series would be greatly altered if there were no such environmental 
changes in the past. Therefore, initial condition is a very important parameter that should be considered in 
life evolution.     
In this chapter, we will describe the importance of the location of our Earth in Milky Way and how the 
initial conditions caused changes in the environment. It is not necessary to trace all the conditions back to 
the beginning of the universe, even though they actually affect the initial conditions of the Earth. All the 
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initial conditions of the universe such as Ω (or the inflation field), λ and Q, have been discussed in the 
previous chapter. Here we mainly examine whether fine-tuning exists in the initial conditions at the 
beginning of the Earth. In the following, by using the fact that initial conditions can sensitively affect the 
environment, I will show that the beginning of life and biological evolution are fine-tuned process. Here, 
as well as the previous chapter, we simply assume that all life forms come from natural processes. In this 
chapter, I call the environment that is hospitable for life the “anthropic environment”. 
 
4.1 The location of Earth in Milky Way 
Recent studies in Astrobiology indicate that the location of a planet in a galaxy is essential for life 
evolution. The region that a planet located in a galaxy such that it could evolve complex life is called the 
Galactic Habitable Zone (GHZ). A region that can be regarded as GHZ should have 1) an appropriate 
supernova rate nearby and 2) appropriate amount of heavy elements.154  
 
4.1.1 Supernova rate 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, supernovae are essential for life formation because some of the 
anthropic elements can only be made through supernova processes. However, the nearby supernova rate 
cannot be too high. Since supernovae would produce a large amount of cosmic rays, which can deplete 
our ozone layer so that our Earth would be exposed to the sun’s radiation. This effect is called the 
Supernovae Sterilization. If the rate of nearby supernovae is as large as 4 times the solar neighborhood 
rate, no life would be formed in our Earth.155 Therefore, the location of our Earth is fine-tuned such that 
the supernova rate is not too high to prohibit life. 
 
4.1.2 Metallicity 
The amount of heavy elements (metallicity) in a planetary system is also crucial for planet formation. If 
no habitable planets can be formed, no life would evolve. Recent studies show that no planet can be 
formed if the metallicity in a system is too low. Also, if the metallicity is too high, only giant planets 
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would be produced, and most likely this kind of planets would either be ejected out from the planetary 
system or fall into the host star due to gravitational attraction. Fortunately, the metallicity of our solar 
system is suitable for making habitable planet – Earth. 
In general, the space of GHZ is not very large in a typical galaxy. To produce life, the host planet must be 
located inside GHZ and need to satisfy many other different conditions and constraints, which will be 
discussed below. 
 
4.2 Initial conditions and the environmental changes 
Environmental changes and climatic changes are inter-related. All climatic changes are governed by 
atmospheric science, which is composed by some physical and chemical laws.  In principle, given all the 
initial conditions and scientific laws, all climatic changes can be predicted. However, this is not the actual 
case. We notice that weather forecasting is not always precise. For example, no one can precisely 
determine whether any typhoons would be created after one month. The reason is that the physical laws 
(or the equations) that govern the climatic changes are highly non-linear. Non-linear physics is hardly 
predictable. Mathematically, the solutions of the non-linear equations are sensitively dependent on initial 
conditions. Errors would be accumulated, and grow with time. Even a very tiny difference in the initial 
condition would generate a great difference. The “butterfly effect” – a movement of butterfly’s wing may 
result in a storm in another continent - is one of the famous results related to non-linear physics.    
In atmospheric science, we need several initial conditions to specify the climatic change. These conditions 
include temperature, pressure, density of air, chemical composition of air, velocity of air, energy supply 
from Sun and water content in air.156 All these parameters are correlated to each other. In the following, I 
will briefly review how these conditions should be fine-tuned for life. 
 
4.2.1 Composition of Earth 
Our Earth can be roughly divided into two parts: “air” and “ground (including sea)”. For the ground, we 
have 92 naturally found elements, in which 25 are presently considered essential for life.157 Many of them 
have been discussed in the previous chapter. No complex life would exist if any one of them is missing. 
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Some of these elements (carbon, oxygen) are generated from stars’ nuclear fusion; and the remaining 
elements (cobalt, copper) are generated from supernovae. Therefore, only a right amount of explosion 
from supernovae may result in this specific composition. However, some elements that are not directly 
essential for life (no role in metabolic reactions) are also crucial for life. They are radioactive elements. In 
general, radioactive elements are harmful to life because they will emit high energy radiation which can 
cause cancers. Surprisingly, recent studies show that a considerable amount of radioactive elements are 
essential to generate life. They provide heat by radioactive decay which can warm the interior of the earth 
shortly after its formation. This effect causes differentiation of elements in Earth which is important in 
life evolution because the elements crucial for life can rise to an upper region to increase the probability 
of generating life. Also, the differentiation process can cause some radioactive elements to float to the 
surface in order to prevent overheating of the Earth’s core. These processes are sensitively dependent on 
the amount of the radioactive elements. Too much radioactive elements would melt the Earth while no 
differentiation would happen if there were too few radioactive elements.158  
Moreover, the presence of radioactive elements helps the movement of Plate Tectonics.159 The Plate 
Tectonic movement recycles carbonate and silicate rock through the planet’s interior, which can also 
stabilize the atmosphere over geologic time. The mass of a planet that can undergo plate tectonics should 
be within 0.5-10 Earth masses.160 
Besides, our atmosphere is also fine-tuned for life. The atmospheric pressure of Earth in the past was 
ranging from 500 mmHg – 1000 mmHg, which is quite stable in history. If it were 10 times smaller, body 
fluids would vaporize at 38℃. If it were 10 times smaller, the respiration would be prohibitive.161 
Therefore, the atmospheric pressure in Earth is fine-tuned. Moreover, one of the most important gases in 
the air, oxygen, also has some fine-tuned properties. Oxygen provides ozone (O3), which can prevent 
harmful ultraviolet radiation to reach the Earth. Also, the oxygen content level (about 21% now) is at a 
point where risk and benefit nicely balance.162 If there were too much oxygen (above 25%), very little 
land vegetation could survive. The probability of a forest fire being ignited by lightning increases by as 
much as 70 percent for every 1 percent increase in the oxygen level.163 If there were too little oxygen, not 
enough energy would be generated for complex life and the diversity of life would be largely decreased. 
In fact, the oxygen content and atmospheric pressure are controlled by a complex set of feedback 
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mechanisms involving complex interactions between the hydrosphere, biosphere and the material making 
up the crust of Earth.164 The interactions between different cycles in different spheres are related to 
chemical properties of anthropic molecules, which will be discussed later. Moreover, it has been shown 
that various cycles (oxygen, carbon, and nitrogen cycles) are also regulated by microbes, not just by the 
physical environment. For example, cyanobacteria produce oxygen and remove hydrogen sulfide.  
Nitrogen fixing bacteria converts usable nitrogen from air to food.165 Therefore, not only the physical 
conditions give a hospitable environment for the microbes, the microbes also help to regulate the 
environment. In order to make an equilibrium condition, these complicated mechanisms and cycles must 
be fine-tuned. In fact, since these mechanisms depend on the results of biological evolution, the processes 
of biological evolution must also be fine-tuned. We will discuss this issue in the next chapter. 
Besides these fine-tuned cycles, one of the major fine-tuned values is the mass of Earth. As mentioned 
above, the mass of Earth controls the plate tectonics. It also controls the oxygen content and the 
atmospheric pressure. A few percent changes in the mass of Earth may result in a drastic change in the 
oxygen content and the atmospheric pressure. 
 
4.2.2 Maintenance of constant content 
In most metabolisms, oxygen is consumed and carbon dioxide is released.  Therefore, one can imagine 
that oxygen content is decreasing and carbon dioxide content is increasing. If so, after a long history, 
lacking of oxygen and greenhouse effect would become more serious which make life impossible. 
Fortunately, it is not the case because some cycles help to balance the content of essential chemicals over 
the past 4 billion years!  
There are many essential cycles to life, such as carbon cycle, oxygen cycle, nitrogen cycle, phosphorous 
cycle, sulfur cycle, calcium cycle, iron cycle and sodium cycle. Most of the cycles are interdependent.166 
Breaking down of any cycles may result in significant changes in other cycles, which would make life 
impossible.  Moreover, these cycles also depend on temperature, tectonic cycle, etc. These cycles would 
generate new essential chemicals by some feedback mechanisms or chemical processes when these 
chemicals were consumed by organisms. For example, the content of carbon dioxide is regulated by a 
negative feedback system via the weathering of silicate rocks. The silicate rocks would increase the 
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uptake rate of the carbon dioxide if the carbon dioxide content is increased. This helps to stabilize the 
carbon dioxide content and the temperature of the Earth.167    
Interestingly, cycles stabilize the chemical content in Earth, but also allow some variations, which are not 
fatal to life. I call it “globally stable but locally fluctuating”. These fluctuations and variations do not 
overwhelm the overall stability, but provide enough forces to generate diversity. Without these variations, 
no diversity would be produced and evolution might not be possible (to be discussed in the next chapter).  
However, too much variation would make the environment unstable for life. Therefore, these cycles, the 
fundamental constants and initial conditions involved, are fine-tuned.  
 
4.3 Origin of life 
In the 19th century, scientist Louis Pasteur showed that if a broth or solution was properly sterilized and 
excluded from contact with micro-organisms, it would remain sterile indefinitely. This experiment 
disproved that life could be generated spontaneously.168 If it were the case, where did the first life come 
from? In the bottom-up scenario, the first life evolved from some simple molecules by natural processes. 
It is known as chemical evolution. According to this scenario, all major building blocks of life such as 
protein, RNA, DNA were formed from more basic chemicals by chemical reactions. A collection of these 
basic chemicals is called the prebiotic soup. These chemicals include water, lipids, sugars, amino acids, 
phosphate and nitrogenous bases. Besides natural processes, some believe that the first life could be made 
by some other intelligent life or supernatural being. In the following, I will mainly follow the bottom-up 
scenario and discuss the probability of getting the first life. 
 
4.3.1 Prebiotic soup 
It is commonly believed that only simple molecules (e.g. water, oxides) were formed when the formation 
of Earth was just complete. More complex molecules such as amino acids and phosphate need to be 
generated from chemical processes. In the early 1950s, Stanley Miller generated some important complex 
molecules that are essential for life by experiment. He used a flask of water to represent the primordial 
ocean and another flask containing water vapour, methane, ammonia and hydrogen to represent the 
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primordial atmosphere. By using a continuous electrical discharge that represents lightning, the gases 
interact and reaction products would be formed. One week later, he found that amino acids were formed 
after the experiment.169 However, recent geochemical evidence shows that the primordial atmosphere 
should contain carbon dioxide, nitrogen, water vapour and oxygen, but not the gases used in the Miller’s 
experiment.170 Models of atmospheric evolution indicate that a methane- and ammonia-rich reducing 
atmosphere would be easily destroyed by sunlight. Therefore, the synthesis proposed by Miller is highly 
improbable. Even if the experimental result is right, many amino acids generated (e.g. pipecolic acid) 
from the experiment are not found in proteins on Earth.171  Now, many scientists believe that the prebiotic 
soup could not be generated from the primordial atmosphere through chemical processes because of its 
extremely low probability.  Therefore, the initial conditions or the environment must be extremely fine-
tuned in order to create the prebiotic soup from simple molecules naturally. 
Another theory states that the prebiotic soup is mainly generated from extra-terrestrial objects. In 1969, a 
town called Murchison in Australia was shattered by a carbon-rich meteorite.172 Scientists discovered that 
this meteorite contained organic molecules including amino acids, lipids, monosaccharides, phosphate 
and nitrogenous bases.173 It indicates that the early Solar System must have been a place in which organic 
chemistry was taking place. However, there are still some essential organic molecules for life that could 
not be found in the Murchison meteorite, such as polysaccharides, proteins, nucleic acids.174 These large 
organic molecules might be polymerized by some mechanisms that would achieve the properties of life.175 
By using statistics, we can estimate the minimum time to accumulate enough organic materials for life. 
The total accumulated carbon content is given by 
𝑥𝑐 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖                                                                   (4.2) 
where Pi, ai, mi are the impact probability, carbon content ratio, mass of particular meteorite i respectively, 
and t is the estimated time. The value of ai is well known, and the values of Pi and mi can be obtained 
from statistics. The mass of carbon in the biosphere is about 6 × 1014 kg and the estimated ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑖  is 
0.32 × 106 kg.176 Therefore, the required time is about 1.9 billion years, which is quite close to the first 
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life appeared since the Earth formed (about 1 billion year). Many scientists start to believe that the 
prebiotic soup or life may come from the extra-terrestrial objects. In the above calculation, we can notice 
that the probability Pi is a fine-tuned value. If Pi is ten times smaller, the required time t for carbon 
accumulation would be 19 billion years, which is impossible for life because the Sun is already dead. If Pi 
is ten times larger, our Earth would be too easy for impact from meteorites, which is fatal for most 
complex life. This fine-tuned Pi mainly depends on the size and the relative gravitational strength of 
Earth. Moreover, the initial conditions of the Solar System have to be fine-tuned. For example, the 
location of the meteorites should not be too close to or too far away from Earth. Otherwise the impact 
probability would be either much higher or smaller. Also, the mass of the meteorites should not be too 
large or too small. Otherwise, either extinction of life would be happened or no life would be created.    
To conclude, in order to generate the prebiotic soup, there are two possible scenarios. Both scenarios need 
to have some fine-tuned conditions. 
 
4.4 Macro-organic molecules 
Scientists believe that the macro-organic molecules, such as protein, RNA, DNA, etc. could be formed 
from the prebiotic soup. However, the actual mechanisms are very poorly understood. It is because some 
specified structures make these molecules difficult to be produced naturally. Some fine-tuned conditions 
must be needed. In the previous chapter, I have outlined some fine-tuned chemical properties of protein 
and DNA molecules. In the following, I will briefly describe the formation of the specified structures of 
three most important macro-organic molecules for life, protein, RNA and DNA. 
 
4.4.1 Protein 
Proteins are polymerized amino acids. A very small protein can contain about 150 amino acids, which has 
10195 possible sequence combinations.177 In general, not all the amino acids can form chains by chemical 
bonds to become protein molecules. Only for those amino acids that can form a peptide bond would fold 
into a protein. When amino acid mixtures are allowed to react in a test tube, the probability of getting 
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peptide bonds is about ½ .178 In other words, for simple protein that contains 150 amino acids, the 
probability of getting this protein by random is (1/2)149 = 10-45, which is very low.179 
Moreover, molecules with identical chemical formulae may have difference structural arrangements. For 
example, in amino acids, there are two different forms, left-handed and right-handed. This chemical 
property is called chirality.180 Out of 20 amino acids used in forming protein, 19 can exist as left-handed 
and right-handed forms. In the absence of life, the chemical reactions from amino acids generally create 
equal numbers of left- and right-handed forms. However, what is remarkable is that all life on Earth uses 
only the left-handed forms of amino acids for producing proteins. 181 Therefore, the probability of creating 
a protein with 150 amino acids randomly is (1/2)150 = 10-195. Combined with the probability of forming 
peptide chain, the total probability of creating a protein with 150 amino acids randomly is 10-240. This is 
an extremely small probability. If this protein has to be created randomly from nature, some fine-tuned 
conditions must be satisfied. Nevertheless, many practical proteins for life need more than 150 amino 
acids, and the required fine-tuning is much more serious. 
One possible mechanism for generating left-handed amino acids in nature has been postulated. The amino 
acids found from meteorites show an excess of the left-handed amino acids.182 One possibility is that the 
excess left-handed amino acids are formed by the ultraviolet circularly polarized light (UVCPL).  The 
electric field direction rotates along the beam which destroys one form of the molecules (right-handed) 
more readily than the other form (left-handed).183 These UVCPL might come from the star-forming 
regions in space. If this is true, the probability of generating a protein molecule naturally may increase 
significantly. However, there should be a fine-tuned condition such that the UVCPL is pointing to the 
Solar System, and these radiations should have enough intensity to increase the amount of left-handed 
amino acids. Therefore, the mechanism that can generate excess left-handed amino acids also requires 
fine-tuning. In any case, the probability of getting a protein is still very low.  
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4.4.2 DNA and RNA 
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) and RNA (ribonucleic acid) are two very important structures in life that 
store genetic information and transcribe the genetic information to synthesize protein respectively. The 
DNA molecules consist of four nucleotide bases Adenine (A), Cytosine (C), Thymine (T) and Guanine 
(G) while the RNA molecules consist of the same three bases A, C, G and one different base, Uracil (U). 
Basically, the genetic information stored in DNA is represented by the sequence of bases, for example, 
ACTGGTCAACGGCTGG…. Then, the RNA molecules will ‘translate’ the code and instruct the cell to 
make proteins.  However, proteins are needed to catalyse the reaction. Therefore, protein cannot 
reproduce without the help of the DNA and DNA cannot produce protein without the help of proteins. If 
so, how could the first DNA exist without the RNA and protein? This is similar to the ‘chicken and egg’ 
paradox.184 
Scientists later discovered the RNA molecules can perform some enzymatic functions needed for 
replication. RNA could store genetic information and act as catalysts, which would make proteins for 
simple life.185 This “RNA-first model” is commonly accepted by most biological scientists. Although this 
suggestion can alleviate the ‘chicken and egg’ paradox, some questions are still not yet addressed. Meyer 
has summarized 5 major problems in the RNA-first model.186 Firstly, the RNA building blocks are hard to 
synthesize and easy to destroy. Experiments show that it is extremely difficult to synthesize and maintain 
the essential RNA building blocks (ribose and the nucleotide bases). As mentioned above, we didn’t find 
any nucleotide acids from the meteorites. These nucleotide bases must be created through naturalistic 
processes. However, the life-times for these bases are relatively short (less than 20 years), which is not 
long enough for life to evolve.187 Secondly, the RNA can only perform a small handful of the thousands 
of functions performed by modern proteins.188 That means RNA is just a very poor substitute for proteins 
in terms of catalyzing properties, which makes life difficult to evolve. Thirdly, no plausible explanation is 
given how primitive self-replicating RNA molecules might have evolved into modern cells that rely on a 
variety of proteins to process genetic information and regulate metabolism.189  Fourthly, the origin of 
genetic information cannot be explained in this model. All genetic codes stored in DNA (or RNA) are 
specified. Not all the codes are meaningful (useful for generating suitable proteins), but just a few 
specified codes can synthesize useful proteins. As there is no chemical affinity between the nucleotide 
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bases in the same strand of DNA, the codes in the DNA can be in any sequences. In other words, there is 
no restriction on the sequence of the DNA. If these sequences were generated randomly, the probability of 
getting a meaningless sequence (cannot form specified proteins for life) is much greater than the 
meaningful one (can form specified proteins for life). Therefore, the probability of getting correct genetic 
information for life is extremely low. Lastly, current scientists cannot create any fully functional RNA-
based RNA polymerase from anything else, unless you provide some directions to enhance function of 
some common types of ligases.190 The above five problems indicate that a functional and information-rich 
RNA is extremely difficult to create.  
In view of these difficulties, the problem of genetic information stored in DNA or RNA is the most 
serious. Many proposals have been suggested to address this problem. In 1977, Prigogine and Nicolis 
suggested that highly ordered pattern can be formed when energy is flowing into a system under non-
equilibrium conditions.191 However, Yockey pointed out that highly ordered pattern is not equivalent to 
specified information.192  Even if a sequence can be generated by some unknown biological forces (laws) 
in nature, the resulting sequence should be periodic or repetitive pattern (e.g. 
ACGTACGTACGTACGT…) rather than specified (aperiodic but meaningful) because natural laws 
describe events that repeatedly and predictably recur under the same conditions.193 Therefore, the DNA 
sequence possesses specified complexity, not just a highly ordered pattern.194 Later, Kauffman suggests 
that the specified information problem can be solved by a self-organizational process – a self-reproducing 
metabolic system might emerge directly from a set of low-specificity catalytic peptides and RNA 
molecules in a prebiotic soup (chemical minestrone).195 However, Meyer points out that Kauffman’s 
model merely transfers the information problem from the molecules into the soup.196 In other words, 
Kauffman presupposes that his system will work only once it had been fine-tuned.197  
Although the RNA-first model is the most reasonable one to explain the existence of proteins, DNA and 
RNA, many fine-tuned conditions in this model are required, especially the information stored in the 
DNA and RNA. For organic synthesis in laboratory, the right materials must be taken from the right 
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bottles and mixed and treated in an appropriate sequence of operations.198 This indicates that even simple 
organic synthesis requires fine-tuned process. For organisms that involve particular enzymes for catalytic 
processes, right sequence of DNA for storing information and specific proteins for biological functions, 
the fine-tuning problem is much more serious. 
 
4.5 Fine-tuning of cell 
All cells in organisms require some fine-tuned properties. These properties work well with some other 
independent fine-tuned properties. 
 
4.5.1 Lipid  
Lipids are important molecules that play many critical roles in cells. They are a major source of cellular 
energy. They function as electrical insulators and as detergents. They form the waxes which coat the 
feathers of birds.199 The solubility of lipid molecules in water is fine-tuned. Lipid molecules cannot carry 
out biological functions if they are either too soluble or insoluble in water. This requires the number of 
carbon atoms in lipid molecules to be 16-18. If the number of carbon atoms is larger than 18, it would be 
too insoluble for biological functions – they cannot be mobilized at all in water. If the number of carbon 
atoms is smaller than 16, it would be too soluble so that all constituents would merely dissolve away.200 In 
addition, the lipid can form bilayer to serve as an electrical insulator to avoid the loss of potassium and 
sodium ions. These ions generate an electrical potential between inside and outside of the cell which helps 
to transit the nerve impulses. 
 
4.5.2 Cell adhesion 
Another important fine-tuned property is the affinity bond between two cells. The strength of these 
affinity bonds is made up of the sum of the various weak chemical bonds between two cells.201 Recent 
studies show that only between 1-10 affinity bonds are sufficient to hold two cells together against most 
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of the common forces in biological systems.202 If the bonds are weaker, the specific cell-cell binding 
would be impossible. If the bonds are stronger, it would be very difficult for cells to detach themselves 
from one another.203 The strengths of these bonds are mainly characterized by the chemical compositions 
of cells and the value of the fundamental constant of electromagnetic force.  
 
4.5.3 Crawling 
Crawling means continual changes to its shape which is formed by deformable cytoplasm. Crawling plays 
an essential role in all developmental processes in higher organisms. This property requires an appropriate 
viscosity of cytoplasm. The cell’s contents would be immobilized if the viscosity is too high. This 
phenomenon is characterized by various weak chemical bonds, and the forces of these chemical bonds 
should be finely balanced in order to make crawling possible.204 
To conclude, the fine-tuning of cells requires several coincident primary and secondary fine-tunings. 
These fine-tuned properties make the cells possible to carry out many crucial biological functions in 
organisms.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The origin of life is a mystery. Two possible scenarios of creating prebiotic soup – chemical evolution 
and accumulation from extra-terrestrial objects – require fine-tuned conditions, such as suitable size of 
Earth, chemical composition, probability of meteorite impact and initial conditions.  Even if the prebiotic 
soup could be generated naturally, it is very difficult for them to evolve into proteins, RNA and DNA. As 
mentioned above, since the structures of proteins, RNA and DNA have some specific properties, the 
probabilities of generating these macro-molecules naturally are extremely low. Therefore, some fine-
tuned conditions must be satisfied in order to create them through natural processes. Even if all RNA, 
DNA and proteins are generated, life would exist only when certain environment is hospitable for life, 
such as chemical composition of Earth, atmospheric pressure and oxygen content level. Some initial 
conditions must be fine-tuned in order to get these anthropic environments.   
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In this chapter, I have discussed the fine-tuned conditions for life. Some of these conditions are dependent 
on fundamental constants. These fine-tuned conditions are mainly secondary fine-tuning.  Nevertheless, 
many fine-tuned properties are based on complex behavior of molecules and environments, which are 
highly non-linear and dependent on initial conditions. Suppose the probability of getting these fine-tuned 
initial conditions P(c) is independent of the primary and secondary fine-tuning. By using equation (3.4), 
the total probability of getting all these fine-tuned anthropic fundamental constants and conditions is 
given by 
                               𝑃(𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝) = 𝑃(𝑐) × 𝑃(𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃) ≤ 𝑃(𝑐) × 𝑃(𝑠) × 𝑃(𝑝).                         (4.3) 
This probability is extremely low. The fine-tuning problem is getting worse if we consider the fine-tuned 
initial conditions. 
Smith and Szathmary generalize seven crucial transitions from prebiotic soup to human life through 
natural processes. They are self-organization (generating protocells), synthesis (RNA formation), RNA to 
DNA, Endosymbiosis (formation of Algae), Asexual to sexual, cell differentiation (animals, plants and 
fungi formation), and language (human intelligence).205  We have now discussed three of them, and all 
need fine-tuned conditions. In the next chapter, we will discuss the remaining crucial steps and show that 
all require fine-tuned conditions.  
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Chapter 5   Global fine-tuning – guidance of evolution 
The theory of evolution was proposed by a biological scientist Charles Darwin in the 19th century. He 
stated that life evolved from basic life to complex life through a long period of natural processes. The 
evolution of complex life is mainly based on a mechanism called Natural Selection. This mechanism 
suggests that all organisms in the nature undergo competitions (food searching). Due to the scarcity of 
resources, some inferior organisms lose in the competition (killed or eaten by the others), and the more 
superior organisms survive. This process continues and the nature will favor the more superior organisms. 
As a result, an equilibrium will be reached - many complex life and only some simple organisms 
remained. Therefore, the theory of evolution mainly consists of two general components: natural selection 
and the survival of the fittest. In other words, the environment and competitions (or cooperation) 
determine the evolution history. 
However, this theory does not suggest a possible mechanism why life would evolve from simple to 
complex life. In the 20th century, scientists discovered genes and noticed that genes would change in time 
due to mutations. The DNA sequence in organisms would have a slight change due to some external 
effects such as cosmic radiations. These changes could be accumulated by passing to the next generation. 
Therefore, the genetic change in DNA provides a possible mechanism of evolution.  
Although the theory of evolution is far from complete due to many missing links in the evolution series, 
most scientists have already come to a consensus that complex life evolved from simple life by evolution. 
The fact of evolution is mainly based on the geological distribution of fossils (simple organisms mainly 
found in the early crusts) and genetic variations among the organisms.206 Intelligent life (human) also 
evolved from simple life by evolution. The ancestor of modern human evolved from the common ancestor 
of humans and apes 6-7 million years ago.207 By the way, not only the biological evolution (evolution of 
body, organs, etc.) is important, the evolutions of languages, social behavior are also very important.  
In this chapter, we will briefly discuss the fine-tuned condition for biological evolution. It requires the 
fine-tuning of global environment and conditions. I call it the “global fine-tuning”. Also, we will discuss 
the fine-tuning of materialistic mind generations in evolution. Lastly, we will focus on the fine-tuning of 
evolution of human beings (intelligent life). 
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5.1 Global environmental fine-tuning    
Evolution is highly dependent on the driving force, the surroundings and the environmental changes. In 
the previous chapter, I have discussed how environment is related to initial conditions and how life 
formation is sensitive to the “background environment” of our Earth (such as oxygen content). In this 
section, I will mention some crucial global environmental changes that lead to some significant changes 
in evolutionary history. 
Most evolution biologists believe that the evolution series would be different if the environmental 
changes were different in the past. Moreover, a slightly different environment in different areas causes 
variations in the organisms. This generates diversity. When a great change occurs in the Earth, such as 
meteorite impact or volcano eruption, a large amount of organisms become extinct and some other 
organisms start to dominate the world. As a result, the driving force becomes different and the evolution 
series would be totally different. Many Biologists used to believe that the “punctuated equilibrium” in 
evolution theory characterizes the burst of intense evolution and speciation. Now, recent studies indicate 
that the effect of punctuated equilibrium in evolutionary history may not be so significant. Instead, global 
episodes may have a crucial role in evolution.208 In this section, I will outline how global events affect the 
evolution. I will also briefly describe the fine-tuning in evolution and the importance of diversity and 
cooperation.    
 
5.1.1 Mass extinction episodes 
In the evolutionary history, the number of families in the Earth is not strictly increasing. There exist at 
least five mass extinction episodes. They occurred at, in chronological order, late Ordovician, late 
Devonian, late Permian, later Triassic and late Cretaceous. A large amount of families were destroyed due 
to different global events. Simultaneously, those organisms who survived in these episodes started to 
grow and change their morphology.  Here I will describe two most important episodes in the history that 
totally change the world. 
The first most important episode occurred at late Permian (251 million years ago). An estimated 95% of 
all species on the Earth became extinct.209 It is commonly believed that global warming caused by some 
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massive volcanic eruption was the main reason.  Life came close to complete annihilation and it took 
about 100 million years for global biodiversity to return to pre-extinction levels.210 
Another crucial episode happened in the best-known period in late Cretaceous during which the extinction 
of dinosaurs occurred. It is widely accepted that this extinction is caused by a huge asteroid impact. There 
may be some massive volcano eruptions which further enhance the effect.211 We now notice that this 
extinction event facilitate the start of mammals, which leads to the development of human beings later.212 
Without the extinction of the dinosaurs, mammals would not be the dominant forces in the nature and 
human beings may probably not be developed through evolution.  
These two crucial episodes require some global events such as massive meteorite impact or volcano 
eruptions. The probability of these global events depends on many factors, such as the size of the 
meteorite, the thickness of our atmosphere and the size of the Earth. Statistics show that the approximate 
frequency (probability) of meteorite impact depends on the size of meteorite (or the energy given out by 
the meteorite). The frequency is about one time in one to ten million years for the global catastrophe 
caused by meteorite impact.213 Therefore, the number of possible global events is not so small compared 
with the long life history (few billion years). However, the massive meteorite impact that makes dinosaurs 
extinct occurred at a right time with a right amount of power. If it is somewhat larger in power, all 
organisms in the Earth might be dead. If the power is much smaller, the extinction would not be occurred 
and human beings would not be able to appear. In fact, statistics show that the frequency of meteorite 
impact is dependent on the size (power) of the meteorite.214 Therefore, these global episodes should be 
under some fine-tuned conditions such that the events appeared at the right time and gave out the right 
amount of power. 
 
5.1.2 Fine-tuning in evolution 
The evolutionary series is governed by biological rules (genetic variations, natural selections, etc.). 
Simple organisms can become complex organisms by following these rules through a very long time. As 
mentioned above, fine-tuned environments and global changes should be made in order to get highly 
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complex organisms. These changes require very specific fine-tuned conditions, which are highly 
improbable to be generated randomly. Apart from these fine-tuned conditions, evolution itself might 
intrinsically be an important fine-tuned process.  
Recently, some computational biologists start to simulate evolution by using computer algorithms. They 
try using computer program to see whether it can generate complex structures from simple structures. The 
first famous attempt is the program called “Game of Life” invented by Conway.215 He starts with a simple 
figure - square array - and sets some rules to determine next generation. For example, a live square with 
two or three live neighbours survives and the cell will be dead if it has more than three neighbours. After 
numerous generations, some complex “life” is formed. During the late 1980s, Dawkins and Küpper 
simulate natural selection by using computer algorithm. They provided a target sequence and let the 
program to run from some primordial sequences. Variation is generated randomly. The computer would 
preserve those sequences that are close to the target sequence and then repeat the process. Finally, the 
program really produced the target sequence.216 Later, a better algorithm called “Avida Algorithm” has 
been used to simulate the effect of random mutation and natural selection. The program would generate 
some random variation and change the input function to the new output function (act as random 
mutation). The computer would first compare the input and output functions and then replicate those 
functions that have logical relationships (act as natural selection). As a result, the program would generate 
some complexity after numerous processes.217  This algorithm does not have any target sequence or 
possible future functions. It seems that these algorithms are able to generate some complex structures 
originated from simple structures. However, all these algorithms were designed by human beings. Robert 
Marks points out that these evolutionary algorithms are continuously adding information to the system.218 
Therefore, it is not surprising why complex structures would be generated. The information adding 
processes have been input to the algorithms artificially by the program designers. Basically, these results 
indicate that some fine-tuned conditions must be satisfied in order to get complex structures. In the 
simulations, all the program languages are fine-tuned. We should use correct computer languages, 
functions and algorithms to get the results. Secondly, the computer logics are fine-tuned. We should have 
some specific logics for replicate and dispose the useful and useless structures respectively in order to 
simulate the natural selection. If wrong functions or logics are used, no stable results would be generated. 
What you should do is to write a better program by using other logics to generate the required output. It 
would not be possible for a computer to generate complexity by randomly typing any letters into the 
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simulations. Therefore, the success of these evolutionary algorithms suggests that evolution itself is a 
fine-tuned process. 
On the other hand, diversity is generated by evolution due to different driving forces in different areas. 
Interestingly, the success of evolution should also be based on diversity. Competitions in evolution rely 
strongly on the food chains. The prey and predators interact with each other to form complex food circles. 
In other words, evolution itself provides a positive feedback mechanism to keep its stability. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the globally stable but locally variable environment maintains this 
stability in evolutionary history. This also suggests that evolution itself is a fine-tuned process.  
 
5.1.3 Gaia hypothesis 
In 1979, scientist James Loverlock realized that if the Earth’s atmosphere were at chemical equilibrium, it 
would be very similar to that of Venus and Mars. However, observations show that the atmospheric 
content of Earth is quite different from that of Venus and Mars.219 On the other hand, observations also 
indicate that the salt content in sea is somewhat smaller than that obtained from theoretical predictions. It 
shows that the sea is at a chemical disequilibrium.220 Therefore Lovelock argues that the presence of 
organisms is a key to set up the chemical equilibrium in our atmosphere (see section 4.2.1).221  
Lovelock summarizes the above facts and proposes the Gaia hypothesis, which holds that “the 
atmosphere, the oceans, the climate and the crust of the Earth are regulated at a state comfortable for life 
because of the behavior of living organism. Specifically, the Gaia hypothesis said that the temperature, 
oxidation state, acidity, and certain aspects of the rocks and waters are at any time kept constant, and 
that this homeostasis is maintained by active feedback processes operated automatically and 
unconsciously by the biota”.222 In other words, life affects environment, and environment affects life. 
This is a non-linear process because a certain change in the life forms might severely affect the 
environment (because the regulation of cycles changes). Consequently, the changes in the environment 
might severely affect the evolution of life. In order to achieve a stable equilibrium, the structures of 
organisms need to be fine-tuned in order to give a positive feedback to the environment. Since the 
structures of organisms are highly dependent on the biological evolution, we can conclude that both the 
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environmental conditions and the evolution processes need to be fine-tuned. Otherwise, a vicious cycle 
would be easily generated to destroy the chemical equilibrium.  
Note that the Gaia hypothesis discussed here is a scientific explanation, but not a personal explanation 
(the definitions of scientific explanation and personal explanation can be seen in p.73). Some advocates of 
this hypothesis (especially the advocates of the New Age Movement) treat our natural world as a living 
thing. Some of them interpret the interaction between the natural world and the living organisms as 
evidence for a living Gaia (or gods). Here, we do not take this view as the interaction can be completely 
understood by scientific explanation. Otherwise, the existence of a supernatural being would be implicitly 
assumed. 
 
5.1.4 Adaptive mutation 
It is commonly believed that mutation is a random process. However, recent studies in micro-organisms 
suggest that some environmental stress can direct the mutation process. This kind of mutation is called 
Adaptive mutation.223 The existence of adaptive mutation suggests that the mutation might be sensitive to 
the environmental changes. Since mutation is an essential element in biological evolution, the process of 
evolution itself is also sensitive to the environmental changes. Therefore, a certain degrees of fine-tuning 
might exist in the evolution process.  
Recently, scientific investigations in Escherichia coli cells reveal a possible mechanism for the adaptive 
mutation. The adaptive mutation is regulated by the SOS response, a complex, graded response to DNA 
damage that includes induction of gene products blocking cell division and promoting mutation, 
recombination, and DNA repair.224 SOS is the prototypic cell cycle check-point control and DNA repair 
system. In general, the adaptive mutation is a complicated mechanism that involves different genes and 
molecules. It is a tightly regulated response, controlled both positively and negatively by the SOS 
system.225 It seems that this mechanism is highly fine-tuned in order to respond to the environmental 
changes. Moreover, recent studies also indicate that the adaptive mutation may increase mutation rates 
under adverse conditions.226 This might provide another favorable route to facilitate the rate of evolution 
because it is believed that most mutations are deleterious. 
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Therefore, the existence of adaptive mutation suggests that mutation can be a fine-tuned process, which 
might control the rate of evolution.  
 
5.2 Fine-tuning in cooperation 
Most scientists believe that natural selection is the most important driving force in evolutionary history. 
However, recent studies indicate that cooperation is another important driving force in evolution. Even 
from the first cell evolved to human beings, cooperation plays a crucial role in the evolutionary history.227 
Interestingly, competitions in naturally selection favour the selfish behavior of organisms while 
cooperation favours the selfless behavior. Although organisms cooperating with each other may enjoy 
some privilege in competitions, the origin of some organisms switching from being selfish to giving 
helping hands is still a mystery. Studies have shown that the bats remember which bats have helped them 
in times of need, and when the day comes that the generous bat finds itself in need of food, the bat it 
helped earlier is likely to return the favour.228 Altruism, which is commonly found in animals and human 
beings, may be generated through selfless behavior in cooperation. This selfless behavior is very 
important in developing the intelligence of human beings. It is an essential component of the social 
behavior of human beings. If all human are selfish, then no cooperation and no social connection would 
exist. Development of languages would also be impossible because we need not communicate with each 
other.  
Suppose the selfless behavior is generated by pure materialistic mechanisms (not by free wills), such as 
the genetic properties of an organism. Due to some unknown reasons, some genes are changed so that the 
organism starts to have some selfless behavior and cooperate with the others. Here, we assume that the 
mind involved in the cooperation is materialistic and deterministic. In other words, these minds can be 
described by some deterministic natural laws. 
Since the cooperation may give organisms some survival advantages, the genetic properties that govern 
the selfless behavior would pass to the next generation. However, evolutionary simulations indicate that 
cooperation is intrinsically unstable.229 That means selfless behavior would easily get lost after some 
generations. This is because the competitions in the nature would force you to become selfish again even 
if you have some selfless behavior. There is no strong reason for an organism to sustain its selfless 
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behavior as this behavior only gains some direct and short-term survival advantages. Although the 
altruistic spirit may rebuild again in some generations later, it does not guarantee this spirit would pass 
from generations to generations forever. Since this is an unstable process, some fine-tuned conditions 
must be satisfied so that the altruistic spirit can accumulate from different generations and become the 
dominant power in the communities of some organisms. This stability should be maintained by some 
fine-tuned process. For example, the genes that characterize this selfless behavior have to be relatively 
stable. 
The cooperation in evolution is very important. Since some cooperation in animals may maximize the 
survival advantages according to the Game Theory, it makes the evolution process faster. Also, scientists 
believe that this behavior is crucial in the development of social behavior in human beings.230 This 
generally affects the evolution of intelligence of human beings.  
 
5.3 Evolution of Intelligence 
Although human beings evolved from the other animals, we are quite different from them with numerous 
unique properties. There are six adaptations being crucial to the unique success of our species: (1) high 
intelligence, (2) linguistic communications, (3) highly developed visual ability, (4) possession of a superb 
manipulative tool – the hands, (5) our upright stance, and (6) our being a highly social species.231 The 
developments of these adaptations depend on several independent evolutionary series, such as the 
evolution of brain, vocal apparatus, eyes, hands and muscles. In the following, I will describe how these 
crucial independent evolutionary series have to be fine-tuned in order to achieve all the adaptations. 
 
5.3.1 Brain 
Although we know that brain size alone seems to bear little direct relationship to intelligence, the 
human’s brain is generally larger than many other organisms. For example, the brain of a fly is about 1mg 
while the human brain weighs about 1.4 kg.232 The evolution of brain is generally getting larger and 
heavier. Nowadays, we know that the human brain is the most complex in the animal kingdom and it may 
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be the end of the road for brain evolution.233 Therefore, through a long series of evolution, our brain has 
evolved to get enough power to have cognitive functions, which may be already the end of the evolution.     
 
5.3.2 Language 
The language ability in human depends not only on the cognitive abilities, but also on our appropriate 
organs for generating complex sound patterns. Nonhuman primates have supralaryngeal vocal tracts in 
which the larynx exits directly into the oral cavity while in human the larynx exits directly into the 
pharynx.234 This difference enables human to generate a far richer phonetic repertoire than that available 
to the other animals.235 Moreover, recent studies reveal that FOXP2 gene on chromosome 7 plays an 
important role in language. This single gene with a subtle misspelling could cause profound language 
deficits without other obvious consequences.236 Surprisingly, this sequence of this same FOXP2 gene has 
been remarkably stable in nearly all mammals while two significant changes have occurred in the coding 
region of the gene in human. These changes might contribute to the development of language in human 
beings.237 
 
5.3.3 Vision 
There are several independent evolution series for eye’s evolution. For example, some organisms possess 
camera-lens eyes (found in vertebrates and octopuses) and some have curved reflector eyes.238 The 
evolutionary history of eye is very long, and can be traced back to the Cambrian explosion. Interestingly, 
human eye is already close to optimum for a camera type of eye using biological cells as photodetectors. 
That means our visual acuity cannot be improved to any significant degree by making changes in its 
absolute size or the relative size of its components.239 
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5.3.4 Hands and human body 
Hands are the most efficient manipulative tool for art works, scientific acquisition, writing, etc. One of the 
most important functions that can be carried out by hands only is making fire. In fact, the utility of hands 
is dependent to a large extent on our upright stance and bipedal gait.240 Besides, the strength of muscle is 
also a crucial component for us to participate in these activities. It controls the movement of our limbs, 
pumping of blood, respiration, and the maintenance of the upright posture.241 Moreover, in order to make 
the smallest fire, the height of our body should be about 1.5-2 m with mobile arm about 1 m long ending 
in manipulatively tools.242 All these parts require different evolutionary routes.  
 
5.3.5 Concordance evolution for intelligence 
All the above adaptations are controlled by different organs, which were evolved independently. 
Interestingly, all these adaptations rely on each other in order to help human becomes intelligent beings. 
Without good visual ability, we can’t make fire or write. Without language ability, we can’t cooperate 
efficiently. Without cognitive development, we can’t invent tools and develop language. Without upright 
stance, we can’t use our hand efficiently. Therefore, all these independently evolved adaptations have to 
cooperate with each other. It seems that all these adaptations simultaneously evolved through a right time 
interval (takes similar long time) and to a right ability so that human beings can give rise to technological 
development.  In other words, evolution gets these six adaptations simultaneously.243 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
In the previous two chapters, we discussed the fine-tuning of fundamental constants and the initial 
conditions. In this chapter, I briefly describe the intrinsic fine-tuning in evolution and the fine-tuning of 
global events that significantly altered the evolutionary history. These fine-tuned conditions are highly 
independent of the fine-tuning of initial conditions in Earth and the primary and secondary fine-tuning. 
Therefore, the total probability of fine-tuning P(FT) by considering all these evidences becomes 
𝑃(𝐹𝑇) = 𝑃(𝐺) × 𝑃(𝐸𝑣) × 𝑃(𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝),                                             (5.1) 
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where P(G) and P(Ev) are the probabilities of global events’ fine-tuning and the fine-tuning in evolution 
respectively. The resulting probability P(FT) is much lower after multiplying the global factor and the 
fine-tuning in evolution. The probability of evolving human intelligence is equal to or less than getting 
all these necessary conditions – right fundamental constants, right initial conditions, right conditions for 
global events and right evolutionary series – simultaneously. In fact, I have not discussed all factors that 
have contributed to the evolution of human intelligence such as the evolution of some other essential 
organs and systems in a body. All these factors involve some complex interactions between individual 
components. Certain fine-tuned conditions must be satisfied to carry out some essential functions for 
human. Nevertheless, by just looking at the evidences mentioned above, the evolution of human 
intelligence is already highly improbable through naturalistic processes. Therefore, we can conclude that 
the evolution of human intelligence is an extremely fine-tuned process in our universe. In the next 
chapter, we will discuss some major ideas to address this interesting fine-tuning phenomenon.  
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Chapter 6   Philosophical arguments about the fine-tuning phenomena 
In the previous chapters, we have a thorough discussion of the fine-tuning phenomena. Observational 
evidence indicates that the existence of intelligent life is highly improbable unless some fine-tuned 
fundamental constants, initial conditions and mechanisms in evolution exist. There is already a consensus, 
from many scientists and philosophers, that fine-tuning phenomena are real in nature.244  
If the fine-tuning phenomena are real (the probability of the evolution of intelligent life on background 
knowledge is extremely low), do they need an explanation? An intuitive answer to this question is yes. 
According to the strong version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (S-PSR), for every proposition, p, if 
p is true, then there is a proposition, q, that explains p.245 However, we still do not have a proof why we 
must accept this principle. There is another weak version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (W-PSR), 
which states for any proposition, p, if p is true, then we presume that there exists a proposition, q, such 
that q explains p.246  
If we accept W-PSR, we should seek any possible explanation until we cannot find an explanation. 
Therefore, we have the presumption that every phenomenon presupposes a rational explanation. For those 
true propositions which do not have an explanation (after seeking all possible explanations), we may 
regard them as the brute facts. If we deny W-PSR, it is equivalent to saying that we need not presume an 
explanation for any phenomenon. If it is the case, science would break down because we do not presume 
any explanation for the natural events. For example, when we observe a ball is accelerating under free 
fall, if we deny W-PSR, we need not account for it and no Newtonian mechanics can be formulated. 
Besides, it also contradicts to our daily experience. When my money deposited in the bank disappears, if 
we deny W-PSR, we do not need to seek any explanation. Obviously, the consequences of denying W-
PSR would be disastrous. Therefore, in the following discussion, we follow W-PSR and first seek a 
possible and reasonable explanation for the fine-tuning phenomena before we can simply regard the fine-
tuning phenomena as brute facts.  
In fact, there are many hypotheses suggested to explain the fine-tuning phenomena (see Fig. 6.1 for the 
classification of the hypotheses). In this chapter, I will briefly describe all the major hypotheses and 
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illustrate how they can explain the fine-tuning phenomena. Finally, I will compare and evaluate all the 
major hypotheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.1. Classification of the major hypotheses. 
Traditionally, philosophers usually categorize a cause of an event into either a teleological cause or an 
efficient cause. A teleological cause gives a purposive explanation whereas an efficient cause gives a 
causal explanation. However, there is another way to categorize an explanation of an event into either a 
personal explanation or a scientific explanation. A personal explanation explains why some proposition is 
true in terms of the intentional action of an agent and a scientific one in terms of some conjunction of law-
like propositions, be they deterministic or only statistical, and one that reports a state of affairs at some 
time.247  
In this thesis, we follow this categorization (personal or scientific explanation) to discuss the major 
available hypotheses which can explain the fine-tuning phenomena. Here, the naturalistic hypotheses are 
the hypotheses which use only scientific explanations to explain the fine-tuning phenomena. Some 
believe that the fine-tuning phenomena can still happen by chance, though the probability is very low. W. 
H. Wong is one of the representative philosophers to support this argument. Some believe that the 
existence of a super-law such as the string theory can explain the fine-tuning phenomena. Many famous 
physicists, such as Edward Witten, are now working on it. On the other hand, some believe that our 
universe is just one of the many universes. They suggest that the existence of multiverse can explain the 
fine-tuning phenomena. There are two possibilities, the multiverse is generated by a “universe generator” 
or the existence of multiverse is a brute fact. The former one is the most popular hypothesis as there are 
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many famous scientists, including Stephen Hawking, supporting it. The latter one is a logical possibility, 
which states that our Universe contains infinitely many universes and our universe is just one of them.   
The non-naturalistic hypotheses are the hypotheses which use some sort of personal explanations or 
assume the existence of a supernatural being to explain the fine-tuning phenomena. We will mainly focus 
on the God hypothesis, which suggests that God creates the fine-tuned universe. Richard Swinburne is 
one of the major representative philosophers to support this argument. We will also discuss some other 
minor hypotheses, such as Pantheism, Panentheism and some other forms of naturalistic theism. The 
former one proposes that the divine and the universe are identical while the latter one proposes that the 
divine interpenetrates every part of the universe and extends beyond it.  
 
6.1 Chance-alone hypothesis 
Some argue that it is not necessary to give any further explanation for the fine-tuning phenomena. 
Although the chance of fine-tuning is extremely low, it is still a non-zero probability, 𝑃(𝐹𝑇|𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ≠
0. Low probability does not mean that we have to give up this chance-alone hypothesis. For example, the 
probability of getting a prize from a lottery is very low. However, it is not necessary for us to give any 
special explanation other than chance why the winner gets the prize. Another example is that even though 
there are 300 million citizens in America and the chance of becoming a president is just 10-9, someone has 
to be the president.248 Therefore, these examples illustrate that it is not necessary for us to give any special 
explanation for the fine-tuning phenomena. The chance-alone hypothesis is already enough to explain the 
fine-tuning phenomena. Recently, Wong provides another argument to show that our fine-tuned universe 
is just a result from the ‘cosmic lottery’.249 Since winning a lottery has no significant difference from 
losing a lottery, similarly, a fine-tuned universe is not significantly different from a non-fine-tuned 
universe. His argument is that 
“the universe is life-permitting requires an explanation only if (a) non-life-permitting possible universes 
are not significantly different from one another so that all possible universes should be divided into two 
groups, namely, ‘life-permitting’ and ‘non-life-permitting’, or (b) the life-permitting possible universe 
stands out as far as being the actual universe is concerned, even though non-life-permitting possible 
universes are significantly different from one another.”250 
                                                          
248 Alister McGrath, A Fine-Tuned Universe (Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), p.121. 
249 W. H. Wong, “The Cosmic Lottery,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 66 (2009): 155-165. 
250 Ibid, p.162. 
70 
 
He thinks that we should not divide all possible universes into life-permitting and non-life-permitting. It 
is because this view is anthropocentric. This would mislead us because it may blind us to the fact that all 
possible universes are significantly different.251 Therefore, in Wong’s argument, the criterion (a) is not 
satisfied. Also, being life-permitting may not be a rare cosmic feature. It is reasonable to conceive that 
many other non-life-permitting possible universes also have rare cosmic features. It is similar to drawing 
a ball randomly from an urn in which there are one thousand balls, each of which is marked with a 
number. It does not require an explanation if you draw a ball that is marked number ‘1’. It is because the 
number-1 ball does not have any special features that are significantly different from the other balls with 
other numbers. Therefore, Wong thinks that “having a rare cosmic feature thus does not make life-
permitting possible universes stand out in such a way that a life-permitting possible universe being the 
actual universe requires an explanation.”252 The criterion (b) is also not satisfied. Since the criteria (a) 
and (b) are not satisfied, the existence of fine-tuning does not require a special explanation. The chance-
alone hypothesis is enough to explain the fine-tuning phenomena. 
It is true that something could occur even if the probability is very low. However, the above two examples 
are somewhat misleading. In the first example, there may be many people participating in the lottery 
which makes the overall probability of getting at least one winner much higher. However, our universe 
has only one time to “choose” the fine-tuned values. The overall probability of getting these fine-tuned 
values is extremely low. In the second example, a president must be elected, while in the evolution of our 
universe, the existence of life is not necessary. 
For Wong’s argument, it is dubious why the criterion (a) is correct. Suppose that there are two possible 
non-life-permitting universes. One is full of black holes and the other one is full of neutron stars. These 
two non-life-permitting universes are significantly different from each other. We don’t see why this 
entails that our universe is life-permitting does not require an explanation. Whether life-permitting 
universe requires an explanation or not does not depend on the natures of the non-life-permitting 
universes. Therefore, the criterion (a) is irrelevant. For the criterion (b), it relies heavily on assuming that 
life-permitting universe is not significantly different from the non-life-permitting universe. By saying life-
permitting just being a rare cosmic feature basically undermines the importance of life. In general, living 
things tend to be highly organized at any given level of description and so differ from objects like stones, 
which tend to have uniform or random structures.253 Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 4-5, our fine-
tuned universe not only can evolve life, but also evolve intelligence that can communicate, create new 
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things, make tools, understand science, etc. These abilities make us significantly different from the other 
non-life-permitting universes. In other words, our universe is fine-tuned such that the evolution of 
intelligence is possible. In fact, we usually view our universe anthropocentrically because life is too 
mysterious and marvelous. Life can produce life, and life can create many possibilities. However, Wong 
says that “suppose a possible universe U has a rare cosmic feature (or set of features) F that is necessary 
for the existence of Xs. If U were the actual universe, then the actual universe would appear to be fine-
tuned for the existence of Xs. No matter what F is, such apparent fine-tuning does not require an 
explanation given that many other possible universes have other rare cosmic features.”254 Wong’s 
argument is reducing life to certain life-permitting fundamental constants and conditions, which are not 
different from the non-life-permitting fundamental constants and conditions. However, this view is 
counter-intuitive. Leslie argues that, “please ask how you would react to the man who, catching a fish, 
next discovered that his fishing apparatus would accept only fish of exactly that length, to one part a 
million, and who still saw absolutely no ground for believing in a fish-creating benefactor or in multiple 
fish.”255 He thinks that such a surprising coincidence requires an explanation, but not explained by 
chance.  
 
In fact, the chance-alone hypothesis itself is not really a good explanation. We use chance to explain an 
event because (i) the occurrence of the event is indeterministic or stochastic, or (ii) the occurrence of the 
event involves complicated processes so that it is hard to determine by natural laws. For example, the 
probability of getting “1” by throwing a fair dice is about 1/6. Strictly speaking, it is possible to determine 
the motion of the dice and predict the result. However, throwing a dice involves many physical processes 
and factors such as the initial conditions, wind, friction, air resistance, etc., which are very difficult to be 
determined. Therefore, we use “chance” to explain why the frequency of getting “1” is about 1/6 of the 
total attempts. Back to the fine-tuning phenomena, we do not really know whether these fine-tuning 
phenomena are deterministic or indeterministic. Also, we do not know the mechanism how these fine-
tuning conditions can be generated. Therefore, using chance to explain the fine-tuning phenomena is not a 
good explanation.  
 
Secondly, Schlesinger thinks that a significant surprising improbable event is different from a normal 
improbable event. He says “a significant surprise, of the sort that is relevant to confirmation theory, is 
one which licitly demands an adequate explanatory hypothesis showing that in fact nothing puzzling has 
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taken place. Now an appropriate explanation has to provide a plausible reason why a given event, rather 
than something else, has actually occurred.”256 He further uses an example to illustrate this idea. 
Scientists now know that the inertial mass of an object is equivalent to its gravitational mass. Schlesinger 
supposes that the inertial and gravitational masses are not equivalent, but one is precisely 17.35 times 
greater than the other. It is safe to assert that in that case scientists would not feel an overwhelming urge 
to search for a theory to explain this ratio. However, it turns out that the ratio between two masses is 1, 
and this has been a source of acute concern. Scientists want to find a theory to explain why the ratio is 
exactly 1.257 Einstein worked for many years to develop General Relativity to explain the ratio 1.258 In 
other words, the ratio “17.35” is not a special number while the ratio “1” is. Although these two numbers 
are equally improbable out of infinitely many numbers, but the ratio “1” has an extremely special kind of 
value and it should be very puzzling if no unifying explanation can be found based on our background 
knowledge. The major difference between “1” and “17.35” is that the former number is exactly an integer 
while the latter one is just a ratio. Also, the integer “1” here indicates that the inertial mass may be 
identical to the gravitational mass. Therefore, as mentioned by Schlesinger, our background knowledge 
serves as the basis for judging the acceptability of a suggested explanation. If a man wins 1000 
consecutive gambling games in a casino and earns a lot of money, we would believe that he is cheating 
rather than he wins by chance. It is because this significant surprising improbable event can be explained 
easily by another explanation (he is cheating). Similarly, since the life-permitting conditions have a 
special kind of value – making life possible, it is still puzzling if we use the chance-alone hypothesis to 
“explain” the fine-tuning phenomena. Therefore, we should seek another better explanation, and later we 
will see that there exists some better explanations to explain the fine-tuning phenomena. 
 
In fact, since the probability of getting the fine-tuned values randomly is extremely small, the chance-
alone hypothesis suggests that all constants and conditions should probably lie outside the anthropic 
region. In other words, the chance-alone hypothesis does not help to raise the prior probability of the fine-
tuning evidence to a higher value, i.e. 𝑃(𝐹𝑇|𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ≈ 𝑃(𝐹𝑇). Therefore, by equation (2.2), we get 
𝑃(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒|𝐹𝑇) ≈ 𝑃(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒), which means that the chance-alone hypothesis cannot be confirmed 
according to the confirmation theory. However, since P(Chance|FT) ≠ 0, it could still be a possible 
solution if there is no other better hypothesis. 
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6.2 The existence of a Super-law 
It is possible for our nature to have a “super-law” such that it “forces” all the fundamental constants into 
the life-allowing region. If this is true, the fine-tuning phenomena could be simply explained by a single 
physical law.  
As mentioned in chapter 3, there are four fundamental forces in the nature. We now know that at certain 
energy scales, these forces may combine together and become unified. The unification of electromagnetic 
force and weak force is known as the electroweak force. Many predictions from the electroweak theory 
have been verified. Later, theoretical physicists start to unify the strong force and the electroweak theory 
to form a theory called Grand Unified Theory (GUT). Some predictions have been made but not yet 
confirmed. For example, the life time of proton predicted by GUT is 1032 years while the recent 
experimental bounds put it to be greater than 1034 years.259 Although the GUT is not favored by the 
observations, one can still further unify the strong force, electroweak theory and the gravitational force 
into a single framework theoretically. However, this is much more difficult because when we focus on 
very small scale within a particle, the uncertainty in energy becomes large due to the Uncertainty 
Principle in quantum mechanics, and the gravitational effect would be very large predicted by the General 
Relativity. This is known as the “normalization problem”. Nevertheless, if we do not treat particles as 
point particles but something like one-dimensional strings or higher dimensional objects, the 
normalization problem can be solved. This theory is called the string theory.  
The string theory is now a well-developed theory. Although none of its predictions have been verified, 
string theory itself is highly self-consistent.  After the first revolution of string theory, there are five 
different models that can explain the main features of the standard model in particle physics. These 
models are “Type I theory”, “Type IIA theory”, “Type IIB theory”, “Heterotic SO(32)” and “Heteotic 
E8× E8 theory”.260 Later, Edward Witten proves that all these five different models are indeed five 
different equivalent versions of a single theory called M-theory. These five models are related to each 
other through the M-theory. However, we do not know much about the content of the M-theory. What we 
now know is that there may exist a most fundamental theory called M-theory which has a potential to 
explain everything in physics.261 Therefore, it has been suggested that if we can obtain the M-theory, we 
might be able to derive the observed fundamental constants from this “super-law” (M-theory). In other 
words, the values of the fundamental constants might not be contingent, but “decided” by natural laws. 
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However, based on the current scientific evidence, the string theory is not yet confirmed by experiment. 
Even for its supporting theory, the supersymmetry theory, is not favored by Large Hadron Collider 
experiments.262 In fact, the string theory is still developing. We do not have any idea how the fundamental 
constants can be derived from the string theory. According to the DN-model in scientific explanation, 
since the string theory does not have any empirical content to explain the observed fundamental constants, 
it should not be qualified to become an explanation.  
Furthermore, even if string theory is true and it really explains the fine-tuning phenomena, we still need to 
ask why we have such a super-law such that many physical constants are fine-tuned. It is because the 
super-law must involve some particular content (in specific mathematical forms) so that the physical 
constants must be those observed values. In other words, the super-law should also be fine-tuned in such a 
way that we can get all those fine-tuned constants. Therefore, invoking super-law to explain the fine-
tuning phenomena is just moving the need for explanation to an upper level. 
In view of this, Flew points out that “the important point is not merely that there are regularities in 
nature, but that these regularities are mathematically precise, universal, and tied together… The question 
we should ask is how nature came packaged in this fashion.”263 Also, Davis thinks that a threefold-
question should be asked: “Where do the laws of physics come from? Why is that we have these laws 
instead of some other set? How is that we have a set of laws that drives featureless gases to life, 
consciousness and intelligence?”264 It means that the existence of any precise laws definitely requires an 
explanation, unless we accept that the existence of the super-law is a brute fact. At least, the existence of a 
supernatural being might be able to provide an explanation to the existence of natural laws. We should not 
simply accept that the existence of the super-law is a brute fact. 
Besides, the initial conditions should be independent of the super-law. Therefore, the super-law cannot 
“control” the initial conditions such that it is fine-tuned for life. As mentioned in previous chapters, many 
initial conditions are fine-tuned for the existence of life. Lewis had already pointed out that natural laws 
are more or less like the rule of addition.265 Natural laws tell you that if you save $1,000 a month, you will 
have $3,000 after three months. Natural laws cannot guarantee you have $3,000 in the bank if you did not 
deposit any money. The actions (put money into the bank) together with the laws (addition rule) enable 
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your money to accumulate correctly.266 Similarly, initial conditions together with natural laws enable our 
universe to be created.267 All the natural laws require initial conditions such as specifying the initial 
entropy, the initial (primordial) quantum fluctuations, and the initial inflation field. Natural laws, 
including the string theory, cannot generate these conditions.  
Therefore, the explanation of the fine-tuned constants and conditions cannot be addressed by natural 
super-law itself. Science can only push this problem to a more fundamental level, but can never fully 
address this issue. In fact, it is quite easy for us to confuse the terms “cause” and “agency”. Natural laws 
can tell you the cause of an event, given that all initial conditions are known. However, natural laws will 
not tell you who or what makes the laws (the agency).268 For example, natural laws can tell you how a 
steam engine works, but not who makes the steam engine.269 Similarly, natural laws can only tell you 
“how” but not “who” or “why”.270 Therefore, it is hopeless to invoke natural laws to explain the fine-
tuned fundamental constants and conditions. 
 
6.3 Anthropic principle and observational selection effect 
6.3.1 The anthropic principle 
The anthropic principle states that we should not be surprised in observing the fine-tuning phenomena. It 
is because if all the fundamental constants or initial conditions were not within the life-permitting region, 
we would not exist and would not be able to observe them. Therefore, the argument becomes:  
 ∼ (life-permitting condition)  ∼ (we exist) 
∴ (we exist)  (life-permitting condition)271 
Therefore, our existence guarantees that all the fundamental constants and initial conditions must fall into 
the life-permitting region. This is known as the anthropic principle. In fact, this principle has different 
versions. The “weak anthropic principle” states that a theory must be compatible with evidently true data 
of observation. The “strong anthropic principle” states that the constants and laws of nature must be such 
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that life can exist.272 These two different versions insist that our existence and the life-permitting 
conditions are inter-related.  
Therefore, some philosophers claim that P(FT|existence) = 1, which means that the probability of fine-
tuning is not very low, but a necessary outcome. For example, Stenger states that since P(FT|natural law 
and our existence) = 1, the apparent fine-tuning phenomena also supports naturalism.273 His statement is 
just another equivalent form of the anthropic principle. Therefore, they claim that this anthropic principle 
can already give a good explanation for the fine-tuning phenomena. However, some argue that the 
compatibility of the fine-tuning effect and our existence does not amount to an explanation. Leslie gives 
an example (example of the prisoner) to illustrate this: 
“On a certain occasion the firing squad aim their rifles at the prisoner to be executed. There are twelve 
expert marksmen in the firing squad, and they five twelve rounds each. However, on this occasion all 144 
shot miss. The prisoner laughs and comments that the event is not something requiring any explanation 
because if the marksmen had not missed, he would not be here to observe them having done so. But of 
course, the prisoner’s comment is absurd; the marksmen all having missed is indeed something requiring 
explanation; and so too is what goes with it – the prisoner’s being alive to observe it. And the explanation 
will be either that it was an accident (a most unusual chance event) or that it was planned (e.g., all the 
marksmen had been bribed to miss). Any interpretation of the anthropic principle which suggests that the 
evolution of observers is something which requires no explanation in terms of boundary conditions and 
laws being a certain way (either inexplicably or through choice) is false.” 274 
This example illustrates that the survival of the prisoner relies on some fine-tuned conditions (unusual 
chance event or the marksmen intend to miss) but not that the fine-tuned conditions rely on the survival of 
the prisoner. Therefore, the relation of the fine-tuning phenomena and our existence should be “(fine-
tuning)  (we exist)” but not “(we exist)  (fine-tuning)”. The former one should be the correct causal 
relationship. Moreover, the fundamental constants and initial conditions fall into the life-allowing region 
does not mean that they must be fine-tuned. In general, coarse-tuning of the constants and conditions can 
also allow life to exist. Therefore, our existence does not entail that our universe is fine-tuned. In other 
words, we still need to seek an explanation for fine-tuning phenomena because there should be something 
else which has caused the fine-tuning. The above mentioned weak anthropic principle is just showing the 
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relation and consistency between the life-permitting conditions and our existence, but not a valid 
explanation of fine-tuning.  
In fact, the consistency shown by the anthropic principle cannot be regarded as an explanation. An 
explanation is an adequate description of underlying causes helping to bring about the phenomenon to be 
explained.275 As mentioned above, there are two kinds of explanation – personal explanation and 
scientific explanation. Clearly, the anthropic principle is not a personal explanation. We have to 
determine whether it is a scientific explanation. What makes a scientific explanation explanatory is that it 
tells us why an event had to occur, why the event was necessary once the basis is there and the laws are 
accepted.276 Based on the pattern of scientific explanation, Hempel suggests that the explanandum must 
be logically deducible from the information contained in the explanans. Also, the explanans must contain 
general laws and have empirical content.277 Therefore, the anthropic principle definitely cannot serve as a 
scientific explanation of fine-tuning. This principle does not have any information and empirical content. 
Also, the existence of life can only entail the constants and conditions are life-allowing, but not fine-
tuned. It is logically possible that the life-allowing conditions are coarse-tuned.  
 
6.3.2 The observational selection effect 
Sober suggests an effect called “the observational selection effect” (or anthropic bias) to explain the fine-
tuning phenomena. It is an improved version of the anthropic principle which involves one more 
assumption. He suggests that our existence may provide some bias on observing the fundamental 
constants. He follows the idea from Bostrom who argues that any special features of the universe which 
we might observe may be ultimately illusory, because of our restricted viewpoint.278  Sober further 
elaborates this effect by using an analogy: 
“Suppose I catch 50 fish from a lake, and all the fish I caught were more than 10 inches long 
(observation O). You may conclude that all the fish in the lake are more than 10 inches long (hypothesis 
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F). However, you then discover that the net can’t catch fish smaller than 10 inches because of the sizes of 
its holes (assumption A). Therefore, the probability of getting 10 inches fish is P(O|F and A) = 1.” 279 
In other words, Sober argues that the very nature of our existence as observers introduces a bias into our 
evidence.  He also responds to the example of the prisoner by using the observational selection effect. He 
mentions that the issue isn’t whether the prisoner’s survival requires explanation, but whether this 
observation provides evidence as to whether the marksmen intended to spare the prisoner or shot at 
random.280 He suggests that we should compare the prisoner’s reasoning with that of a bystander who 
witnesses that the prisoner survives from the firing squad. It is reasonable for the bystander to conclude 
that the prisoner’s survival is due to the marksmen’s intention (P(the prisoner survived|the marksmen 
intended to miss) > P(the prisoner survived|the marksmen fired at random)) because he/she is independent 
of the prisoner’s survival. However, the prisoner is subject to the observational selection effect, which 
should be P(the prisoner survived|the marksmen intended to miss and the prisoner survived) = P(the 
prisoner survived|the marksmen fired at random and the prisoner survived) = 1. Therefore, the prisoner 
and the bystander are in different epistemic situations. 281  
In view of this, he applies a concept called “blindspots” proposed by Sorensen.282 A proposition p is a 
blindspot for an individual S just in case, if p were true, S would not be able to know that p is true.283 If p 
is a blindspot for S, then if S marks an observation to determine the truth value of p, the outcome must be 
that not-p is observed. The prisoner, but not the bystander, has “the prisoner does not exist” as a 
blindspot.284 Moreover, Sober thinks that it is not possible to determine the probability that a prisoner will 
survive because he does not have information about the estimation of probability. A probability should be 
calculated based on counting the total number of outcomes compared with the total trials. Therefore, a 
single survivor cannot know that the marksmen’s intention is more likely than chance.285 
To summarize, Sober suggests that (P1) we have a restricted viewpoint because “we do not exist” is a 
blindspot; and (P2) an observer has blindspot so that he/she does not share a bystander viewpoint. 
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Therefore, our observations of the fine-tuned conditions are biased. We need not be surprised by the fine-
tuning phenomena. No special explanation is needed.  
Based on the definition of the blindspot, Sober’s premise (P1) is correct. While for the premise (P2), he 
assumes that the viewpoints from the prisoner and the bystander are radically different, is questionable. 
Weisberg argues that based on enough physical knowledge and human experience, the third person 
(bystander) and first person (observer) can have identical epistemic starting points and epistemic 
inputs.286 It is because the prisoner and the bystander can share similar physical knowledge and 
experience. A rational agent has rational power to think objectively. Unless the required knowledge or 
experience are totally subjective, it is not reasonable to separate the viewpoints from different persons. 
Based on our evaluation of the fine-tuning phenomena, the discussion so far is objective. Therefore, there 
is no difference between the “bystander” and the “observer”. Since the bystander does not have any 
observational selection effect, similarly, the observer should also not be subject to any observational 
selection effect either. This view can be justified by using an example. Human beings were evolved 
through biological evolution many years ago. Strictly speaking, we are observers of the evolution. If 
observational selection effect exists, all evolution biologists suffer from their “blindspots” and all of their 
observations are biased. This view is obviously wrong. Biologists can objectively study evolution and the 
related mechanisms. We can understand how evolution occurs and investigate the processes. We do not 
say due to the observational selection effect, the evolution of human beings is not very special and we 
need not seek any special explanation. Similarly, we still need to seek a special explanation for the fine-
tuning phenomena. 
Therefore, the anthropic principle can only show the consistency between the observed life-permitting 
conditions and our existence, but not the explanation of fine-tuning. Also, it is not justified why the 
viewpoints from a bystander and an observer are radically different. Based on the above arguments, the 
anthropic principle and the observational selection effect cannot provide a viable explanation for the fine-
tuning. 
 
6.4 God hypothesis 
God hypothesis is one of the major hypotheses to explain the fine-tuning phenomena. Based on the 
definition of God in chapter 1, He is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good. It is logically possible 
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that God creates the nature by fine-tuning all the initial conditions and fundamental constants. Although it 
is very difficult for us to know how He fine-tuned the conditions and constants, it does not affect the 
validity of the argument. He might initially set the right constants and conditions to let the world and 
intelligence evolve naturally, or He might intervene in the nature by changing the conditions if something 
is not on the right track.  
According to the confirmation theory, a theory T can be regarded as confirmed if P(T|E) > P(T). This is 
satisfied if and only if P(E|T) > P(E). Therefore, the necessary condition is that the theory T renders E 
probable (T raises the probability of getting E). In this context, the theistic solution requires P(FT|God) > 
P(FT), i.e. the existence of God raises the probability of getting a fine-tuned universe. This is true if we 
have287 
𝑃(𝐹𝑇|𝐺𝑜𝑑) > 𝑃(𝐹𝑇| ∼ 𝐺𝑜𝑑).                                                      (6.2) 
 
6.4.1 Formalism 
Swinburne suggests that if God is perfectly good, in the sense of always doing the best action or an equal 
best kind of action, there is quite a probability that God will create humans:  
“He has good reason to cause the existence of souls join them to bodies, in the goodness of the existence 
of embodied animals and human beings who can have enjoyable sensations, satisfy their desires, have 
their beliefs about what the world is like, and form their own purposes in the light of these beliefs which 
make a difference to the world.”288 
Moreover, it is a good choice if God creates intelligent humans such that they can communicate with God 
and understand the great creation from God. On the other hand, if there is no God, as mentioned above, 
the probability of getting fine-tuned universe by random processes and our existence is extremely low. 
Since God is omniscient, He knows that fine-tuning the parameters and condition can make our existence 
possible. Since God is omnipotent, He can rightly set all the fundamental constants and initial conditions 
in order to achieve His plan. Therefore, the three basic properties of God, omnipotent, omniscient and 
perfectly good, make it quite probable for God to create human beings by fine-tuning the fundamental 
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constants and initial conditions. As a result, the existence of God would raise the prior probability of fine-
tuning P(FT) to a higher value of P(FT|God). Since P(FT|God) > P(FT), we have P(God|FT) > P(God). 
The fine-tuning phenomena support the existence of God, and the God hypothesis is confirmed.  
 
6.4.2 Theodicy 
In the above discussion, we assume that the creation of intelligent humans is an overall good decision. 
This is equivalent to saying that the existence of intelligent humans is better than the non-existence of 
intelligent humans. However, if the total amount of evils or sufferings is much greater than that of goods, 
the creation of intelligent humans might not be an overall good decision. Therefore, a theodicy is required 
to show that there is a significant probability that any evil on earth is such that by allowing it to occur, a 
perfectly good God forwards some good purpose which could not be forwarded in any better way.289 
Swinburne suggests that it is not morally wrong for God to create or permit the various evils, normally on 
the grounds that doing so is providing the logically necessary conditions of greater goods.290 For example, 
it is a good thing that there exist free agents (human beings), but a logically necessary consequence of 
their existence is that their power to choose to do evil actions may sometimes be realized. Swinburne 
thinks that “a world in which no one except the agent was affected by his evil actions might be a world in 
which men has freedom but it would not be a world in which men has responsibility.”291 Therefore, it is a 
price (existence of evils) which must be paid if they are to have those responsibilities.  
In fact, theodicy is one of the most controversial issues in philosophy of religion. We do not have the 
space to discuss this issue rigorously in this thesis. Nevertheless, numerous sophisticated versions of 
theodicy may show that the creation of a perfectly free, responsible, and intelligent human may well be an 
overall good decision, though a certain amount of evils are permitted.292 God would possibly want us to 
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learn responsibilities and become more mature. That might be His goals and plans. Here we just assume 
that these possibilities have not yet been disproved. 
Even if we cannot find an appropriate theodicy to solve the problem of evil, this would not affect too 
much our conclusion. What we need to do is to fine-tune the God hypothesis and assume a deity is 
omnipotent, omniscient and not perfectly good. Even we can postulate that an evil deity creates humans to 
suffer in the universe. As a result, this revised hypothesis can still explain the fine-tuning phenomena. 
Therefore, whether the deity is good, partly good or evil can be treated as a degree of freedom. The major 
point is that the fine-tuning phenomena seem to challenge the naturalistic worldview and may indicate 
some form of supernaturalism. In other words, in so far it poses a challenge to naturalism.  
 
6.4.3 Prior probability of God hypothesis 
Based on the confirmation theory, we need to check whether P(God) is non-zero. If P(God) is zero, the 
posterior probability P(God|FT) must be zero no matter how high the likelihood probability is. The prior 
probability P(God) is zero if the concepts in the God hypothesis are incoherent. Based on the formalism, 
we assume that God is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good. Are the three concepts coherent? We 
have discussed the concept of perfect goodness in the above section. As mentioned above, an appropriate 
theodicy can show that the existence of a perfectly good God is compatible with a world with evil. 
Therefore, the concept of perfect goodness is coherent. How about the other two?  
Throughout the history, many philosophers propose that omnipotence is an incoherent concept. Some of 
them used a famous paradox – the stone paradox – to indicate the problem. It questions “can God make a 
rock so heavy that he cannot lift it?”293 It seems that no answer to it could be satisfactory. If God cannot 
make the rock, then He is not omnipotent. If He can make it, He would not be able to lift it and hence He 
is not omnipotent. To deal with this problem, Swinburne defines the term omnipotence as follow: A 
person P is omnipotent at a time t if and only if he is able to bring about any logically contingent state of 
affairs after t, the description of which does not entail that P did not bring it about at t.294 According to 
this definition, if God really exercises His ability to bring about the existence of the stone that He cannot 
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lift, He will cease to be omnipotent. Nevertheless, God may remain omnipotent forever because he never 
exercises His power to create that stone.295 Therefore, the concept of omnipotence is a coherent concept.  
How about the concept of omniscience?  As Swinburne argues, persons obviously can know much. It is 
definitely possible for a person to know all true propositions.296 However, we should notice that the 
concept of omniscience may be incompatible with free wills. Swinburne states that “God does not 
foreknow anything. He knows it as it happens, but there is no moment at which he does not know it. 
Hence He is omniscient in the sense which I have been considering, because all things are present to 
him.”297 Here, the meaning of omniscience does not include controlling others’ free wills or foreknowing 
everything. Therefore, if God is not a timeless God, the concept of omniscience can be a coherent 
concept.  
If there is no incoherent concept in the God hypothesis, P(God) is non-zero. Furthermore, this prior 
probability can be raised if we have other evidence which shows the existence of God is at least 
somewhat probable. In the following, I outline another argument, the Kalam Cosmological Argument, 
which can increase the value of P(God).  
The Kalam Cosmological Argument can be formulated as follow:298 
P1: Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its coming to exist. 
P2: The universe began to exist. 
C: The universe has a cause of its coming to exist. 
The conclusion C derived from the two premises P1 and P2 needs an explanation. It is commonly 
believed that the existence of God is the ultimate cause or explanation.299  
Is the premise P1 always true? Modern quantum physics allows particles to be created from “nothing” 
(vacuum). The Hawking’s radiation can be generated around a black hole through this process. The only 
“cause” for these created particles is quantum fluctuations, which is a random process without any 
specified conditions. However, it is not very precise to say that the particles are really created from 
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“nothing”. Quantum mechanics shows that both the minimum energy and the energy fluctuation are not 
zero for vacuum. Some energy is extracted from the vacuum to create the particles and these particles 
annihilate to return the energy back to the vacuum. These particles are virtual particles, and the cause of 
these particles is the energy fluctuation. Besides, the creation of these particles must follow the rules from 
quantum physics, though the rules are indeterministic.300 In general, if an event occurs randomly, its cause 
is called a stochastic cause.301 Therefore, the creation of particles from vacuum is just an example of a 
stochastic cause. It is still reasonable to say that P1 is true. 
The premise P2 can be verified. Recent studies in the cosmological microwave background indicate that 
the age of our universe is about 13.7 billion years old.302 This evidence is independent of the fine-tuning 
phenomena. However, Hawking has pointed out that our universe may not have a beginning. He supposes 
that the beginning of the universe was like the South Pole of the earth, with degrees of latitude playing the 
role of time. As one moves north from the South Pole, the circles of constant latitude, representing the 
size of the universe, would expand. The universe would start as a point at the South Pole, but the South 
Pole is much like any other point. Technically speaking, Hawking is suggesting the time at the very 
beginning is an imaginary number rather than a real number (no “t = 0” exists).303  Therefore, if our 
universe is considered in this way, it has no boundary in space and time.304 I agree with Hawking that the 
South Pole is not so special in this analogy. However, this analogy only states that the starting time t = 0 
is not a special time, but it does not explain why we have a beginning of time t = 0. In other words, even 
if Hawking’s suggestion is true, there would exist a transition such that time is changing from an 
imaginary value to a real value. However, the proposed imaginary time epoch is ontologically unreal and 
unintelligible.305 Holder thinks that there are some difficulties involved in ontologizing imaginary time. If 
there is an imaginary time, then how can time flow? How can anything change?306 Since there is a 
particular moment for the transition (from imaginary time to real time), our universe is transformed from 
an ontologically unreal state to an ontologically real state.  If the transition exists, strictly speaking, our 
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universe began to exist and something has to cause its existence.307 In fact, recently, Craig and Sinclair 
examine most of the popular models which can generate an eternal universe. However, they find that none 
of them can really get a beginningless universe.308 In other words, our universe is very likely to have a 
beginning. 
Therefore, there is no strong reason why premises P1 and P2 are wrong. If these premises are true, then 
the universe has a cause of its coming to exist. The probability of getting this cause with God is higher 
than without God, P(universe exists|God) > P(universe exists|∼ God). Therefore, P(God|universe exists) > 
P(∼ God|universe exists). This result raises the value of P(God) before consideration of the fine-tuning 
phenomena. 
 
6.4.4 Criticisms of the God hypothesis 
Sober thinks that if we say God is omnipotent, He is not predictable.309 How can we know God would 
create humans and thus fine-tuned our universe? He believes that nothing can be said about design 
without independent evidence as to the putative designer’s goals and abilities.310 Later, Saward argues 
that it is not possible to generalize the conclusion about which hypothesis is better. The explanatory 
power of a hypothesis is strongly dependent on the actual content of the hypothesis. For example, there 
are many choices of God such as evil-god, good-god, etc. One cannot generalize about all the God 
hypotheses to arrive at any conclusion.311 
Although we do not know everything about God, we can still assume some properties of God based on 
our thoughts. For example, most religious believers thought that God is omnipotent, omniscient and 
perfectly good. This enables us to postulate a hypothesis – the God hypothesis. Based on these limited 
properties, we can assess whether God would create human or not. Moreover, McGrew suggests that the 
knowledge of design can be inferred from a human designer. Although a human designer is not the same 
as God, we still have some knowledge about God based on their common characteristics.312 As Aquinas 
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argues that the likeliness between God and human beings (the creatures) is established by God in the act 
of creation.313 In the God hypothesis, God as a being creates human beings. By using the analogy of 
being, it is natural to claim that human beings are similar to God to some extent. Therefore, the use of 
analogies based on creatures to refer to God is thus not arbitrary, but is ultimately grounded in creation 
itself.314 In fact, modern science also uses analogies to build new theories. For example, although the 
correct form of the “super-symmetry theory” is not known, most physicists develop “super-symmetry 
theory” based on the symmetry found in other theories, such as the electro-weak theory. It is because 
physicists believe that these theories should share some similarities in the formalism.  
 
Certainly, based on our pure thoughts and common experience, the assumptions in the God hypothesis 
may be wrong. Nevertheless, treating God in analogy with the human designer is the simplest and 
plausible way for us to establish the God hypothesis for assessment. The evidence in the assessment 
would tell us whether the hypothesis is confirmed or not. In principle, we can create any God hypothesis 
to test. For example, as mentioned in 6.4.2, we can assume that God is evil. If we really find that our 
universe is full of inexplicable evils, then we can conclude that the evil-god proposal is confirmed. 
Therefore, it is not necessary for us to fully understand the nature of God. We can generally postulate any 
properties which are coherent and then do the assessment. 
 
Let’s further discuss this point by an example in modern science. Recently, scientists claim that Higgs 
particle is discovered. How do we know that the particle discovered is really the Higgs particle? Before 
the discovery of Higgs particle, we do not know much about it. However, based on some extended 
theories from Standard Model, we are able to predict some (or a few) behaviors of a Higgs particle such 
as its decay channel and range of mass. These predictions are not certainly correct because we do not 
have a confirmed theory about the extended Standard Model. Fortunately, based on this unconfirmed 
model, we discover an unknown particle in the experiment such that the observed decay channels and 
range of mass are consistent with the theory. In other words, the experimental observations support the 
Higgs hypothesis as well as the extension of Standard Model. Therefore, the confirmation of Higgs 
particle need not rely on any other independent evidence of Higgs particle.  This story tells us that it is not 
necessary for us to know much about God before we can confirm the God hypothesis. A few 
characteristics based on some assumptions are enough for setting up a hypothesis to be tested even if 
these characteristics might be wrong. Certainly, there may be more than one hypothesis that can explain 
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the observations. In order to choose a best hypothesis, we have to compare the explanatory powers and 
the prior probabilities of different hypotheses. This comparison can be done by using the confirmation 
principle or inference to the best explanation.  
Let’s use one more example to illustrate that it is not necessary for us to know the exact properties of 
God. Consider an astronaut in Mars discovers a machine which can generate water when he puts sands in 
it. It is reasonable for him to conclude that this is a product of intelligence. Although he doesn’t know 
who creates it and the properties of the creator, based on our common sense, we can safely conclude that 
the machine is designed by intelligent beings. Similarly, although we do not know all the properties of 
God, we can still assess whether the fine-tuning universe is designed by God. 
Thus, by assuming some properties of God based on our limited knowledge or imagination, we can still 
assess the God hypothesis, even though we do not have other independent evidence for the exact goals or 
abilities of God. This is similar to the confirmation of Higgs particle based on our limited knowledge on 
extended Standard Model and Higgs particle. We don’t say that Higgs particle is not confirmed because 
we have no other independent evidence to verify the existence and properties of Higgs particle. Therefore, 
in general, we can postulate different kinds of God hypothesis to see whether they can explain the fine-
tuning phenomena.   
Another objection to the God hypothesis is the problem of “who designs the designer”, which was 
suggested by Hume many years ago.315 Some philosophers suggest that any designer involved in 
explaining complexity in the universe will feature complexity of its own.316 This requires an explanation 
in terms of design. Scientist Dawkins thinks that if God exists, God is intelligent and complicated beyond 
all imagination.317 Therefore, God should be internally complex and hence requires a designer. If we 
don’t know who designs the designer, how can we accept the existence of God? The problem of “who 
designs the designer” severely affects the persuasiveness of the design argument.  
Basically, the complexity here involves two concepts: complexity of designer and complexity of 
designer’s ideas. In view of this problem, Collins thinks that God is the simplest being who does not have 
any internal complexity.318 Craig suggests that God Himself is a remarkably simple thing.319 Moreover, 
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Richmond and Barr both deny the complexity of God’s thought.320 They think that God has an infinite 
idea or thought. God can hold many things together in a single insight. Therefore, since the omniscient 
and omnipotent God is not a finite being, He is the simplest thing without any internal complexity. His 
infinite idea of thought involves no complexity in His ideas. As Leslie says, infinity is simpler than “five 
million and seventy”.321 In other words, no special explanation about the complexity of God is required. 
Even if the creator of our universe is not an ultimate origin, it does not affect the assessment of the God 
hypothesis here. Swinburne mentions that the design argument is still valid even if we do not know the 
origin of the creator.322 As the example mentioned above, the machine that the astronaut discovered can 
be confirmed as a product of intelligence, even though he doesn’t know the origin of the intelligent being. 
In this thesis, we are going to ask whether the God hypothesis can explain the fine-tuning phenomena. If 
the creator is created by someone, it does not affect the truth that the creator creates the fine-tuned 
universe. In other words, whether the creator is created does not affect our conclusion.  
 
6.4.5 Other non-naturalistic or theistic hypotheses 
In our postulated God hypothesis, God is a transcendent being. However, recently some proposals suggest 
that God is not a transcendent being, but continuously interacting with the nature or identical to the 
nature. These theistic proposals can be regarded as “naturalistic theism” or “theistic naturalism”. 
Generally speaking, there are various proposals and theories about naturalistic theism as there are many 
religious beliefs all over the world. In the following, we will discuss three major proposals, Pantheism, 
Panentheism and Confucianism. 
 
6.4.5.1 Pantheism 
Pantheism suggests that God is identical to the natural world (or universe). In this view, God is not a 
transcendent being. Therefore, God can’t intervene with the natural world and the natural laws. If God 
cannot change the natural laws, it is doubtful if He can fine tune the fundamental constants and 
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conditions. Also, in Pantheism, God is not a personal God. It is difficult to justify why He wants to create 
human beings because the nature of human beings is totally different from a non-personal God. 
Besides, if God is identical to the natural world, theistic account of the fine-tuning would be equivalent to 
the naturalistic account of the fine-tuning. In this sense, Pantheism can be thought of a naturalistic 
hypothesis, but not a non-naturalistic hypothesis. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to consider 
Pantheism.  
 
6.4.5.2 Panentheism 
Panentheism is closely related to “process theism” which states that God or a number of gods 
interpenetrate every part of the universe, including the atoms and molecules. The power of God is not 
coercive but persuasive. The direct influence of God is analogous to the power of thought over thought, of 
feeling over feeling, but never suppress all freedom. It implies that entities from quarks to atoms to cells 
and all the way up to humans have their own degree of freedom and self-determination.323 In other words, 
God is not omnipotent and not omniscient.  
In some sense, God is not totally supernatural because God can only “persuade” the nature but not control 
it. If it is true, we don’t know whether He can fine-tune the fundamental constants and conditions because 
atoms have “freedom” to “reject” God’s will. Since He is not omniscient, we don’t know whether He can 
predict the evolution of human beings when the conditions are fine-tuned. Also, since He is not a personal 
God, it is difficult for us to use analogy to describe the will of God. Therefore, due to many uncertainties, 
it is not easy for us to logically deduce all the consequences and make prediction based on Panentheism. 
Although we cannot reject this proposal, it cannot be confirmed by using the confirmation principle. 
 
6.4.5.3 Confucianism 
Confucianism can be regarded as a form of naturalistic theism. It has a concept “heaven” (or Tian), which 
has some characteristics that overlap the category of deity.324 However, different versions of 
Confucianism might have different descriptions about the properties of the “heaven”. Therefore, whether 
Confucianism is a better option depends on the empirical content of the concept “heaven”. In some 
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original forms of Confucianism, the concept of “heaven” expresses a form of Pantheism.325 If it likes a 
form of Pantheism, then, as mentioned above, it can be treated as a completely naturalistic theory. If the 
concept “heaven” is not identical to the natural world, then it would be close to Panentheism or the God 
hypothesis. If the “heaven” wants to create human beings and it can freely “control” the fine-tuned values 
and conditions, Confucianism can be regarded as a possible hypothesis to account for the fine-tuning 
phenomena. This general rule can also be applied to other forms of theism.  
 
6.5 Multiverse hypothesis 
Besides the God hypothesis, there are some hypotheses that are based on natural causes. Although these 
natural causes are still compatible with the existence of God (God can use these methods to create our 
universe), as mentioned in chapter 1, we regard all these as atheistic hypotheses in the following 
discussion (we will discuss the compatibility of the naturalistic causes and the existence of God in chapter 
7).  
So far we have discussed one of the possible naturalistic causes, the super-law explanation. However, as 
mentioned above, it cannot satisfactorily explain the fine-tuning phenomena. Another spectacular solution 
to the fine-tuning phenomena is the multiverse hypothesis. Multiverse hypothesis suggests that there are 
many universes which are independent of each other and may have different properties. If there are many 
universes in the nature, each has a particular set of fundamental constants and initial conditions, and we 
are just living in one of them, we should not be surprised why our universe is fine-tuned. It is because it 
may be more probable to have a universe in a multiverse such that it has the required anthropic 
fundamental constants and anthropic initial conditions. These right constants and initial conditions are 
chosen randomly from numerous universes. This is similar to a person winning a lottery randomly out of 
many participants. Therefore, the existence of multiverse may provide a satisfactory explanation of the 
fine-tuning phenomena. In general, a four level taxonomy of multiverse cosmologies has been 
proposed:326 
Level  1: The infinite Ergodic universe – a universe that has many Hubble volumes with all possible 
initial conditions but homogeneous laws (same fundamental constants). 
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Level 2: Bubbles’ universe – many different universes with different laws and fundamental constants. 
Level 3: Metaphysical universes – many different universes based on the many-worlds interpretation of 
quantum mechanics. These universes exist in an infinite dimensional Hilbert space rather than real 
physical space.  
Level 4: Multiverse motivated by a principle of mathematical democracy – any universe that is possible in 
mathematical structure exists in reality.   
For the level 1 multiverse, it means that our universe (just one universe) consists of many observable 
universes, but not many different universes.327 In principle, all the observable universes must have the 
same set of fundamental constants, but different initial conditions. In other words, the level 1 multiverse 
can only use chance-alone hypothesis to address the fine-tuning phenomena because there is only one set 
of fundamental constants. Since it is very unlikely to get the fine-tuned fundamental constants by chance, 
in the following discussion, we will just focus on the level 2, 3 and 4 multiverse theories. 
For the level 2 multiverse, it is predicted by most currently popular models of inflation and string theory. 
According to this theoretical framework, nearly infinitely many bubble universes could be generated.  
For the level 3 multiverse, it is usually called the “Many World Interpretation (MWI)”. It is first 
developed by Everett and is stimulated by the quantum mechanics. 328 In quantum mechanics, a wave 
function ψ is invoked to describe the evolution of a system. The function ψ can be a superposition of 
infinitely many base functions ψi such that  
𝜓 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝜓𝑖𝑖  ,                                                                      (6.3) 
where ai characterizes the probability of getting the base function  ψi when a measurement is made on the 
system. Similarly, if the fundamental equations of physics are unitary, one may imagine our universe 
keeps dividing into parallel branches. Whenever a quantum event appears to have a random outcome, all 
outcomes should occur, one in each branch.329 Therefore, our “Universe” is composed by infinitely many 
different small branch universes which are described by different state functions. These state functions 
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may have different physical laws, fundamental constants, and initial conditions. We are only in one of 
those universes and so only observe the values realized in our universe.330 
For level 4 multiverse, it involves the idea of mathematical democracy, in which universe governed by 
other equations are equally real.331 
Generally, all the multiverse theories can be divided into two different kinds: 1. the multiverse just exists 
(it is a brute fact), and 2. the multiverse is generated by some fundamental laws or mathematical 
structures (it is generated by a “universe generator”). The difference between these two is that some 
simpler fundamental propositions exist in the second kind of multiverse but not in the first kind.  
 
6.5.1  Type 1: The existence of multiverse as a brute fact (non-generated multiverse) 
For this type, we assume that there are infinitely many universes, which are beginningless and exist 
eternally. These universes are not generated by fundamental laws or agents. Their existence can be 
considered as a brute fact. Although the probability of getting a fine-tuned universe is extremely low, the 
huge numbers of trial make the low probability event possible. Therefore, the theory of the type-1 
multiverse (non-generated multiverse, NG multiverse) renders the evidence of fine-tuning probable, i.e.  
P(FT|NG multiverse) > P(FT). The hypothesis can be confirmed according to the confirmation theory, 
P(NG multiverse|FT) > P(NG multiverse).  
Since the existence of the NG universe is not derived from any fundamental principles, the existence of 
the NG universes is merely an assumption. We will further discuss this issue in a later section. 
 
6.5.2 Type 2: The generated multiverse 
In the generated multiverse scenario, the existence of nearly infinitely many universes itself is not an 
assumption, but a derived result of some more fundamental physics or mathematics.  As mentioned 
above, the string theory together with some eternal inflation theories can generate multiverse, though both 
theories are not yet confirmed. 
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The basic content of the string theory or M-theory is related to six-dimensional manifolds (Calabi-Yau 
manifolds). According to the string theory, a particular Calabi-Yau manifold may represent a particular 
set of fundamental constants in the nature. Mathematical estimation shows that there are 10500 possible 
types of Calabi-Yau manifold, and the number of possible types should be finite.332 In other words, if 
there are really many universes, and each universe is characterized by a particular Calabi-Yau manifold, 
there would be about 10500 universes which exist in the nature.333  
However, string theory only mentions that the mathematical structure allows 10500 possible universes. We 
need another physical environment (initial conditions) to really generate these possible universes. As 
mentioned in chapter 3, our universe has probably undergone inflation. This inflation is probably 
triggered by a scalar field. If a scalar field exists eternally, an eternal inflation would occur and may 
generate many different universes. In other words, string theory plus the eternal inflation provide a 
possible mechanism and theoretical framework to generate the multiverse.334   
If there is only one universe, the probability of getting a fine-tuned universe is extremely small. However, 
if there are really 10500 universes, even though the probability is extremely small, it is more probable for 
us to have an anthropic universe. As a result, the theory of generated multiverse can raise the probability 
of getting a fine-tuned universe, P(FT|generated multiverse) > P(FT). Therefore, we get P(generated 
multiverse|FT) > P(generated multiverse) and this theory can be confirmed according to the confirmation 
theory. 
It is important to note that P(FT|generated multiverse) ≠ 1. This would be true only if there are really 
infinitely many universes with infinitely many possible set of fundamental constants and initial conditions 
without “logical gap”. However, since the set of fundamental constants is constrained by the 
mathematical structures, it is not possible to have infinitely many possible set of fundamental constants 
without logical gap (see the discussion in 6.6.1). As mentioned above, a rough estimation gets 10500 
possible sets of fundamental constants. Although this is a great number, if the probability of getting the 
fine-tuned universe is much smaller than 10-500, P(FT|generated multiverse) would still be very small.  
 
6.6 Comparison of the hypotheses using confirmation principle 
                                                          
332 S.-T. Yau and S. Nadis, The Shape of Inner Space (Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing, 2012). 
333 Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design (New York: Bantam Books, 2010), p.118. 
334 Douglas Watson, “On the Anthropic Principle in the Multiverse: Addressing Provability and Tautology”, ArXiv: 
1103.6044. 
94 
 
In this section, we are going to evaluate which hypothesis is the best to explain the fine-tuning 
phenomena. According to the classification diagram shown in Fig. 6.1, we have already introduced all the 
known naturalistic hypotheses and the God hypothesis. As discussed above, the chance-alone hypothesis 
does not provide a satisfactory account for the fine-tuning phenomena. Also, the super-law explanation 
and the observational selection effect do not provide enough information and content to serve as an 
explanation. Therefore, these hypotheses and theories will not be evaluated in this section. The only 
available competitive hypotheses are the God hypothesis and the two kinds of multiverse hypotheses.  
In chapter 2, we have discussed two major methodologies in evaluating the best hypothesis – the 
confirmation principle and the inference to the best explanation. According to the confirmation principle, 
the best hypothesis should have the highest value of P(T|E) or S(T,E). On the other hand, by using the 
inference to the best explanation, we can use several criteria discussed in chapter 2 to evaluate the best 
hypothesis.  We will first do the assessment by using the confirmation principle. 
 
6.6.1 Likelihood 
Now, we first compare the likelihood functions of the three different hypotheses – God hypothesis, type-1 
multiverse hypothesis and generated multiverse hypothesis. The posterior probabilities are respectively 
given by P(FT|God), P(FT|NG multiverse) and P(FT|generated multiverse). As mentioned above, God 
would have some reasons to create human beings in order to make a better world. Swinburne suggests 
that humans are such good things that he attributes the value P(FT|God) = 0.5.335 For the NG multiverse 
hypothesis, we discuss the most extreme case that there are infinitely many possible universes without 
“logical gap” and each has a unique set of fundamental constants and initial conditions, the probability of 
getting at least one life-permitting universe is close to 1. Therefore, we can assign P(FT|NG multiverse) = 
1. However, for the generated multiverse, the probability of getting the fine-tuned value is very small. 
This is because, according to the calculations by Roger Penrose, the probability of all the necessary 
conditions sufficient to allow the formation of planets coming together (a necessary condition for life) just 
by chance is 10−10
123
.336 For the most robust theory of generated multiverse theory, there are only 10500 
different universes and possible sets of fundamental constants. Therefore, the total number of possible 
outcome of getting the right planets coming together to evolve life is around 10−10
121
, which is still an 
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extremely small number. It is important to note that we haven’t considered the secondary fine-tuning and 
the fine-tuning in evolution and the environment of the Earth. This number would be much smaller if all 
these factors are taken into account. Therefore, this finite set of generated multiverse is not enough to 
explain the fine-tuning problem. As a result, we can safely assign P(FT|generated multiverse) ≈ P(FT) in 
this case.  
Some may argue that the estimation of possible sets of fundamental constants is very rough. Indeed, this 
number may be much larger if we know more possible Calabi-Yau manifolds. If there were more than 
1010
123
possible types of Calabi-Yau manifolds, the probability of getting the fine-tuned universe would 
be much larger. In fact, Linde and Vanchurin propose a slow-roll inflation model such that there can be 
approximately 1010
107
 universes, which is much larger than 1010
123
.337 Nevertheless, the actual number 
of universes is still uncertain. In the following, let’s assume that there are infinitely many possible Calabi-
Yau manifolds to see whether this scenario can probably generate the fine-tuned universe. Strictly 
speaking, the existence of infinitely many possible Calabi-Yau manifolds does not mean that there must 
be a set of fundamental constants that can fall into the anthropic region. For example, there are infinitely 
many solutions (x ,y) that can satisfy the equation x + y = 1. However, clearly (1, 1) is not a solution to 
the equation. In fact, there are also infinitely many (x, y) that cannot satisfy the equation. Under a 
constraint x + y = 1, the possible set of solution {x, y} is just a small set in all real number set R. If there 
is one more constraint, say x ≥ 1, the set of solution {x, y} would be smaller than before, but it still has 
infinitely many solutions. Therefore, just talking about the number of possible solutions is not useful. We 
should also consider whether the set of solutions includes the fine-tuned values or not. If the possible 
solutions of the fundamental constants of the multiverse hypothesis do not overlap with the fine-tuned set, 
then the hypothesis cannot explain the fine-tuning phenomena. This problem would not arise in the NG 
multiverse theory because these universes exist without any causes. There are no constraints on the 
fundamental constants as no physical laws govern the formation of the universes. Technically speaking, it 
has no “logical gap” in the parameter space of the fundamental constants and initial conditions.338 
However, in the generated multiverse scenario, all universes are generated by a fundamental law (string 
theory) and a scalar field (inflation field). Also, the string theory is not an arbitrary theory, but based on 
some specified assumptions (e.g. particles behave like strings) and some higher-dimensional geometry. 
Since the shape of a Calabi-Yau manifold is not arbitrary, it has to follow some geometrical properties 
                                                          
337 Andrei Linde and Virtaly Vanchurin, “How Many Universes are in the Multiverse?”, Physical Review D 81(2010): 
083525. 
338 W. David Beck and Max Andrews, “God and the Multiverse: A Thomistic Modal Realism”, Philosophia Christi 
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(constraints). For example, the simplest form of 5-dimensional Calabi-Yau manifold (quantic threefold) is 
given by 𝑧1
5 + 𝑧2
5 + 𝑧3
5 + 𝑧4
5 + 𝑧5
5 = 𝑧1𝑧2𝑧3𝑧4𝑧5, where 𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝑧3, 𝑧4, 𝑧5 are the coordinates in 5-
dimensional  geometry.339 A slight variation in the coefficients would not be able to generate the 
manifold. Due to many specified conditions and constraints, the possible set of the fundamental constants 
that can be generated by the string theory is much smaller compared with the set of all real number space 
R (even though it has infinitely many possible solutions). In other words, there are many logical gaps in 
the parameter space of fundamental constants and initial conditions due to the constraints in geometry and 
string theory. These available values are very unlikely to overlap with the anthropic fine-tuned 
fundamental constants unless the conditions and constraints in the string theory are fine-tuned. Therefore, 
the popular generated multiverse theory may not be able to significantly raise the prior probability of the 
fine-tuned universe.  
This proposition can be verified by a recent simulation by Gil and Alfonseca. They perform a computer 
simulation and discover that if we want to provide a satisfactory explanation for the fine-tuning 
phenomena by using the most general type of multiverse theory (level-4 multiverse in Tegmark’s 
taxonomy), the physical laws required are complicated and show certain time dependence.340 These 
requirements are not consistent with the physical laws in our living universe. Since it is contradictory to 
our observations, the multiverse theory is probably wrong, i.e. P(multiverse) ≈ 0. Therefore, if we want to 
increase the value of P(FT|multiverse), the value of P(multiverse) would be simultaneously decreased 
because some more assumptions have to be added to satisfy the constraints. Page also believes that the 
most general type of multiverse is not possible. He says that “different mathematical structures can be 
contradictory, and contradictory ones cannot co-exist. For example, one structure could assert that 
spacetime exists somewhere and another that it does not exist at all. However, these two structures 
cannot both describe reality”.341 In other words, since different contradictory mathematical structures co-
exist in the ultimate reality, it is logically impossible to have a level-4 multiverse. 
There is another method to raise the probability P(FT|multiverse). If the constraints under the string 
theory and the eternal inflation are specified to match the fine-tuned value, the probability of getting the 
fine-tuned values would be higher. However, that means the multiverse theory has to be fine-tuned in 
order to get the fine-tuned universe. Collins points out that if we eliminate or modify one of the fields or 
law in the fine-tuned universe generator by just a little bit, no life-permitting universes would be 
                                                          
339 S.-T. Yau and S. Nadis, The Shape of Inner Space (Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing, 2012). 
340 Francisco Gil and Manuel Alfonseca, “Fine Tuning Explained? Multiverses and Cellular Automata”, Journal of 
General Philosophy of Science 44(2013): 153-172. 
341 D. N. Page, “Predictions and Tests of Multiverse Theories.” In Universe or Multiverse? ed. B. Carr (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.411-430 (at p.424). 
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produced.342 In other words, the requirement of the fine-tuned universe is that the universe generator 
should also be fine-tuned. This may move the issue of fine-tuning up one level to the higher-level fine-
tuning.343 In fact, there are only 5 possible versions of string theory instead of many possible versions. 
This may suggest that only certain fine-tuned or highly constrained string theory can explain our universe. 
To conclude, the likelihood analysis gives P(FT|God) = 0.5, P(FT|NG multiverse) = 1 and P(FT|generated 
multiverse) ≈ P(FT). 
 
6.6.2 The prior probability 
The calculations of the prior probability depend on two major factors: 1. Simplicity of a hypothesis, and 
2. Compatibility with background knowledge. As mentioned in chapter 2, the simplicity of a hypothesis 
can be evaluated by six criteria (see section 2.1.2). In the following, we evaluate all three hypotheses by 
using these criteria. 
 
6.6.2.1 Simplicity 
Criterion 1: Number of things 
All the things postulated in each of the hypothesis are summarized in Table 6.1. We can see that the God 
hypothesis postulates the fewest things.  
 God hypothesis NG multiverse Generated multiverse 
Things postulated One God Infinitely many 
universes 
Many universes (finite) 
 Table 6.1: Number of things postulated. 
 
 
                                                          
342 Robin Collins, “The Teleological Argument”, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, eds. Chad 
Meister and Paul Copan (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp.351-361.   
343 Michael Murray and Michael Rea, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), p.154. 
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Criterion 2: Number of entities and properties of entities 
All the required kinds of things and properties of entities in each of the hypothesis are summarized in 
Table 6.2. We can see that the God hypothesis postulates fewer kinds of things. Some philosophers argue 
that naturalism (or materialism) only postulates physical things while theism postulates both physical 
things and mind. Therefore, theism should be more complicated. First, theistic proposals only postulate 
God as the ultimate source of things. The physical things are created by God so that only mind exists at 
the very beginning. In other words, there are two kinds of things but only one ultimate source of things. 
The finite matter and energy are created by and dependent on God. However, for naturalism, it is not 
proven that mind can be reduced to physical things. Dualism, suggested by Descartes a few centuries ago, 
has in recent years found a number of able defenders, though not always in exactly Descartes’s form.344 
For example, Nagel argues that physical sciences will not enable us to understand the irreducibly 
subjective centres of consciousness that are such a conspicuous part of the world.345 Burge mentions that 
actual successful mentalistic explanations, commonsense or scientific, do not appear, on their face, to 
refer to material compositions of mental states.346 Swinburne argues that “a man’s having mental life must 
be understood as a non-bodily part of the man, his soul, having a mental life.”347 Chalmers develops a 
systematic framework and shows that the conclusion that consciousness is not logically supervenient on 
the physical, and therefore cannot be reductively explained. He argues for a form of dualism on which 
consciousness is seen as a non-physical property that supervenes on the physical by a lawful 
connection.348 Furthermore, Baker and Goetz list out several outstanding problems in Cognitive science, 
including the problem of qualia, the problem of intentionality, the problems of free will and morality, the 
problem of abductive reasoning and the binding problem, that suggest mind may not be reducible.349 If 
mind is not reducible, naturalism has to postulate two things: mind and the physical things. In other 
words, the number of things postulated based on naturalism is as least the same as that based on theism. 
Nevertheless, only one ultimate source of things postulated by theism while there is no ultimate source of 
mind and the physical things postulated by naturalism. 
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 God hypothesis NG multiverse Generated multiverse 
Kinds of things 
postulated 
1. God – Infinite mind 
2. Finite matter/energy 
(created by and 
dependent on God) 
 
1. Infinitely many 
universes 
2. Different universes 
having different 
fundamental constants 
3. Different universes 
having different initial 
conditions 
4. Finite minds evolved 
from matter 
1. A universe generator 
which can generate 
many universes 
2. Different universes 
having different 
fundamental constants 
3. Different universes 
having different initial 
conditions 
4. Finite minds evolved 
from matter 
Table 6.2: Number of entities and properties of entities involved. 
Criterion 3: More readily observable properties 
Many atheists claim that God is not observable. However, the word “observable” here should not be 
limited to sensible properties. God can manifest in visions and voices, which are observable in reality. 
This is commonly known as religious experience. Therefore, strictly speaking, God can be observable if 
we do not exclude religious experience. Nevertheless, the multiverse theories have a serious problem. It is 
not possible for us to observe the other universes because the universes will not interact with each other. 
Also, the distance between the other universes and our universe is far beyond our limit of observation. 
Scientist Ellis says that “I do not believe the existence of those other universes has been proved – or ever 
could be.”350 Even if the other universes might produce some observable effects on our universe, we can 
never confirm this objectively because we are subject to our own set of fundamental laws and views. 
Therefore, multiverse is not a readily observable thing while we can at least possible to “observe” God 
based on religious experience.  
 
 
                                                          
350 G. F. R. Ellis, “Does the Multiverse Really Exist?” Scientific American, 305(2011): 38-43. 
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Criterion 4: Number of laws 
All the required laws in each of the hypothesis are summarized in Table 6.3. Note that no specific laws 
are required to govern an omnipotent God. As mentioned above, He can do all logically possible things, 
and no laws (except logic) would prohibit him from doing anything. The only principle required is the 
moral principle for a perfectly good God. Obviously, the number of laws required is the fewest for the 
God hypothesis. 
 God hypothesis NG multiverse Generated multiverse 
Required laws or 
principles 
1. Creation of human 
is overall a good 
action 
1. Quantum law of the 
universes 
2. There exists a law that 
can give different 
fundamental constants 
without logical gap 
3. There exists a law that 
can give different initial 
conditions without 
logical gap 
1. A ultimate law exists 
to generate all 
universes 
2. There exists a law 
that can give different 
fundamental constants 
which yield life-
permitting set 
3. There exists a law 
that can give different 
initial conditions which 
yield life-permitting set  
Table 6.3: Number of laws and principles required. 
 
Criterion 5: Variables involved in the required laws 
For the God hypothesis, God creates human beings through fine-tuning the fundamental constants and 
initial conditions. Therefore, the only variables involved are the fine-tuned fundamental constants and 
initial conditions in our actual universe. However, for multiverse hypotheses, many more variables have 
to be involved. Since each universe would have a unique set of fundamental constants and conditions, the 
total number of variables involved is much greater than that in the God hypothesis. As a result, the God 
hypothesis has the fewest variables involved in the required laws. 
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Criterion 6: Mathematical formulation 
All the hypotheses cannot be easily quantified by mathematical formulation. Therefore, it is difficult for 
us to judge by using this criterion. 
In summary, the overall simplest hypothesis is the God hypothesis. It has postulated the fewest entities, 
properties among the entities and variables involved.  
 
6.6.2.2 Compatibility with other knowledge 
For the compatibility with other knowledge, although we have no observational evidence for the existence 
of God, as mentioned above, religious experience of some people do suggest some information about 
God. Swinburne argues that we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be (in the epistemic sense) 
unless and until we have evidence that we are mistaken. He calls this the principle of credulity.351 By 
using this principle, religious experiences are treated as prima facie evidence for the existence of God 
until there are reasons for doubting them.352 Therefore, the only way to defeat the claims of religious 
experience will be to show that the strong balance of evidence is that there is no God.353 However, for the 
NG multiverse hypothesis, it is not derived from any fundamental physics but is postulated to be a brute 
fact. We do not have any independent experience or knowledge to support this hypothesis.  
For the generated multiverse hypothesis, it can be roughly divided into two sub-divisions: 1. Quantum 
interpretation (level 3), and 2. Due to eternal inflation (level 2 and level 4). For the level-3 multiverse, it 
is proposed solely based on quantum physics, which suggests that a system is comprised of infinitely 
many possible states. When the system is being measured, it would collapse into a certain state according 
to a probability, which is determined by the coefficients that characterize the states. In general, this theory 
has three major assumptions: 
A1: Our universe behaves like a quantum system that has infinitely many possible states.  
A2: Each possible universe should have different fundamental constants and initial conditions. 
A3: The time evolution of the wave-function of universe is unitary354. 
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For the assumption A1, these infinitely many possible states are not real, but manifest in infinite-
dimensional Hilbert space.355 The Hilbert space is an imaginary space based on quantum mechanics, and 
it is a theoretical term rather than an observational term. Generally speaking, it is a mathematical tool to 
connect the indeterministic behavior in quantum mechanics to the deterministic observational real world. 
Since the Hilbert space may not be a real space, it is doubtful that these universes would evolve 
independently and one of them (our universe) has finally evolved to produce intelligent life. The second 
assumption A2 is purely imaginary. Although different states in a system would have different properties, 
it does not entail that all properties would be different. For example, a vibrational mode of a string can be 
described by a superposition of infinitely many possible resonant states with different frequencies. 
However, the travelling speeds of wave in these states are the same. Therefore, it is logically possible that 
all different universes (if really exist) have different initial conditions but the same fundamental constants. 
The last assumption A3 is also doubtful. Although experimenters have encountered no departures from 
unitary, some theorists who work on quantum gravity suggest that evaporating black holes might destroy 
information, which would be a non-unitary process.356 
Swinburne rejects this theory because its assumptions are beyond our rational belief and background 
knowledge.  He comments on the level-3 multiverse (many-world interpretation) as follow:357 
“The postulation of the actual existence of an infinite number of worlds, between them exhausting all the 
logical possibilities, many of them consisting of an infinite quantity of matter – energy behaving in accord 
with simple laws over infinite time, which are not caused by anything else, which do not causally affect 
each other, but which between then exhaust the logical space without any one being qualitatively 
identical to any other, is to postulate complexity and non-prearranged coincidence of infinite dimensions 
beyond rational belief.” 
Scientist Francis Collins states that “… near-infinite number of unobservable universes strains credulity. 
It certainly fails Occam’s Razor.”358 
For the generated level-2 or level-4 multiverse, it is mainly extrapolated based on two more fundamental 
theories: string theory and the eternal inflation theory. As briefly discussed above, the generated 
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multiverse can generate many different initial conditions due to random generation while the string theory 
constrains that there should be roughly 10500 possible sets of fundamental constants. 
However, the string theory and the eternal inflation theory are unconfirmed theories. Scientist Ellis 
comments on the multiverse by stating that:359 
“A multiverse is implied by some forms of inflation but not others. Inflation is not yet a well defined 
theory and chaotic inflation is just one variant of it. … the key physics involved in chaotic inflation 
(Coleman-de Luccia tunneling) is extrapolated from known and tested physics to quite different regimes; 
that extrapolation is unverified and indeed inverifiable. The physics is hypothetical rather than tested.” 
Any extrapolated theories from known physics should be tested or verified until they can be claimed as 
successful theories. Since you can extrapolate anything from known physics by adding some more 
assumptions, the uncertainty is large unless some of these assumptions or predictions are verified. 
However, although there is some positive evidence for inflation, we still have no evidence for eternal 
inflation. Ellis points out that “… not all types of inflation go on forever and create an infinite number of 
bubble universes. Observations do not single out required type of inflation from other types. Some 
cosmologists such as Steinhardt even argue that eternal inflation would have led to different patterns in 
the background radiation than we see.”360 For the string theory, it is not a complete theory and none of 
the predictions is verified. The present form of string theory is highly dependent on the theory of 
supersymmetry in physics.361 The search of supersymmetry particles is now undergoing in Large Hadron 
Collider in Europe. Unfortunately, no such particles have been observed.362 It may indicate that the theory 
of supersymmetry as well as the string theory is not true at all. Since there is no evidence supporting both 
theories, the prior probability of the generated multiverse theory subject to our background knowledge 
(i.e. the probability P(generated multiverse) before evaluating the fine-tuning phenomena) is very low. 
Moreover, some probabilistic predictions can be made by the multiverse theory. For example, there is a 
principle called the “principle of living dangerously” which states that if the prior probability for a 
parameter is a rapidly increasing (or decreasing) function (goes like Q4 for large Q and goes like exp(Q) 
for small Q)363, then we expect the observed value of the parameter to lie near the edge of the 
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anthropically allowed range.364  A particular parameter that satisfies the principle of living dangerously is 
the primordial quantum fluctuation Q. The anthropic allowed region for Q is 10−6 ≤ 𝑄 ≤ 10−4, while 
the observed value is 10-5. Therefore it is not close to either edge of the anthropically allowed range.365 In 
other words, if there exists infinitely many universes, it would be very high probability that an anthropic 
universe with Q close to 10-4 or 10-6. However, the parameter Q of our universe is a highly improbable 
value under the multiverse hypothesis. This problem is now known as the “Q-catastrophe”. Another 
probabilistic prediction is that it is highly probable for an anthropic universe to be much less fine-tuned. 
Modern astrophysics is able to construct some scenarios that are also possible for life. One of them is the 
Cold Big Bang model (our present universe is evolved under the Hot Big Bang model). This model 
requires the primordial ratio of photons to baryons 𝜂 ∼ 1 (it is 𝜂 ∼ 109 in our universe). Some early 
population of luminous objects can generate heavy elements for life. In this scenario, structure formation 
is not suppressed by the cosmic microwave background radiation pressure, and thus stars and galaxies 
require a smaller value of Q.366 Aguirre claims that this scenario requires 10−11 ≤ 𝑄 ≤ 10−5, which is a 
much wider range compared with the Hot Big Bang model in our universe (10−6 ≤ 𝑄 ≤ 10−4).367 If a 
life-permitting universe is chosen randomly under the multiverse theory, it would be much more likely 
that the universe is evolved under the Cold Big Bang model, but not the Hot Big Bang model. Therefore, 
this result does not favour the multiverse hypothesis. It is important to note that these results do not 
strictly falsify the multiverse hypothesis because it is still possible (even the probability is extremely 
small) that our universe is evolving by Hot Big Bang model with a value Q that is not lying near the edge 
of the anthropically allowed range. However, these results would further decrease the prior probability of 
the multiverse hypothesis subject to our background knowledge before evaluating the fine-tuning 
phenomena.  
Some argue that there may be some evidence that support the multiverse hypothesis. For example, 
observations indicate that a void exists in front of the cosmic microwave background cold spot and more 
than 1000 galaxy clusters are moving with up to 1000 km/s towards Centaurus or Vela. Some suggest that 
these phenomena are due to the gravitational pull from other universes.368 However, it is not known 
whether different universes would interact with each other because they may not have the same 
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gravitational law. Also, some irregular distribution of mass may also generate these phenomena. Recent 
researches incline to suggest that the existence of void and cold spot are correlated with an overdense 
region surrounded by an underdense region at the last scattering surface.369 Therefore, the alleged 
evidence for multiverse is just a speculative idea but not confirmed evidence. 
To conclude, many scientists and philosophers reject the idea of multiverse because it is not founded on 
standard physics. Moreover, some of its predictions do not match the observations. Some scientists also 
think that multiverse theory is only a speculative idea without any explanatory power. Davies writes that 
“it is trivially true that, in an infinite universe, anything that can happen will happen… Like a 
blunderbuss, it explains everything and nothing.”370 In fact, as mentioned above, the multiverse theory 
has many limitations. For example, it has a finite set of possible Calabi-Yau manifolds and fundamental 
constants. The constraints in string theory may restrict the allowed space for the fundamental constants. 
Last but not least, there are many doubts and questions about the string theory.371 Clearly, although string 
theory is a well-defined theory due to its mathematical elegance, it is not a confirmed theory in physics. 
All these problems and limitations in both string theory and multiverse theory decrease the prior 
probability of the generated multiverse hypothesis subject to our background knowledge. 
Therefore, based on the simplicity and the compatibility of the hypotheses with background knowledge, 
we conclude that P(God) is the best among all the available hypotheses, and P(NG multiverse) ≈ 
P(generated multiverse) are very small compared with P(God). Since P(FT|God) = 0.5, P(FT|NG 
multiverse) = 1 and P(FT|generated multiverse) ≈ P(FT), by using the strength value of a theory S(T,E) = 
P(E|T)P(T) defined in equation (2.4), we get S(God, FT) = 0.5P(God), S(NG multiverse, FT) = P(NG 
multiverse), and S(generated multiverse, FT) ≈ P(FT)P(generated multiverse). As discussed above, we 
can safely assign P(God) > 2P(NG multiverse) and P(God) > 2P(generated multiverse). Since P(FT) < 1, 
we can get 
                                                    𝑆(𝐺𝑜𝑑, 𝐹𝑇) > 𝑆(𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒, 𝐹𝑇),                                                     (6.4) 
where “multiverse” stands for either NG multiverse or generated multiverse. Based on the confirmation 
principle, the God hypothesis is the best explanation of the fine-tuning phenomena. 
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6.7 Comparison of the hypotheses using inference to the best explanation 
Now, we use another principle, the inference to the best explanation, to assess all the available 
hypotheses. In chapter 2, we have discussed the explanatory virtues commonly used by scientists and 
philosophers. They are explanatory power, degree of testability, simplicity, consistency with background 
knowledge, informativeness, and fecundity.372 We have discussed the explanatory power and the 
simplicity of different hypotheses. The God hypothesis is a simpler hypothesis and has a relatively high 
explanatory power. For the NG multiverse hypothesis, it also has a relatively high explanatory power but 
it is a complicated hypothesis. For the generated multiverse, it has the lowest explanatory power and it is 
also a complicated hypothesis. In the following, we will discuss all the other remaining explanatory 
virtues of the available hypotheses. 
 
6.7.1 Degree of testability 
A testable hypothesis must contain some empirical content (see section 2.2.2). In the following, we are 
not going to discuss whether the predictions made by a particular hypothesis are satisfied or not by the 
available empirical observations. We will just compare the “amount of empirical content” in each of the 
available hypotheses. 
In general, it is very difficult for us to give predictions about God’s action because we do not have any 
“laws of divine action”. However, in our context, the God hypothesis is not a single hypothesis. Our 
proposed God hypothesis is in the form “there is a God who wills creation of intelligent human beings”. 
Here, the creation of intelligent human beings is a posited divine goal. Therefore, we can to some degree 
predict what would happen if God creates human beings. For example, it’s likely that God would 
communicate with us and educate us. These can be some of the predictions. Therefore, there are some 
empirical contents for the God hypothesis.  
For the NG multiverse hypothesis, it can predict everything because this hypothesis has infinitely many 
parameters without logical gap and it can predict all possibilities. However, as mentioned above, it is 
equivalent to saying that this hypothesis predicts nothing. Therefore, the NG multiverse hypothesis does 
not have any empirical content. Although observations (such as using principle of living dangerously) can 
verify the probabilistic predictions made by the NG multiverse hypothesis (or generated multiverse 
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hypothesis), such observations can only give us a very few degrees of testability because it is very 
difficult to determine which particular type of multiverse is true or not true. 
For the generated multiverse hypothesis, as mentioned in section 6.6.2.2, it can generate some predictions. 
Although the predictions generated from this hypothesis do not satisfy the observations, this hypothesis 
has some empirical content. However, since we are not sure whether the string theory and the chaotic 
inflation theory are correct or not, the amount of substantiated empirical content is quite little.  
Therefore, we can say that the God hypothesis and generated multiverse hypothesis do have some degrees 
of testability, while the metaphysical multiverse nearly does not have any. 
 
6.7.2 Comprehensibility 
This criterion suggests that a good hypothesis should be comprehensible by our background knowledge. 
For the God hypothesis, although it is difficult for us to imagine how an omnipotent and omniscient God 
could create our universe with fine-tuned values and conditions, we can still define the meanings of 
“omnipotent” and “omniscient”. Since we have ability and knowledge, what we have to do is to extend 
the idea of ability and knowledge to an infinite extent. It can be done by our imagination. Similarly, we 
can also understand the meaning of “perfectly good” based on our experiences. In general, these 
definitions are comprehensible by our background knowledge and do not have any contradiction. 
For the multiverse hypotheses, based on known physics, we can imagine how the universes can be 
generated through physical processes, though we don’t know whether these mechanisms are correct or 
not. Therefore, all the proposed hypotheses are comprehensible by our background knowledge.  
 
6.7.3 Informativeness 
An informative theory should specify some articulated casual mechanism whose description allows us to 
deduce the precise details of the effect.373 For the God hypothesis, we have no casual mechanism to 
describe God’s creation. Nevertheless, we also have no casual mechanism to describe how fine-tuned 
values and conditions could be generated by the multiverse hypotheses. For the NG multiverse, we don’t 
know how these universes could be generated and we are not sure these universes could have different 
fundamental constants and conditions. For the generated multiverse, we have no theory to describe how 
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universes could be generated through a universe generator. We are not quite sure whether the possible 
Calabi-Yau manifolds must have an anthropic set of fundamental constants and conditions. Therefore, all 
the available hypotheses are not informative for us to judge because there are too many uncertainties and 
unknowns. 
 
6.7.4 Fecundity 
This criterion suggests that a good theory should be able to suggest new lines of research.374 God 
hypothesis implies that the creation of human beings and intelligence is overall a good action. We can 
further investigate this by various disciplines such as sociology, psychology, etc. Also, it makes theology 
and religious studies possible. For the NG multiverse hypothesis, as mentioned above, it has no predictive 
power. Therefore, it does not suggest any lines of research. It can just serve as an explanation of fine-
tuning. For the generated multiverse, it can suggest a few lines of research such as finding any 
interactions between the generated universes. It may also give rise to some other lines of research if we 
could know more details of the hypothesis. 
 
6.7.5 Summary of all explanatory virtues 
In table 6.4, we can summarize all the above discussions and use three scales (good, fair, poor) to assess 
the best hypothesis. 
 Explanatory 
power 
Simplicity Testability Comprehensibility Informativeness Fecundity 
T1 Good Good Fair Good Poor Fair 
T2 Good Poor Poor Good Poor Poor 
T3 Poor Poor Fair Good Poor Fair 
Table 6.4. Summary of different hypotheses (T1, T2 and T3 stand for God hypothesis, NG multiverse 
hypothesis and generated multiverse hypothesis respectively).  
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Obviously, the God hypothesis is the best hypothesis to explain the fine-tuning phenomena. It generates 
the same conclusion by using the confirmation principle.  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
Based on the classification in Fig. 6.1, we have discussed all major available hypotheses that can provide 
explanation of the fine-tuning phenomena. In fact, there are some other types of multiverse hypotheses, 
such as oscillating universe. However, the general features of these theories have already been involved in 
the discussions above. The NG and generated multiverse hypotheses basically have already covered most 
of the essential features of the other hypotheses, such as the total number of universes, the origin of 
multiverse and the nature of multiverse (see Tegmark’s taxonomy). In particular, since dark energy will 
dominate the cosmological energy density in the future, it is nearly impossible to have oscillating 
universe.  
Among the available hypotheses, the chance-alone hypothesis, super-law explanation, and observation 
selection effect are not able to give a satisfactory explanation of the fine-tuning phenomena. Therefore, 
most of our discussions focus on the God hypothesis and the two multiverse hypotheses. By using the 
confirmation principle, we conclude that the God hypothesis has the largest value of P(T|E). On the other 
hand, by using another principle, inference to the best explanation, we still get the same conclusion. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the theistic worldview can offer the best explanation of the fine-tuning 
phenomena.  
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Chapter 7 Compatibility of the hypotheses and the criticisms of the fine-
tuning argument 
In the previous chapter, we assume that the God hypothesis, metaphysical multiverse hypothesis and 
generated multiverse hypothesis are mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, in general, they can be compatible 
with each other. For example, God can use a generated multiverse scenario to allow a fine-tuned universe 
to evolve human beings. In this chapter, we are going to discuss the implication of the compatibility of 
the God and multiverse hypotheses. We will also discuss some criticisms of the fine-tuning argument. 
 
7.1 Compatibility of the hypotheses 
What if the God hypothesis and multiverse hypothesis are compatible with each other? If the fine-tuning 
is generated by non-generated multiverse scenario, the probability of fine-tuning does not depend on the 
existence of God. Therefore we have  𝑃(𝐹𝑇|𝐺𝑜𝑑 & 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒) = 𝑃(𝐹𝑇|~𝐺𝑜𝑑 & 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒). 
However, if the fine-tuning is generated by a single universe, then clearly we have 
𝑃(𝐹𝑇|𝐺𝑜𝑑 & 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒) > 𝑃(𝐹𝑇|~𝐺𝑜𝑑 & 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒). If there are only two possibilities – 
single universe or multiverse, the weighted average of combining these two possibilities gets 
𝑃(𝐹𝑇|𝐺𝑜𝑑) > 𝑃(𝐹𝑇| ∼ 𝐺𝑜𝑑).375 Therefore, even if the God hypothesis is compatible with the multiverse 
hypothesis, the existence of God is still a better solution to the fine-tuning problem and our conclusion is 
the same for the most general situation.  
The above discussion is an oversimplified version. It assumes that the multiverse hypothesis and God 
hypothesis are marginally independent and we do not know the multiverse hypothesis is confirmed or not. 
In chapter 2, we have discussed a methodology in assessing the residual confirmation if two competing 
hypotheses are considered at the same time. The residual confirmation RC evaluates the effect of the 
confirmation of hypothesis T1 if the hypothesis T2 is confirmed. Let’s assume that T1 is the God 
hypothesis and T2 is the multiverse hypothesis. Since there is some observational evidence that disfavours 
the existence of multiverse, we simply assume that ~𝑇2 is confirmed. From equation (2.8), RC would be 
positive if 𝑃(𝐸|𝑇1, ~𝑇2) > 𝑃(𝐸|~𝑇1, ~𝑇2). Obviously, the existence of God would render the fine-tuning 
evidence E more probable then without the existence of God. Therefore, the residual confirmation is 
                                                          
375 B. Monton, “God, Fine-tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence,” British Journal of Philosophy of Science 
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positive if multiverse and God are marginally independent. This is also consistent with our previous 
conclusion. But it does not raise the probability. 
What if the multiverse hypothesis and God hypothesis are marginally dependent? For example, if one can 
show that God has some reasons that He would not create multiverse, i.e. 𝑃(~𝑇2|𝑇1) ≈ 1, what would be 
the implication? By using equation (2.9) and replacing 𝑇2 by ~𝑇2 , we have  
𝑅𝐶′ = log [𝑃(𝑇1) +
𝑃(𝐸|~𝑇1, ~𝑇2)
𝑃(𝐸|𝑇1, ~𝑇2)
𝑃(~𝑇2|~𝑇1)
𝑃(~𝑇2|𝑇1)
𝑃(~𝑇1)]
−1
≈ log [𝑃(𝑇1) +
𝑃(𝐸|~𝑇1, ~𝑇2)
𝑃(𝐸|𝑇1, ~𝑇2)
𝑃(~𝑇2|~𝑇1)𝑃(~𝑇1)]
−1
, 
                                                 (7.1) 
where RC’ is the degree of residual confirmation if the two hypotheses are marginal dependent. Since 
𝑃(~𝑇2|~𝑇1) < 1, we have 
     𝑅𝐶′ = log [𝑃(𝑇1) +
𝑃(𝐸|~𝑇1, ~𝑇2)
𝑃(𝐸|𝑇1, ~𝑇2)
𝑃(~𝑇2|~𝑇1)
𝑃(~𝑇2|𝑇1)
𝑃(~𝑇1)]
−1
> log [𝑃(𝑇1) +
𝑃(𝐸|~𝑇1, ~𝑇2)
𝑃(𝐸|𝑇1, ~𝑇2)
𝑃(~𝑇1)]
−1
        
(7.2) 
The right-hand-side of the above equation stands for the original RC if the two hypotheses are marginal 
independent (see equation (2.8)). Therefore, if God would not create multiverse and multiverse is unlikely 
to exist, the degree of confirmation of God hypothesis would be increased. In other words, the 
disconfirmation of multiverse indirectly increases the degree of confirmation of God hypothesis. In the 
following, I would like to argue that God has some reasons not to create multiverse (𝑃(~𝑇2|𝑇1) ≈ 1).
376 
Suppose that God wants to create human intelligence. He has two choices: 1. specially create all the fine-
tuned constants and conditions, and 2. create a universe generator to generate many universes with 
different fundamental constants and conditions. Based on the God hypothesis, God is omnipotent, 
omniscient and perfectly good. Since both choices are logically possible, an omnipotent God is able to use 
either choice to create a life-allowing universe. For an omniscient God, He must know fine-tuning the 
universe can make life possible. However, can He guarantee that life would be evolved through a random 
nature of multiverse? The answer is yes. Although producing a life-allowing universe through multiverse 
scenario depends on probability, an omniscient God can estimate how large amount of universes should 
                                                          
376 Part of the following sections also appears in M. H. Chan, “Would God Create Our Universe through 
Multiverse?” Theology and Science, 13(2015): 394-407. 
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be generated for getting at least one life-allowing universe. Therefore, an omnipotent and omniscient God 
can create a universe generator such that an enough amount of universes would be generated for getting 
life. As a result, an omnipotent and omniscient God could choose either choice to create our universe.  
In fact, some theistic philosophers support a theistic version of multiverse. For example, O’Connor argues 
that God has any number of distinct reasons for creating a variety of different possible worlds.377 Collins 
thinks that since theists have traditionally believed that God is infinite and infinitely creative, the physical 
reality would be much larger than one universe. He thinks that “God is infinite and infinitely creative, it 
only makes sense that creation would reflect these attributes of God, and hence that physical reality 
would be much larger than one universe, perhaps even infinitely larger”.378 Therefore, it seems that 
creation through multiverse is more elegant and ingenious than creating a single universe.379 In the 
following, I argue that a perfectly good God would choose the single universe scenario to create life-
allowing universe rather than using the multiverse scenario. It is because a perfectly good God would 
choose the overall best choice, and the single universe scenario is definitely the best choice.  
What are the criteria to assess the best choice? I suggest that a good choice should have the following 
three properties: 1. simple, 2. ontologically economical, and 3. fewest disadvantages. Therefore, the best 
choice should be the simplest, most economical, and have minimum disadvantages. In the following, I 
will provide some arguments to justify the suggested three criteria and discuss the two scenarios by using 
these criteria. 
 
7.1.1 Simplicity 
With reference to the “inference to the best explanation”, simplicity is a criterion for a good theory. 
Moreover, we generally believe that a good God would create a beautiful or elegant universe. According 
to Hogarth, the defining feature of beauty or elegance is “simplicity with variety”.380 In view of this, 
“simple” is the most important feature to describe beauty or elegance. Therefore, simplicity is definitely 
one of the most important criteria to assess the best choice. 
                                                          
377 Timothy O’Connor, “Simplicity and Creation”, Faith and Philosophy, July(1999): 405-412. 
378 Robin Collins, “Design and the Many-Worlds Hypothesis”, Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, ed. W. L. 
Craig (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), pp.130-148 
379 Robin Collins, “The Multiverse Hypothesis: a Theistic Perspective.” In Universe or Multiverse? ed. B. Carr 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.459-480. 
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For the single universe scenario, although God has to create a set of anthropic fundamental constants and 
initial conditions, it has fewer entities and kinds of thing, but with a large amount of variety (we have 
different structures and matter in our universe). However, for the multiverse scenario, God has to create 
an appropriate universe generators (or create an appropriate super-law) such that an enough amount of 
universes are generated for life evolution. It is full of variety but much more complicated (as mentioned in 
Chapter 6). Therefore, under this assumption, a single universe with variety is more elegant than 
multiverse.  
In view of this, O’Connor argues that we have to separate God’s intrinsic from his relational properties.381 
That means God’s simplicity does not entail that the world created by God is also simple. In fact, the 
argument of simplicity is not based on the doctrine of God’s simplicity. Here, we argue that God would 
use the best choice, which should be also the simplest choice, to create our universe. 
 
7.1.2 Ontological economy 
From an engineering perspective, a good engineer would use an efficient way to create. Therefore, an 
economical choice would be an important criterion to assess a theory. An economical choice is closely 
related to a simple choice. The difference is that the simplest choice should contain the fewest things and 
kinds of things while the most economical choice should involve the fewest by-products and processes. 
Intuitively, creating one universe by special creation is ontologically economical. Just one universe with 
fine-tuned laws and conditions can achieve God’s purpose – creation of intelligent beings. However, for 
the multiverse scenario, one needs a large amount of “wasted universes” to achieve the same purpose. For 
those “wasted universes”, which do not have correct life-allowing fundamental constants or conditions, 
are not functional. They are purposeless and totally dead. Some of them have no stars, no life and perhaps 
nothing evolved there. Since the natural laws of these universes are different from our natural laws, we 
are not able to observe them. The existence of these wasted universes does not give us any knowledge. 
One may argue that some useless and functionless stars and galaxies are also generated in the special 
creation scenario. Nevertheless, we can observe them and generate scientific knowledge from them. Also, 
most galaxies and stars are interacting with each other through gravity. They are not totally useless. 
Strictly speaking, most of the “wasted universes” are the useless by-product. For the special creation 
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scenario, there is no “useless by-product universe”. Obviously, the special creation scenario is more 
ontologically economical. 
In fact, Collins admits that creation through multiverse is an inefficient way for God to proceed.382 
However, he believes that God behaves like a great artist other than a great engineer. In general, for a 
great artist, he/she would express his/her creativity and ingenuity in creation rather than considering the 
least amount of material. Therefore, Collins believes that God may not use an economical way to create 
our universe. In other words, whether God would create our universe through multiverse depends on the 
intrinsic properties of God (artist vs engineer).  
However, we need not accept this dichotomy. God can be both a great artist and a great engineer (or a 
better term: a great architect)383. In our universe, we can still see much diversity, such as black holes, dark 
energy, dark matter, galaxies, galaxy clusters, planets and satellites. God can express His creativity in the 
creation of a single universe (be a great artist). God can also use the least amount of material to achieve 
His purpose (be a great engineer). Although making a multiverse might express more creativity, this may 
not be His major purpose. Based on our discussion in the previous chapters, our universe contains an 
incredible amount of fine-tuning constants and conditions, which are set to evolve life. Therefore, 
creating life is definitely one of His major purposes. In fact, a great artist can express his/her creativity by 
drawing a small picture. However, God has to use a much more complicated way to create our universe 
through multiverse. He can only be a great artist, but not a great engineer. Therefore, being a great artist 
and a great engineer, God would not choose to create our universe through multiverse. 
However, some may argue that for an omnipotent God, everything He did was simple and economical. 
Therefore, these concepts are meaningless when applied to God. It is true that it might imply nearly the 
same effort for an omnipotent God to make either a single universe or multiverse. However, not all the 
choices are wise choices. Consider a lottery game as an analogy. There are five green balls and one blue 
ball in a box. The one choosing the blue ball would get a prize. Suppose God plays this game. He knows 
how to get the blue ball by only one attempt because He is omnipotent and omniscient. He also notices 
that by playing many times (about 6 attempts), He can still get a blue ball to win. Which choice is the best 
one? Keeping all other factors constant, we would think that the former choice is the best because it is the 
simplest and most economical (a wise choice) while the latter one is stupid, provided that the only 
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purpose of playing is to win. Although both choices are simple relative to God’s omnipotence, God would 
choose the objectively simplest (cleverest) way to achieve the same goal (creation of humans).384 
 
7.1.3 Minimum disadvantages 
If God correctly fine-tuned a set of fine-tuned fundamental constants and initial conditions for life, then 
life evolution could be controlled easily for just one universe. However, for multiverse scenario, the 
outcome is probabilistic. A large amount of universes would be produced based on the quantum nature of 
the natural laws. This nature is indeterministic, and the outcome is not 100% guaranteed. Although God 
can guarantee a sufficiently large amount of universes produced such that probably at least one life-
allowing universe would be produced, the “degree of control” is still less than the special creation 
scenario. Moreover, the type and the properties of the universe created are highly controllable by special 
creation scenario. He can design a best and the most beautiful universe as He likes. However, due to the 
indeterministic and purely random nature of the multiverse scenario, some universes created might be full 
of evils, suffering, problematic or ugly. There may be some good universes created, but simultaneously 
some bad universes would also be created, unless the multiverse scenario is not purely random. As 
mentioned in chapter 6, the “logical gap” of the parameter space of fundamental constants and conditions 
must be very small such that a life-allowing universe would be generated.385 Therefore, it is quite likely to 
have these bad universes generated, which can be regarded as a disadvantage. Hence, only the special 
creation scenario could generate minimal disadvantages. 
In fact, God can create some mechanisms to avoid the creation of bad universes. This would become a 
“fine-tuned multiverse scenario”, and the “degree of control” would be the same for the special creation 
and fine-tuned multiverse scenarios. However, this type of multiverse (fine-tuned multiverse) is much 
more complicated. If God wants to give “freedom” to our natural world to generate universes, He would 
not additionally impose any constraints on it. Otherwise, it is “constrained free” (or fine-tuned) but not 
perfectly free. We need to give some extra arguments to prove that God would prefer a fine-tuned 
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multiverse rather than a fine-tuned single-universe.386 In general, a fine-tuned multiverse would be much 
more complicated than a fine-tuned universe.387  
In the above discussion, some may argue that the creation of many universes can generate diversity, 
which is also a good action (just like bio-diversity). For example, God would use evolution to create life 
rather than special creation. However, I argue that whether the diversity is good or not depends on 
different situations. Within a community, diversity is good because we can learn to respect and help one 
another. I call it the “interactive diversity”. For example, different kinds of life on Earth would interact 
with each other. Therefore, the life on Earth generated by evolution is an example of interactive diversity. 
However, for the multiverse scenario, different universes cannot interact with each other. This “non-
interactive diversity” is not necessarily good (may be bad). Although we are not sure whether diversity is 
good to God or not, we can conclude that “interactive diversity” may be good for a community, based on 
our experience. Therefore, God would probably create a single universe with diversity, but not many non-
interactive universes. The non-interactive diversity in the multiverse scenario cannot generate any good 
things for each of the universe. As mentioned above, the useless universes can be thought as a 
disadvantage. On the other hand, the “amount of good” is not necessarily proportional to the “amount of 
diversity”. A single universe might have enough diversity already. It is not necessary for God or our 
nature to have infinite diversity. 
Based on the above three criteria, we can conclude that the special scenario is the best choice. Since a 
perfectly good God would choose the best choice, the probability of creation of multiverse by God is very 
low. Therefore, as mentioned above, if we have 𝑃(~𝑇2|𝑇1) ≈ 1, the disconfirmation of multiverse can be 
used as an indirect evidence of God hypothesis. In fact, we have a thorough discussion on some of the 
negative evidence of the multiverse hypothesis (see section 6.5.2.2). These can be served as an indirect 
support of the God hypothesis. 
 
7.2 Some other criticisms of the fine-tuning argument 
Although in the previous chapter we have concluded that the existence of God is the best explanation of 
the fine-tuning phenomena, some philosophers have criticized this modern design argument. In this 
section, I will briefly outline these criticisms and respond to them. 
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7.2.1 No objective prior probability 
Sober suggests that it is relatively easy to compare two posterior probabilities P(E|T1) and P(E|T2) of 
theories T1 and T2. However, it is difficult to determine the actual values of the prior probabilities P(T1) 
and P(T2). Since we don’t have the objective prior probabilities (the probabilities are undefined), it is 
impossible for us to determine which one, P(T1|E) or P(T2|E), is greater.388 In other words, we don’t have 
enough background knowledge or data to determine the prior probabilities. There may be some more 
information we don’t know that determine the prior probabilities. Also, we have only one universe which 
is not enough to determine the probability. Therefore, there is no reason to accept the fine-tuning 
argument’s claims about probability. Moreover, since we do not have the prior probabilities P(T1) and 
P(T2), we can simply assume that they are equal based on the Principle of Indifference.389 Therefore, if 
P(T1)=P(T2), the posterior probabilities P(E|T1) and P(E|T2) determine which theory should be the best. 
This principle is known as the Likelihood Principle.390 If it is true, we can get P(non-generated 
multiverse|FT) > P(God|FT) because we have P(FT|non-generated multiverse) > P(FT|God). 
In fact, Sober is adopting the “frequency-based objective interpretation” of probability. This interpretation 
is based on the experimental probability, which means we can only determine the probability by 
experimental data. For example, the probability of getting a “1” by throwing a fair dice is about 1/6 
should be based on experiments (throwing a dice one thousand times), but not from prior knowledge. 
Monton comments on this by stating that it is not necessary to stick to this interpretation. It is still 
reasonable for us to use the “subjectivist interpretation”.391 On the subjectivist interpretation of 
probability, one’s probability for a proposition represents one’s personal degree of belief that that 
proposition is true.392 Therefore, our personal degree of belief can still compare the prior probabilities 
among different hypotheses. However, this kind of interpretation would have difficulties if different 
people’s subjectivist probabilities differ a lot.  
Generally speaking, it is not necessary to determine the actual value of the prior probability by 
experimental data. In my argument, I follow Swinburne’s approach to compare the prior probabilities 
objectively based on simplicity and our knowledge. For example, we compare the number of things 
involved in different hypotheses, which can be determined objectively. Based on several objective 
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criteria, we can obtain P(God) > P(multiverse), though we do not have the exact value of the prior 
probabilities. For a scientific theory, we also do not have the exact value of its prior probability. 
Nevertheless, we can still compare different theories and choose the best one to account for the required 
observations. Modern science would break down if we just consider the Likelihood Principle. For 
example, in science history, a geocentric model with numerous deferents and epicycles can give a similar 
prediction power compared with a heliocentric model. However, scientists accept heliocentric model 
because it is a simpler and more elegant model to explain the motion of planets (especially for the 
retrograde motion of planets). If we just compare their likelihood functions, they would generate nearly 
the same results. However, the prior probability of a heliocentric model is much higher than the 
complicated geocentric model. This example illustrates the importance of the consideration of prior 
probability.   
 
7.2.2 Possible alternatives criticism 
In the previous chapter, we have considered mainly 4 hypotheses: chance-alone hypothesis, observational 
selection effect hypothesis, multiverse hypothesis and God hypothesis. In general, there may be many 
more alternative hypotheses that can address the fine-tuning phenomena. Suppose there are n hypotheses, 
T1, T2, …, Tn. Therefore we have 
𝑃(𝐹𝑇) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐹𝑇|𝑇𝑖)𝑃(𝑇𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 .                                                     (7.3) 
A hypothesis T1 is confirmed if and only if P(FT|T1) > P(FT). Therefore, the confirmation of the 
hypothesis T1 would satisfy 
𝑃(𝐹𝑇|𝑇1)[1 − 𝑃(𝑇1)] > ∑ 𝑃(𝐹𝑇|𝑇𝑖)𝑃(𝑇𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=2 .                                      (7.4) 
The above inequality means that we should consider all plausible alternative hypotheses before claiming a 
hypothesis is confirmed.393  
Theoretically the above argument is true. However, it proves too much. It is always possible that some 
unknown hypotheses exist. What we can do is to compare all the existing hypotheses. Just like in 
cosmology, it is possible to have numerous unknown possible models. Nevertheless, we confirm that the 
Hot Big Bang model is the standard model in cosmology nowadays. Therefore, before any new 
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hypothesis has been formulated, our conclusion is still valid. In other words, unknown hypotheses should 
not take part in any consideration. Otherwise, science is not possible because no scientific theory can be 
confirmed as it is in principle possible for us to construct infinitely many scientific models to account for 
an observation.  
Moreover, based on current knowledge, we can estimate the prior probability of getting other unknown 
alternatives. For example, it is known that there are four fundamental forces in the nature. Is there any 
fifth fundamental force? The probability of getting a fifth fundamental force is not large because we still 
don’t find any new particles that are related to the fifth fundamental force. Therefore, it is possible for us 
to estimate a probability that comprises all the unknown alternative theories. In view of the fine-tuning 
phenomena, we can show that the probability of getting a good alternative is not high. As mentioned 
before, we have discussed the most probable hypotheses based on the two main kinds of explanation in 
our experience (scientific explanation and personal explanation). For personal explanation, there are only 
limited choices of person who can transcend a universe and control a universe. The probability of having 
an alternative hypothesis for personal explanation is very low. For scientific explanation, we have 
discussed different types of explanations, such as single-universe scenario and multiverse scenario. We 
have also discussed the possibility of any law-like and random process that can explain the fine-tuning 
phenomena. Besides law-like and random processes, we do not have any other process to explain our 
natural world. Therefore, it seems that the considerations of the scientific explanations are nearly 
exhaustive. In other words, the probability of having an alternative scientific explanation is very low. In 
fact, the burden of proof should be on the critics’ side. Otherwise, as mentioned above, this kind of 
criticism can always be applied to all existing scientific theories, not only in the fine-tuning argument.  
 
7.2.3 Weak or strong confirmation? 
In the above argument, we conclude that P(God|FT) > P(NG multiverse|FT) and P(God|FT) > P(generated 
multiverse|FT). However, this conclusion is just a “Weak Confirmation. The “Weak Principle of 
Confirmation” states that if an observation O is more likely under hypothesis H1 than under hypothesis 
H2,…,Hn, then O counts as evidence in favour of accepting H1 over H2,…,Hn.394 It is equivalent to 
P(H1|O) > max{P(H2|O), P(H3|O), … P(Hn|O)}. However, this just provides some force in the 
confirmation. What we need should be a “Strong Confirmation”. The “Strong Principle of Confirmation” 
states that if an observation O is more likely under hypothesis H1 than under hypothesis H2, …, Hn, then 
                                                          
394 K. E. Himma, “Prior Probabilities and Confirmation Theory: A Problem with the Fine-Tuning Argument,” 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 51(2002): 175-194. 
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we are epistemically warranted in accepting H1 over H2,…, Hn.395 A “Strong Confirmation” is obtained if 
and only if 𝑃(𝐺𝑜𝑑|𝐹𝑇) > 𝑃(∼ 𝐺𝑜𝑑|𝐹𝑇) or 𝑃(𝐺𝑜𝑑|𝐹𝑇) >
1
2
. Can we draw a conclusion of the strong 
confirmation? 
Suppose there are only 4 possible hypotheses (God hypothesis, chance-alone hypothesis, generated 
multiverse hypothesis and non-generated (NG) multiverse hypothesis) to explain the fine-tuning 
phenomena.  Although we have P(God|FT) > P(generated multiverse|FT), P(God|FT) > P(NG 
multiverse|FT) and P(God|FT) > P(chance|FT), it does not entail 𝑃(𝐺𝑜𝑑|𝐹𝑇) >
𝑃(𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 ∪ 𝑁𝐺 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 ∪ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒|𝐹𝑇). If all the hypotheses are mutually 
exclusive, we have 𝑃(𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 ∪ 𝑁𝐺 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 ∪ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒|𝐹𝑇) =
𝑃(𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒|𝐹𝑇) + 𝑃(𝑁𝐺 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒|𝐹𝑇) + 𝑃(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒|𝐹𝑇) = 𝑃(~𝐺𝑜𝑑|𝐹𝑇). Although 
the three individual probabilities may be very small, the sum can be still greater than P(God|FT). The 
strong confirmation can be obtained if and only if we have 𝑃(𝐺𝑜𝑑|𝐹𝑇) > 𝑃(~𝐺𝑜𝑑|𝐹𝑇) =
𝑃(𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 ∪ 𝑁𝐺 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 ∪ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒|𝐹𝑇). 
Based on the confirmation principle, we can determine whether our conclusion is a strong confirmation or 
not. Assume all the hypotheses are mutually exclusive and let T1 = generated multiverse, T2 = non-
generated multiverse and T3 = chance. We have 𝑃(𝐺𝑜𝑑|𝐹𝑇) = 𝑆(𝐺𝑜𝑑, 𝐹𝑇)/𝑃(𝐹𝑇) and 𝑃(~𝐺𝑜𝑑|𝐹𝑇) =
𝑃(𝑇1|𝐹𝑇) + 𝑃(𝑇2|𝐹𝑇) + 𝑃(𝑇3|𝐹𝑇) = [𝑆(𝑇1, 𝐹𝑇) + 𝑆(𝑇2, 𝐹𝑇) + 𝑆(𝑇3, 𝐹𝑇)]/𝑃(𝐹𝑇). Since S(T3,FT) is 
nearly zero, we can safely neglect this term. By using Eq. (6.4), 𝑆(𝐺𝑜𝑑, 𝐹𝑇) > 𝑆(𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒, 𝐹𝑇) =
𝑆(𝑇1, 𝐹𝑇) + 𝑆(𝑇2, 𝐹𝑇), we get 𝑃(𝐺𝑜𝑑|𝐹𝑇) > 𝑃(~𝐺𝑜𝑑|𝐹𝑇), which means a strong confirmation is 
obtained. 
In the above analysis, we also assume that there is no other unknown naturalistic hypothesis which can 
explain the fine-tuning phenomena. As mentioned in the above section, this assumption can be justified 
because the probability of having an alternative unknown scientific explanation is very low. Therefore, 
our analysis provides a strong confirmation of the fine-tuning phenomena. 
 
7.2.4 Irrelevance of the fine-tuning evidence 
Himma suggests that if we have two theories T1 and T2 such that P(FT|T1) = P(FT|T2), i.e. both theories 
can equally explain the fine-tuning problem, we need to compare their prior probabilities P(T1) and 
P(T2). Therefore, the argument of fine-tuning now depends on the success of the other arguments 
                                                          
395 Ibid. 
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purporting to show that one of the theories is more likely to be true. The argument simply renders 
irrelevant the appearance of fine-tuning.396 As a result, we are epistemically warranted in accepting one 
hypothesis T1 over another T2 only when the prior probability of T1 is higher than T2. If it is true, what 
is the role of the fine-tuning evidence? The prior probability has already determined the result.  Himma 
also thinks that we lack an objectively reliable way to settle the disagreement between theists and atheists 
regarding the prior probabilities of the two hypotheses. Since we don’t know the prior probabilities, the 
“Strong Principle of Confirmation” is not valid.397  
I don’t agree with both arguments. Firstly, the prior probability is not really independent of the fine-
tuning phenomena. One can always create any hypothesis H to explain the fine-tuning phenomena. 
However, when you want to increase its explanatory power, what you need to do might be putting more 
variables or assumptions so that the hypothesis H can fit as much observational data as it can. Therefore, 
in order to raise the posterior probability P(FT|H), the drawback is to lower the prior probability P(H) 
because of the additional assumptions. For example, for the metaphysical multiverse hypothesis, you need 
to assume that each universe must have different sets of fundamental constants and initial conditions, 
which is a pure assumption. This would decrease the prior probability of the hypothesis. Therefore, the 
fine-tuning phenomena indirectly contribute to the prior probability. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Gil and Alfonseca perform a computer simulation and discover that if we want to provide a 
satisfactory explanation of the fine-tuning phenomena by using multiverse theory, the physical laws 
required are complicated and show certain time dependence.398 In other words, if we want to fit the 
observational data, we have to modify our hypothesis (usually add more assumptions or entities) and 
lower the prior probability.  
For the second argument, I agree that there is no consensus on whether God exists based on the arguments 
other than the fine-tuning evidence. It means that we can’t generally claim 𝑃(𝐺𝑜𝑑) > 𝑃(∼ 𝐺𝑜𝑑). 
However, in our context, P(God) is the prior probability of a particular God hypothesis that is used to 
explain the fine-tuning phenomena. As mentioned above, it is intrinsically related to the fine-tuning 
evidence. What I have done in the above section is to show that P(God) > P(multiverse), but not P(God) > 
𝑃(∼ 𝐺𝑜𝑑). In fact, we determine the posterior probabilities objectively, but not subjectively. Our 
conclusion is still correct no matter you are an atheist or a theist.  
                                                          
396 Ibid. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Francisco Gil and Manuel Alfonseca, “Fine Tuning Explained? Multiverses and Cellular Automata”, Journal of 
General Philosophy of Science 44(2013): 153-172. 
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7.3 Conclusion 
In the first part of this chapter, we have discussed the effect if the God hypothesis is compatible with the 
multiverse hypothesis. We have shown that if God would not create multiverse, and the existence of 
multiverse is unlikely based on observational evidence, the degree of confirmation of the God hypothesis 
would increase. It means that the disconfirmation of the multiverse from observations can be used as an 
indirect evidence to support the God hypothesis. Also we have encountered some criticisms on our fine-
tuning argument. Most of these criticisms appeal to skeptical views, which are not strong arguments to 
oppose our conclusion. We have already discussed and given responses to these criticisms. Instead, we 
show that the God hypothesis can give a strong confirmation to explain the fine-tuning phenomena. 
Therefore, based on the fine-tuning evidence, the theistic worldview is rationally preferable to the 
naturalistic worldview. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have first outlined all the fine-tuning evidence, including the existence of anthropic 
elements based on the fine-tuned fundamental constants (primary fine-tuning), the fine-tuned chemical 
and physical properties of some anthropic elements, the fine-tuned environment and initial conditions for 
life and the fine-tuned evolution process. These evidences suggest that the probability of the existence of 
intelligent human beings by chance is extremely small. Therefore, it requires an explanation of our 
existence. We have encountered several possible hypotheses, chance-alone hypothesis, observational 
selection effect hypothesis, theistic hypothesis, metaphysical multiverse hypothesis and the generated 
multiverse hypothesis. Among these hypotheses, we have to choose one which is the best explanation of 
the fine-tuning problem. The criterion of the best explanation, according to the confirmation theory, is to 
compare the posterior probability and the prior probability. The best hypothesis is the one if the product 
of the posterior probability and prior probability of the hypothesis is the largest.  
For the chance-alone hypothesis, although the prior probability P(chance) is not zero, the posterior 
probability P(FT|chance) is too low such that P(FT|chance)P(chance) ≈ 0. Therefore we get P(Chance|FT) 
≈ 0. For the super-law hypothesis, we argue that this kind of explanation can only push the problem to a 
more fundamental level because we have to seek an explanation to explain the fine-tuned super-law. In 
fact, the closest attempt of this explanation, the string theory, is not yet a standard theory. Therefore, it is 
not a good explanation of the fine-tuning phenomena. 
For the other explanations, such as the anthropic principle and the observational selection effect, we have 
already shown that the anthropic principle just shows the consistency between observations and theories, 
but not an explanation. Moreover, we argue that there is no difference in viewpoints from a “bystander” 
and an “observer”. Therefore, we do not have any observational selection effect when we are observing 
those fine-tuned constants and conditions. 
For the non-generated multiverse hypothesis, we assume that there are infinitely many possible constants 
and initial conditions without logical gap, it is very likely to have one universe such that it is life-
permitting. Therefore we have P(FT|NG multiverse) ≈ 1. However, we need a lot of assumptions, such as 
each universe has different fundamental constants and initial conditions, and it does not have any 
theoretical basis of its existence, the prior probability is very low, i.e. P(FT|NG multiverse)P(NG 
multiverse) is very low. For the generated multiverse, it is mainly extrapolated from unconfirmed 
theories, string theory and eternal inflation theory. This decreases the prior probability of the generated 
multiverse hypothesis before assessing the fine-tuning phenomena. Also, the number of possible sets of 
fundamental constants is finite and subject to the constraints in string theory. It is quite likely that the 
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generated fundamental constants do not fall into the anthropic region. Therefore, generally speaking, we 
conclude P(FT|generated multiverse)P(generated multiverse) is low. For the theistic hypothesis, based on 
the assumed properties of God – omnipotent, omniscience and perfectly good, it is very likely that God 
creates intelligent human beings. Therefore we have P(FT|God) ≈ 0.5. By considering some other 
evidence such as the Kalam cosmological argument, there is a possibility that God exists. By comparing 
the assumptions needed for theistic hypothesis, metaphysical multiverse hypothesis and generated 
multiverse hypothesis, the prior probability of theistic hypothesis is higher than the others (much fewer 
assumptions). Therefore, by using P(FT|God) ≈ 0.5, the product P(FT|God)P(God) is the largest compared 
with the other hypotheses. We conclude that the fine-tuning evidence supports the existence of God more 
than the other naturalistic hypotheses.  
Besides, we also discuss the compatibility of the God hypothesis with multiverse hypothesis. We show 
that a perfectly good God is unlikely to create humans through multiverse scenario. Since the current 
evidence disfavours the existence of multiverse, the incompatibility of the hypotheses indirectly supports 
the teleological argument. 
In addition, we have also discussed many criticisms of the arguments presented above. All these 
criticisms cannot disprove the above conclusion based on current knowledge about our natural world. 
Nevertheless, if one day there are some new observations which may affect the arguments presented, our 
conclusion can still be challenged.  
To conclude, after a comprehensive study of the fine-tuning arguments, the fine-tuning phenomena 
strongly support the theistic worldview.  
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